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1.6 The T. abaqāt “Curve” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.7 Geographical Coverage of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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D.1 Nisbas of the Wu↪↪āz. (537) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (20–670 ah/642–
1272 ce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
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Note on Dates, Maps and
Figures
Pre-modern Muslim authors use almost exclusively the Islamic lunar (or hijr̄ı)
calendar. Thus, the dates are given first according to the hijr̄ı calendar and
then in the Common Era (Gregorian calendar), separated by slash. In most
cases, when I use only years in dates (i.e., no months, no days), the year in
Common Era is automatically converted from the hijr̄ı year, using the simple
formula for years: ce = ah− ah
33
+622;2 the resulting number is then rounded,
thus giving the ce year that included the largest part of the ah year. For most
of our purposes this is precise enough dating. In cases when more precise dating
is necessary, I rely on online converters, such as the one at IslamiCity.com.
The use of color in figures and maps is crucial since it makes it possible
to visualize data more efficiently. Unfortunately, it is hardly possible for my
readers to reproduce colors on maps and figures the way they are supposed
to. For this reason I recommend perusing figures and maps in their electronic
format. Even when figures appear small in the printout or PDF, their digital
forms includes high-resolution images that can be enlarged and viewed in all
details.
2See, for example: Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The venture of Islam: conscience and
history in a world civilization. Vol. 1. The classical age of Islam., volume 1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1974a), 21.
xxiv
Note on Transliteration
I use three different transliteration systems, but each one is confined to spe-
cific sections. In the main text I use the standard transliteration system with
only one slight difference—I transliterate alif maqs. ūra as á. Because of tech-
nical issues I was not able to use either the standard transliteration system or
Arabic script in automatically generated graphs and maps: here I am using a
combination of simplified transliteration and a simplified Buckwalter translit-
eration scheme. The latter was developed by Tim Buckwalter in the 1990s
as a workaround to overcome numerous issues with the support of Arabic on
computers.3 This system is most commonly used by computational linguists
who work with Arabic texts converted into Latin script. Although the overall
situation with Arabic support has improved significantly over the past decade,
there are still some software packages that do not provide satisfactory support
for Arabic and, unfortunately for me, R turned out to be one of them. I mod-
ified the Buckwalter transliteration scheme in order to avoid complications
with special characters during computational analysis.
In order to make the graphs more user-friendly, I use a simplified translit-
eration that does not differentiate between short and long vowels, emphatic
and non-emphatic consonants. This is more readable than the Buckwalter
scheme, but occasionally insufficient. For example, in simplified transliteration
shah̄ıd is indistinguishable from shāhid—both will appear as shahid; Buck-
walter transliteration allows to keep the distinction: shah̄ıd becomes Ehyd,
and shāhid—EAhd.
All three transliteration schemes are given below: Al stands for “Arabic let-
ter;” St—“Standard Transliteration” (if different, simplified Transliteration is
given in parenthesis); Bw—“Simplified Buckwalter Transliteration Scheme.”
(In Simplified Buckwalter Scheme capital and small letters are treated as dif-
ferent symbols.)
3For more details: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buckwalter_transliteration.
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This dissertation is a project in the digital humanities. Over the past few years
“digital humanities” has become an extremely overused buzzword, and one of-
ten gets a feeling that, as a Russian saying goes, only the lazy do not speak
of themselves as digital humanists. For this reason, some clarifications are in
order. The digital humanities still remain a vaguely defined field4 and DH
studies range widely from theoretical inquiries into possible effects of tech-
nological developments on the humanities at large to the development and
application of digital methods to traditional sources. While the prevailing
majority of digital humanists prefer to contribute to the area of theoretical in-
quiries, this dissertation is primarily about studying traditional sources with
non-traditional methods.
The initial plan was to write a dissertation on the history of “public preach-
ing” (wa↪z.). My sociological background and my overall interest in Arabic
biographical literature, which was firmly instilled in me by my Russian men-
tor Professor Stanislav M. Prozorov, steered me toward the history of “public
4For an interesting attempt to define digital humanities, see: Anne Burdick et al.,
Digital Humanities (The MIT Press, November 2012), especially Chapter 4. Provocations:
A Short Guide to the Digital Humanities.
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preaching” through the analysis of biographical collections. In order to study
preachers as a social group it was necessary to study all their biographies.
Unfortunately, conventional close reading was of little help and a different
method was necessary. In order to understand how this social group fitted
into Islamic society, it was necessary to know what Islamic society was, i.e. it
was necessary to study all other biographies as well.5 Only this would allow
to place preachers into a wider context of Islamic society as it is represented
on the pages of biographical collections. This also required a different method.
Graduate students in our field often learn additional languages of the
Islamicate world in order to advance their research. In order to solve my
methodological issues I needed not a different language, but a different kind
of language—a language that would allow me to work with texts in a radically
different manner. It so happened that learning scripting languages—in my
case Python and R—was the answer. These formal languages indeed allow one
to read texts in a completely different way, no matter in what language and
how long they are. They enhance and augment our ability to read by allowing
us to work with practically unlimited volumes of text. They allowed me to
pull together almost 30,000 biographies from al-Dhahab̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām,
the largest biographical collection that became the backbone of my study, and
start studying them as a whole.
Since digital methods have not yet entered the domain of Islamic studies,
the first part of the dissertation offers a detailed explanation of “computational
5It is still hard to speak about the society at large, but I hope that methodologically I
was able to make a few steps in the right direction that would allow us to better understand
the Islamic élites that are described in biographical collections.
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reading” that has been developed over the past two years. This method is built
upon existing digital techniques and approaches that were picked from a variety
of disciplines and adapted to the analysis of Arabic biographical collections. I
fully realize that the reader may find the exposition of the method painfully
technical, but since the method is essential for the entire study and largely
unprecedented, its inner workings must be explained in sufficient detail. Most
importantly, I hope that this part will provide young scholars who are willing
to step into the still uncharted terrain of digital methods of textual analysis
with a desperately needed road map: something that I, to my own misfortune,
did not have.
The first part is also meant to be a step toward finding a viable approach
for studying the vast digital corpus of classical Islamic texts which keeps on
growing practically by the minute. If Islamicists do not find a way to deal with
this big issue, eventually someone else will. In this light it is worth drawing
attention to an experimental study conducted by a group of information sci-
entists. Published in an American academic journal,6 this “computer study of
the reliability of Arabic stories” attempts to evaluate the reliability of chains
of transmitters (isnāds) in Prophetic reports (had̄ıths) using contemporary
information reliability theories. Although these scientists are far from produc-
ing anything as appealing to reading public as, for example, Guns, Germs,
and Steel,7 there is no reasons to believe that our field will forever remain
immune to those who might want to follow in the footsteps of Jared Diamond,
6Ibrahim Bounhas et al., ‘Toward a computer study of the reliability of Arabic stories’,
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology , (2010).
7Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, 1st edition
(W. W. Norton & Company, July 2005), first published in 1999.
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a biologist-turn-historian.
The second part is on modeling. Extracted with digital methods, “big
data” still need to be re-ogranized in some coherent manner in order to be
useful for analysis. Modeling is a way to achieve this. As clearly defined
systems of assumptions about different kinds of data and their interrelations,
models are designed to provide explanations for complex processes.8 Thus, this
part models big data extracted from al-Dhahab̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām to further
our understanding of the social geography of the Islamic world and major
social transformations that the Muslim community underwent in the course of
its early history. Although largely a road map for further research, this part
provides an important chronological, geographical and social background for
the last part of the dissertation.
The third part is an application of the devised method to the study of
Islamic preaching. It focuses on an exploratory overview of all major forms
of Islamic preaching as featured on the electronic pages of my corpus that
covers about 700 years of Islamic history. Partially determined by the cur-
rent state of the development of computational reading, this part studies the
major forms of Islamic preaching from chronological, geographical and social
perspectives that have been largely overlooked in academic treatments of this
subject. The choice of establishing the overview, instead of trying to find an-
8For valuable examples of modeling “big data,” see: Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps,
Trees: Abstract Models for Literary History (Verso, 2007); Ian Morris, The measure of
civilization: how social development decides the fate of nations (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2013); also see http://orbis.stanford.edu/ for the geographical model of
the Roman world, developed by Walter Scheidel and Elijah Meeks. In the field of Islamic
studies: Richard W. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the medieval period: an essay in
quantitative history (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
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swers to particular historical questions, was deliberate. Working with big data
makes it abundantly clear that there are too many unknowns and that asking
specific questions without knowing what is and what is not in the data only
leads to wrong answers. At this stage, “exploratory analysis” is much more
crucial than specific inquiries. One of the major goals of this part is also to
demonstrate how exactly computational reading can contribute to the studies
of specific phenomena and practices in the pre-modern Islamic world.
The three parts of the dissertation build upon each other, but ultimately




1.1 Defining the Corpus
1.1.1 Evergrowing Corpora
[A] canon of two hundred novels, for instance, sounds very
large for nineteenth-century Britain . . . , but it is still less
than one per cent of the novels that were actually
published: twenty thousand, thirty, more, no one really
knows—and close reading won’t help here, a novel a day
every day of the year would take a century or so . . . And
it’s not even a matter of time, but of method: a field this
large cannot be understood by stitching together separate
bits of knowledge about individual cases, because it isn’t
a sum of individual cases: it’s a collective system, that
should be grasped as such, as a whole—and the graphs
that follow are one way to begin this.
Franco Moretti. Graphs, Maps, Trees. p.4
The availability of great volumes of information in our digital age has made
our life easier on the one hand, but on the other, it has made it incredibly
more difficult, since such abundance of information forces us into the stack
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Publications on the Islamic world
according to data from Brill’s INDEX ISLAMICUS
the number of publications practically doubled over
the past two decades (the number of published
books grew almost 4 times) if compared to
almost the entire preceding history of
Islamic studies as a discipline:
approximately 284,000 publications
(with about 47,000 books) for the period
of 1990-2009 against approximately
145,000 publications (with about
13,000 books) for the period
of 1900-1989.
Figure 1.1: Publications on the Islamic world. Source: the Index Islamicus hosted
at EBSCO, accessed via http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/, October,
2012.
overflow 1 mode—that is, we have to deal with much more information than
we can possibly process, let alone effectively analyze. According to Brill’s
Index Islamicus, the largest bibliographical database on the Islamic world,
the number of publications practically doubled over the past two decades (the
number of published books grew almost four times!) if compared to almost
the entire preceding history of Islamic studies as a field of scholarly inquiry:
approximately 284,000 publications (with about 47,000 books) for the period
of 1990–2009 against approximately 145,000 publications (with about 13,000
books) for the period of 1900–1989 (See Figure 1.1).
Developments in the digital world have affected the area of primary re-
1In programming, stack overflow is an error condition that occurs when there is no room
in the stack for a new item. Often, this will overwrite the adjacent memory locations causing
hard-to-trace bugs.
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search as well. Historians now have access to digital forms of primary sources:
scanned images of printed books, high-resolution images of manuscripts, fully-
searchable versions of these texts etc. The pace of different fields in this area
varies, but digital libraries of primary sources are now available for classi-
cal Greek, Latin, Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, and Chinese, as well as for early
forms of European languages, such as English, German, Italian, Old Church
Slavonic, etc.
The area of classical Arabic has undergone a very significant change: thou-
sands of primary sources have been scanned and uploaded to a great number
of websites all over the world. Among the largest resources of books in classi-
cal Arabic are: al-Maktaba al-waqfiyya (www.waqfeya.org), Multaqá
ahl al-h.ad̄ıth (www.ahlalhdeeth.com), the Internet Archive (www.
archive.org) and Wı̄k̄ı mas.dar (ar.wikisource.org); Hathi Trust (www.
hathitrust.org) offers a number of Arabic sources, which are no longer un-
der the copyright. More important, however, is the fact that a great number
of these texts have been converted into a fully-searchable format (henceforth
such texts will be referred to as eTexts).
1.1.2 The Classical Arabic Corpus
At the moment it is hardly possible to give even an approximate estimate
for the overall volume of the classical Arabic corpus,2 but we can get some
2For now I can say that in his voluminous Had̄ıyat al-↪ārif̄ın (“The Gift of the Knowl-
edgeable”), Ismā ↪̄ıl Bāshā al-Baghdād̄ı listed over 8,700 men of letters, who contributed to
the treasury of Islamic written culture up to the early 20th century. This means that
the total number of books should be at least twice as many. ↪Umar Rid. á Kah.h. āla’s
Mu↪jam al-mu↩allif̄ın (“The Dictionary of Authors”) includes almost twice as many records—
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glimpses by looking into the available digital libraries of classical Arabic texts.
While these libraries are huge, most of them suffer from strong ideological
bias and include mostly Sunn̄ı texts that have passed the Salaf̄ı test for or-
thodoxy. However, even this fraction of the entire classical Arabic legacy is
quite impressive. The commercially available software al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır
includes 2,400 titles (approximately 5,500 volumes) and adds up to almost
400 million words;3 another commercially available library, al-Mu↪jam al-
fiqh̄ı, includes over 1,100 titles.4 The largest online libraries of classical Ara-
bic texts surpass al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır and al-Mu↪jam al-fiqh̄ı combined:
as of September 2012, al-Maktaba al-shāmila included over 5,800 titles
(over 800 million words);5 al-Mishkāt—over 7,300; S.ayd al-fawā↩id—over
approximately 16,500—and covers a slightly longer period (up to the 1950s), but it suffers
from a number of issues. First of all, his work is surprisingly inconsistent and authors are
often described quite haphazardly. Second, ↪Umar Rid. á Kah.h. āla regularly uses anachro-
nistic descriptions, e.g., he often qualifies both Sunn̄ı and Sh̄ı↪̄ı jurists as usūl̄ı, while one
rarely finds this descriptor in pre-modern Sunn̄ı sources: e.g., 36 people in al-Dhahab̄ı’s
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (100–700 ah) vs. 314 in Mu↪jam al-mu↩allif̄ın (for the same period of 100–
700 ah); at the same time important affiliations mentioned in pre-modern sources are often
omitted (for example, many Sh̄ı ↪̄ı authors are not explicitly described as such). On the
other hand, ↪Umar Rid. á Kah.h. āla’s dictionary includes a significant number of non-Muslim
authors, something which Ismā ↪̄ıl Bāshā al-Baghdād̄ı’s dictionary seems to lack.
3al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır is the largest digital library offered by al-Turāth (Jordan), which
includes all the smaller libraries developed by this publisher; unfortunately, the program
shell is the paragon of poor programming—it is barely usable and the publisher does not
provide any customer support for their quite expensive product ($400). Earlier, thematic
libraries by al-Turāth are easier to work with, but they offer only very basic search and
browsing capabilities. Reviews/manuals for some of libraries by al-Turāth will soon be
available at www.alraqmiyyat.org (written by Michael Bonner, Stanislav Prozorov and
Maxim Romanov).
4al-Mu↪jam al-fiqh̄ı was developed in the city of Qom under the patronage of āyatullāh
al-Gulpāyagān̄ı and includes both Sunn̄ı and Sh̄ı ↪̄ı texts (some in Persian); the software shell
of this library is quite stable and offers better search capabilities.
5al-Maktaba al-shāmila is a free database shell with a decent user interface, which
allows one to add any text available on the website of al-Maktaba al-shāmila as well
as texts of suitable format from other resources; it seems to include all the texts from
al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır in addition to a large selection of texts, which were added by the
community of users. This library is a striking example of crowdsourcing, a process that
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Digital Library Media Titles Vols Words uTokens† 
al-Jāmi῾ al-kabīr HDD, Win.95 2,400 5,552 394,5 mln 0.524% 
al-Maktaba al-shamīla www.shamela.ws 5,869 no data 821,5 mln no data 
al-Mishkāt www.almeshkat.net 7,375 no data no data no data 
Ṣayd al-fawā᾿id www.saaid.net 10,159 no data no data no data 
al-Mu῾jam al-fiqhī †† DVD, Windows 1,131 3,000‡† no data no data 
al-Warrāq www.alwaraq.net 862 no data no data no data 
 
Figure 1.2: Major Digital Libraries of Classical Arabic. † uTokens show the number of
unique word forms in the library; †† al-Mu↪jam al-fiqh̄ı includes both Sunn̄ı and Sh̄ı ↪̄ı
texts; ‡† the number of volumes is approximate.
10,000;6 while the al-Warrāq Website, perhaps the first online library to
appear, had only 860 titles (Figure 1.2). It is important to stress that these
are the largest and perhaps most easily accessible digital libraries/collections
of texts in classical Arabic.
The contents of most of these these libraries seem rather similar and in
many cases they do re-use the exact same texts. Yet, the actual number of
classical Arabic titles is not easy to estimate for all of these libraries, since
they often include modern titles as well. As for al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır and al-
Maktaba al-shāmila, the contents of which I was able to analyze, they
have a very significant number of books written by authors who died before
1900 ce, with most of the titles distributed in the period between 800 ce and
involves the outsourcing of the task of database population to an undefined public. In the
human language this means that a great number of texts were added by enthusiasts known
to others largely by their online nicknames.
6al-Mishkāt and S.ayd al-fawā↩id, in fact, are nothing but repositories and do not
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Digitized Arabic Sources (by Titles). The graphs of both
libraries are strikingly similar, which strongly suggests that that al-Maktaba al-shāmila
has been built upon al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır. Additionally, two periods vividly stand out: 801—
1200 ce and 1201—1700 ce.
1700 ce: at least 2000 titles in al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır and 3200 in al-Maktaba
al-shāmila.7 Looking at the graph of titles from these two libraries one
cannot but notice two things (Figure 1.3). First, the graphs of both libraries
are strikingly similar, which strongly suggests that that al-Maktaba al-
shāmila has been built upon al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır (particularly, distribution
by 50 year periods). Second, two periods stand out vividly: 801—1200 ce and
1201—1700 ce.
The emphasis on these two periods does not necessarily characterize the
entire corpus of classical Arabic, but they do tell us about the contents of these
two libraries, especially if the creators consistently implemented their Salaf̄ı
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Digitized Arabic Sources (by Cumulative Lengths in Words).
While the number of titles is significantly larger for the earlier period (26% for al-Maktaba
al-shāmila, and 21% for al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır, see Fig. 1.3), the cumulative lengths are
significantly larger for the later period (27% for al-Maktaba al-shāmila, and 33% for
al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır), which reflects the more original nature of the earlier period and the
compilatory nature of the later one.
agenda and we are dealing with the same genres throughout the libraries.
Looking at the distribution of titles (Figure 1.3) in combination with the dis-
tribution of the cumulative lengths of these titles (Figure 1.4), one can see
that the number of titles is significantly larger for the earlier period, while the
cumulative lengths are significantly larger for the second period, suggesting
the more original nature of the earlier period and the compilatory nature of
the later one.8
8The cumulative lengths of the later period might also suffer from the isnād growth
effect, i.e. the lengths of later books grow since the chains of transmitters become longer
and longer. However, this affects only certain genres and only until the Sunn̄ı canon is firmly
established and the isnāds get replaced with simple references to the universally recognized
collections of Prophetic reports.
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Just to give an idea of how big these libraries are, one can compare them
with other digital libraries of books in various historical languages. For ex-
ample, the Perseus Project at Tufts University, the largest digital library
of classical texts in Greek and Latin, contains about 14 million words.9 For
comparison, the three largest books in al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır amount to 19 mil-
lion words.10 Of all other digital corpora of historical languages in general,
it seems that only the corpus of classical Chinese is comparable to that of
classical Arabic. Funded by the Hong Kong government, the Chant library
includes most of the pre-Qin and Han corpora amounting to about 60 million
characters (the library, however, is technologically antiquated). A Taiwanese
database at Academia Sinica has a selection of texts from all periods of Chi-
nese history, totaling about 150 million characters. The largest digital library
of Chinese texts is probably Siku Quanshu, the 18th century imperial library,
which contains about 800 million characters.11
Most electronic texts of classical Arabic sources are based on specific paper
editions and, by and large, the quality of electronic reproductions in them is
very high, with formatting, pagination and even typographical errors of the
9As of March 2011, the corpus contains 7.5 million words of Greek and 6.5 million words
of Latin. In all other aspects, however, the Perseus Project surpasses all digital resources
available to the scholars of the Islamic world.
10These texts are: Ta↩r̄ıkh mad̄ınat Dimashq of Ibn ↪Asākir (d. 571/1176 ce), which is
8.1 million words; ↪Umdat al-qār̄ı f̄ı sharh. S. ah. ı̄h. al-Bukhār̄ı of al-↪Ayn̄ı (d. 855/1452 ce),
which is 4.6 million words; and Tāj al-↪arūs of al-Zab̄ıd̄ı (d. 1205/1791 ce), which is 3.9
million words.
11I am deeply grateful to Donald Sturgeon, a PhD student at the University of Hong Kong,
for providing me with this information on Chinese digital libraries. Sturgeon develops his
own digital library of classical Chinese texts—the Chinese Text Project (www.ctext.
org). Although still relatively small in comparison to the above-listed giants, his web-library
of about 17 million characters is equipped with a variety of digital research tools, which will
make any Arabist green with envy.
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originals carefully preserved. It should be noted here that most of the editions
published in the Arab world are not critical (at least not in the rigorous sense
of European medievalists and classicists); however, they are widely used by
Western scholars of medieval Islam, if only because there are no other editions
available and most of the manuscripts are difficult of access.
Concluding this brief introduction with the notion of millions of words,
it is important to stress that in our digital age there is a desperate need for
new methods of text analysis. Equipped with only the traditional methods of
historical inquiry, we will not be able to make sense of this constantly growing
digital corpus of primary sources in classical Arabic. In this chapter I pro-
pose a method that relies on a number of digital techniques of text analysis
that have emerged at the intersection of statistics, corpus linguistics and com-
puter science. In doing so, I will focus on the genre directly relevant to my
research: traditional Islamic biographical collections. Although in its current
stage of development this method is most effective for the analysis of sources
that are composed of structurally similar blocks of information—collections of
Prophetic reports (sing. h. ad̄ıth), interpretations of the Qur↩ān (sing. tafs̄ır),
collections of legal decisions (sing. fatwá), chronicles (sing. ta↩r̄ıkh), etc.—and
can be adapted to the study of any kind of texts in any oriental or occidental
language.12
12The method has been presented at different stages of its development: in April 2012—
as “Digital History of the Muslim World: Computer-Aided Analysis of Biographical Dic-
tionaries,” at “Methods and means for digital analysis of ancient and medieval texts and
manuscripts,” at the Katholieke Universitet, Leuven & the Royal Flemish Academy of
Belgium (KVAB), Brussels (paper submitted for publication under title Maxim Romanov,
‘Writing Digital History of the pre-Modern Muslim World’, in: Methods and means for dig-
ital analysis of ancient and medieval texts and manuscripts, Proceedings of the Conference
(Leuven, 2012)); in August 2012—as “Mining pre-Modern Islamic Sources” at “Working
14
1.1.3 Biographical Collections
Biographical collections constitute one of the most prominent genres of pre-
modern Islamic literature. Paul Auchterlonie’s referencework—now outdated
and incomplete, but still extremely helpful—lists about 230 biographical col-
lections, published completely or partially up to the 1980s.13 The total num-
ber of titles in this genre is most likely somewhere between three and four
hundred. In addition to their numbers, one must definitely stress their size:
most biographical collections are multivolume, they usually cover rather long
periods—in most cases measured in centuries—and include from hundreds
to tens of thousands of biographical records. The text of the largest14 bio-
graphical collection—“The History of Islam” (Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām) of al-Dhahab̄ı
(d. 748/1348 ce)—takes up 50 volumes, covers 700 years of Islamic history
and includes over 30,000 biographies.15 The overall number of biographies
with Text in a Digital Age,” the summer institute at Tufts University, Medford, MA; in
October 2012—as “Writing the Digital History of the Premodern Muslim World, 670-1300
ce: Exploratory Analysis of Primary Sources” at the Interdisciplinary Workshop under the
rubric “Forum on Research in Medieval Studies” (FoRMS), at the University of Michigan;
in November 2012—as “Social History of the Muslim World in the Digital Age: Making
Sense of 29,000 Biographies from al-Dhahab̄ı’s History of Islam’ at the Middle East Studies
Association (MESA) Annual Meeting, Denver, CO (also, as a poster at Cyberinfrastructure
Days, at the University of Michigan).
13See, Paul Auchterlonie, Arabic biographical dictionaries: a summary guide and
bibliography (Durham [Durham]: Middle East Libraries Committee, 1987). In the late 70s,
Ibrahim Hafsi’s series of articles covered 225 titles of the t.abaqāt sub-genre of biographical
literature. The first one of the series is: Ibrahim Hafsi, ‘Recherches sur le genre ‘t.abaqāt’
dans la littérature arabe, I’, Arabica, 23 (1976), for the other two, see Bibliography. Data
from this study have been graphed in: R. Kevin Jaques, Authority, conflict, and the
transmission of diversity in medieval Islamic law (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 18, 20, 21.
14It is the largest in terms of coverage. The palm for being the longest belongs to Ibn
↪Asākir (d. 571/1176 ce) and his 70-volume Ta↩r̄ıkh mad̄ınat Dimashq (“The History of the
City of Damascus”), the longest book, with 8,100,000 words, in al-Jāmi↪ al-kab̄ır.
15al-Dhahab̄ı, Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāh̄ır wa-al-a↪lām, edited by ↪Umar
Tadmur̄ı, 2nd edition (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-↪Arab̄ı, 1990). The book is 50 volumes long
according to al-Dhahab̄ı’s own division; printed editions may vary.
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in these sources reaches hundreds of thousands.16 Some of these biographical
collections include only members of particular occupational or religious groups
(t.abaqāt—prosopographical dictionaries, in the strict sense), others cover spe-
cific locations and/or time periods (biographical dictionaries), yet others are
all-inclusive—at least they are imagined as such by their authors—and may
also cover historical events (“obituary chronicles”).
A great number of biographical records in these sources are rather short
notices—often just the name of a person with dates of his (seldom—her) life,
whether precise or approximate. However, even onomastic data alone pro-
vide historians with a lot of valuable information, due mainly to the part of a
Muslim name known as the nisba, “descriptive name.” In strict grammatical
terms, a nisba is an adjective formed from a noun by means of adding suffix
“̄ı” and thus denoting a relation to the noun from which it was formed, i.e.
Baghdād + ı̄ = Baghdād̄ı, meaning something or someone related to the city
of Baghdād. In historical terms, however, a nisba is not necessarily limited
to this particular morphological pattern, but is rather used for any word that
can meaningfully describe a person, including but not limited to such morpho-
logical patterns as fā↪il , fa ↪̄ıl , fa↪↪āl[a] , dhū shay[ayn] , mufa↪↪il , mufā↪il , etc.17
This is particularly true in the case of al-Sam↪ān̄ı who included them all into
16Over ninety years ago the Italian scholars Leone Caetani and Giuseppe Gabrieli collected
250,000 biographical references, see Fedwa Malti-Douglas and Geneviève Fourcade,
The treatment by computer of medieval Arabic biographical data: an introduction and guide
to the Onomasticum [i.e., Onomasticon] Arabicum (Paris: Editions du Centre national de
la recherche scientifique, 1976). My own biographical databank, which is still in the process
of preparation already includes over 86,000 biographies and biographical records (with only
24 biographical dictionaries processed). The cumulative number of biographies—as well as
of actual people described in these biographies—still remains a mystery.
17See, du Grandlaunay, R.-V.; Druel J.N., ‘Nisba,’ in EALL.
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MORPHOLOGICAL PATTERNS REGULAR EXPRESSIONS DISTRIBUTION 
nisba proper 91.1 4,065 ي]+ي-ء[لا% 
fa῾῾āl[a] 4.0 178 ?ة]ي-ء][ا[}2{]ي-ء[لا% 
fā῾il 1.2 52 }2{]ي-ء][ا][ي-ء[لا% 




fa῾īl 0.7 30 ]ي-ء][ي[}2{]ي-ء[لا% 
af῾al 0.5 24 }3{]ي-ء][أ[لا% 
“look-alikes” ]ي]+ي-ء 14 0.3% 
dhū shay᾿ 0.3 12 ?.* ذو% 
SOURCE: Kitāb al-ansāb of al-Sam῾ānī TOTAL:   4,463 100% 
	
Figure 1.5: Patterns of “Descriptive Names” in al-Sam↪ān̄ı’s Kitāb al-ansāb. Almost 10%
of “descriptive names” (398 of 4,465) in Kitāb al-ansāb are not nisba adjectives proper.
Regular expressions were used to collect these data from the list of al-Sam↪ān̄ı’s nisbas.
While regular expressions may look confusing at first, they are very similar to Arabic
morphological patterns and the Arabists should find them enjoyable. For example, the
regular expression for nisba proper denotes that a word must begin with the alif -lām
of the definite article followed by any number of any letters, but the last one must be
yā↩ nisbiyya; the regular expression for the fa↪↪āl[a] pattern denotes that a word must
begin with the alif -lām of the definite article followed by four letters where the third of
them is alif and this word may end with tā↩ marbūt.a; and so on. Based on these regular
expressions, the script was designed to “flag” words which fit more than one patterns, such
as qād. ı̄, that fits both nisba proper and the fā↪il pattern. This is where one must manually
finalize tagging (10-15% of 4,463). NB: regular expressions in this table are simplified
for readability and do not take into account different forms of alif and other minor spelling
variations. “Look-alikes” are words that “look like nisbas” (lahā s. ūrat al-nisba); usually
these are personal names: Khal̄ı, Mās̄ı, Wah. sh̄ı, etc.
his Kitāb al-ansāb (see Figure 1.5).
Let’s take a close look at one such name: Abū l-Faraj ↪Abd al-Rah.mān,
the son of (ibn) ↪Al̄ı, the son of (ibn) Muh.ammad, . . . , the son of (ibn) [so-
and-so], . . . , the son of (ibn) Muh. ammad, the son of (ibn) Ab̄ı Bakr al-S. idd̄ıq,
al-Jawz̄ı, al-Qurash̄ı, al-Taymı̄, al-Bakr̄ı, al-Baghdād̄ı, al-H. āfiz., al-Mufassir,
al-H. anbal̄ı, al-Wā↪iz., al-S. affār. This name includes nine meaningful “descrip-
tive names,” which tell us that this particular person belonged to the clan of
Taym (al-Taymı̄) of the tribe of Quraysh (al-Qurash̄ı) and was a descendant
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of Abū Bakr al-S. idd̄ıq (al-Bakr̄ı), the first of the four Rightly-guided caliphs
of the Islamic community; a native of Baghdād (al-Baghdād̄ı) and a jurist of
the H. anbal̄ı school of law (al-H. anbal̄ı); he distinguished himself as a knowl-
edgeable transmitter of Islamic tradition (al-H. āfiz.), an exegete of the Qur↩ān
(al-Mufassir) and a public preacher (al-Wā↪iz.); the last nisba (al-S. affār) also
tells us that he comes from a family that earned its living selling copper uten-
sils (nuh. ās).
18 Thus, the onomastic information alone is tantamount to the
social profile of a person. Studied as a whole, such social profiles have a ca-
pacity of transforming themselves into a unique looking glass through which
the historian can study different aspect of Islamic history which are otherwise
indiscernible. Additionally, such profiles form a unique body of data, which is
ideally suitable for different forms of sociological and spatial analyses.
People who became the subjects of these biographical records were not sim-
ple commoners. By and large, they were representatives of religious, admin-
istrative, military and literary élites. Nonetheless, the lives of these notables
often present so many details that studying them as a whole will also shed
light on the life of rank-and-file believers.
1.1.4 Building the Corpus
Although the digital corpus of classical Arabic has yet to be thoroughly stud-
ied, I will not be too far off the mark if I say that about 200 biographical
collections are now available as eTexts at different digital repositories. This is
18In addition, the number of ancestors mentioned in the name (each begins with “the son
of . . . ”), tends to be proportional to the fame of a person.
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quite a corpus, considering that most of these are multi-volume titles. To be
suitable for the digital method, which I am constantly developing, each and
every title must be collated with its paper sources and reformatted according
to certain rules. Although a valuable investment of time in the long run, it
becomes a very costly procedure when dozens of multi-volume sources have
to be reformatted.19 Moreover, my study is largely experimental and method-
ologically relies on a great many things that have nothing to do with Arabic
and Islamic studies in their classical form. I am learning the necessary digital
skills practically on the go and since I have no formal training in programming
my work tends to take rather unexpected detours,20 even though—to my own
surprise—I have succeeded in implementing a number of analytical tasks that
I initially did not expect to realize until after finishing my thesis. Lastly, the
constraints of time have pushed me to reduce my already prepared corpus of
about two dozen titles to a dozen. However, I am planning to expand my
corpus later on, incorporating all available titles.
Under these circumstances it was only logical to select sources that offer
the widest coverage: two large works of al-Dhahab̄ı (d. 748/1348 ce)—Ta↩r̄ıkh
al-islām21 and Siyar a↪lām al-nubalā↩22—that comprise the lion’s share of the
corpus, and eight biographical dictionaries of legal schools.
19For example, it took me over a month to collate and reformat al-Dhahab̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh
al-islām.
20Computational study of large corpora of texts requires one to internalize a very different
paradigm of thinking about texts and working with them, which is largely at odds with
the traditional humanities; for thoughtful advice from an accomplished DH scholar, see:
http://www.matthewjockers.net/2013/01/03/advice-for-dh-newbies/.
21The digital text is based on and collated with: al-Dhahab̄ı (1990), Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
22The digital text is based on and collated with: al-Dhahab̄ı, Siyar a↪lām al-nubalā↩,
edited by H. usayn al-Asad and Shu↪ayb al-Arna↩ūt. (Bayrūt: Mu↩assasat al-Risāla,
1992).
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al-Dhahab̄ı’s collections seem to be the best fit for my criteria: both cover
roughly 700 years of Islamic history and are not limited to any specific socio-
religious group. Their biographical coverage is also the most impressive: over
30,000 in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām and almost 6,000 in Siyar a↪lām al-nubalā↩. Ad-
ditionally, both are organized chronologically into “layers” (sing. t.abaqa) of
10 and 20 years respectively. For studying the longue durée I rely particu-
larly on Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, as the largest biographical collection. Although I
have considered other extensive collections, I have had to put them on the
back burner. For example, al-Wāf̄ı bi-l-wafayāt of al-S. afad̄ı (d. 764/1363 ce)
and Tahdh̄ıb al-tahdh̄ıb of Ibn H. ajar al-↪Asqalān̄ı (d. 852/1449 ce) are the
next largest biographical collections with a rather similar chronological and
geographical coverage, but their biography count is significantly lower—about
12,700 and 12,300 biographies respectively. The main issue, however, regards
their organization, as both are arranged alphabetically. This makes compu-
tational analysis significantly more complicated, even though I consider this
only a temporary setback.
The next largest collection, Shadharāt al-dhahab f̄ı akhbār man dhahab
of Ibn ↪Imād al-H. anbal̄ı (d. 1089/1678 ce) has similar geographical cover-
age. Although its chronological coverage is even more impressive—the entire
first millennium of Islamic history—its biography count is significantly smaller
with only about 8,500 entries. This collection is organized chronologically. Its
structure—both in its paper and digital version—posed some difficulties: many
biographies in the printed edition are “fused” together and neither discernible
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in the text nor included in the table of contents.23 This made reformatting
this collection particularly difficult and I had to put it aside for now as well.
Other collections are significantly smaller in either geographical or chronolog-
ical scope, or in biography count. The ultimate goal, however, is to include all
collections and analyze them together as one corpus.
The Siyar a↪lām al-nubalā↩ was selected to supplement Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām for
two main reasons. To begin with, the first three volumes of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām,
which cover the period up to the year 40/661 ce, differ structurally from
the rest of the collection and cannot be studied with the same computational
method; as for Siyar a↪lām al-nubalā↩, it has the same structure through all its
volumes. Second, the average length of biographies in Siyar a↪lām al-nubalā↩ is
significantly higher than in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, and thus providing more detailed
accounts for close reading.
Other sources that were selected are the biographical collections of the
four legal schools (sing. madhhab): H. anaf̄ıs (3 titles), Mālik̄ıs (2 collections),
Shāfi ↪̄ıs (3 collections) and H. anbal̄ıs (2 collections). The H. anaf̄ı collections
include al-Jawāhir al-mud. ı̄ya f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya of Ibn Ab̄ı-l-Wafā↩ (d. 775/
1374 ce), Tāj al-tarājim f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya of Ibn Qutlūbughā (d. 879/
1475 ce) and al-T. abaqāt al-san̄ıya f̄ı tarājim al-h. anaf̄ıya of al-Tamı̄mı̄ al-Dār̄ı
(d. 1010/1602 ce).
The Mālik̄ı collections include al-Dı̄bāj al-mudhahhab f̄ı ma↪rifat a↪yān
↪ulamā↩, al-madhhab of Ibn Farh. ūn (d. 799/1397 ce) and Tart̄ıb al-madārik
23With this in mind, the actual biography count must be higher than 8,500. The edition
discussed here is: Ibn al-↪Imād, Shadharāt al-dhahab f̄ı akhbār man dhahab, Dhakhā↩ir
al-turāth al-↪arab̄ı. (Bayrūt: al-Maktab al-tijār̄ı lil-t.ibā↪a wa-l-nashr wa-l-tawz̄ı↪, 1966).
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wa-taqr̄ıb al-masālik li-ma↪rifat a↪lām madhhab Mālik of al-Yah. sūb̄ı (d. 544/
1150 ce).
The Shāfi ↪̄ı collections include T. abaqāt al-fuqahā↩ al-shāfi ↪̄ıya of al-Shah-
razūr̄ı (d. 676/1278 ce), T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya al-kubrá of al-Subk̄ı (d. 771/
1370 ce) and T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya of Ibn Qād. ı̄ Shuhba (d. 851/1448 ce).
The H. anbal̄ı collections include T. abaqāt al-h. anābila of Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá (d.
526/1133 ce) and al-Dhayl ↪alá t.abaqāt al-h. anābila of Ibn Rajab (d. 795/
1393 ce).
This list of ten dictionaries is hardly exhaustive and is determined mainly
by what is currently available in digital format. Fortunately, these constitute
the major specimens of legal biographical literature. The chronological cover-
age of these legal collections usually begins with the lifetime of their found-
ing fathers—Abū H. an̄ıfa (d. 148/766 ce), Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/796 ce),
Muh. ammad al-Shāfi ↪̄ı (d. 204/820 ce) and Ibn H. anbal (d. 241/856 ce)—and
only in some cases goes significantly past 700/1301 ce. With the rise of the
madhhabs legal affiliations become perhaps the most prominent part of the
identity of the Islamic noteworthy, whether they actually were jurists or not.
Thus, if treated as a whole, biographical dictionaries of all four legal schools
should also offer the widest chronological and geographical coverage with a
significant cumulative biography count of over 9,000. In this regard they be-
come somewhat similar to Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām while counterbalancing it at the
same time. Most importantly, they will allow us to explore how legal schools
differed in terms of preaching institutions.
For different purposes of computational analysis I have also extensively
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used two classical references: the Mu↪jam al-buldān24 of Yāqūt al-H. amaw̄ı
(d. 626/1230 ce)25 and the Kitāb al-ansāb of al-Sam↪ān̄ı (d. 562/1167 ce).26
The first of these is a toponymic reference work, while the second is the stan-
dard reference for nisbas, “descriptive names.” In addition, these two works
also amount to biographical collections. Both dictionaries include thousands
of entries on their subjects—almost 4,500 nisbas27 in Kitāb al-ansāb and over
14,000 toponyms in Mu↪jam al-buldān—but in practically every entry the brief
explanation of the subject is followed by a list of individuals strongly associ-
ated with the descriptive name or place in question. Such a format makes
biographical information unsuitable for my computational method (at least in
its current form); yet, the data from these sources are indispensable for the
computational identification of nisbas and toponyms in biographical entries of
other collections.
1.1.4.1 On the Notion of T. abaqa
The term t.abaqa is often translated as “generation,” but every scholar familiar
with the genre of t.abaqāt is well aware that this notion is quite complicated. To
begin with, t.abaqas always overlap chronologically
28 and a person belonging
24The digital text is based on: Yāqūt al-H. amawı̄, Mu↪jam al-buldān (Bayrūt: Dār
al-fikr); collated with: Yāqūt al-H. amawı̄, Mu↪jam al-buldān (Bayrūt: Dār S. ādir, 1977).
25On him, see: Gilliot Cl., ‘Yāk. ūt al-Rūmı̄,’ in EI2.
26On him, see: Sellheim R., ‘al-Sam↪ān̄ı,’ in EI2.
27However, Sellheim in his article on al-Sam↪ān̄ı writes that Kitāb al-ansāb contains 5,348
entries, see: Sellheim R., ‘al-Sam↪ān̄ı,’ in EI2. I am not sure why there is such a dis-
crepancy. I have collated my digital text of Kitāb al-ansāb—based on the 5-volume Beirut
edition—with the 12-volume Cairo edition without discovering any discrepancies in nisbas.
Editions: al-Sam↪ān̄ı, al-Ansāb (Bayrūt: Dār al-fikr, 1998); al-Sam↪ān̄ı, al-Ansāb, 1st edi-
tion (al-Qāhira: Maktabat Ibn Taymı̄ya, 1984).
28Şentürk gives a nice visualization of overlapping t.abaqas in: Recep Şentürk, Nar-
rative social structure: anatomy of the Hadith transmission network, 610-1505 (Stanford,
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to an earlier “generation” can be significantly younger than someone from
the next “generation.” The word “layer” conveys more precisely what the
word t.abaqa means, but while “generation” conveys the general idea, however
remotely, the word “layer” would require too much additional explanation.
The word “cohort” might be a better way to translate the term t.abaqa—if it
is understood as a group of people with shared characteristics or experience.29
In the case of t.abaqa, this shared experience is a personal connection to the
key figure around whom the “layer” is organized.
T. abaqas seem to remain coherent and tangible as long as such key individu-
als are vividly present. The first such individual is, of course, the Prophet, and
the t.abaqas are his “companions” (s.ah. āba), who are divided into sub-classes
(sub-t.abaqas) depending on the length and thoroughness of their companion-
ship. The companions are replaced by the “followers” (tābi↪ūn), who are also
divided into sub-groups based on their superiority. After that t.abaqas are
numbered instead of named and tend to become more “chronological,” i.e.
determined more by the length of a time period rather than anything else. A
similar pattern can be seen in the biographical collections of the legal schools.
For example, Mālik b. Anas is the key figure of the Mālik̄ı school and the first
three t.abaqas are defined in terms of time spent with Mālik b. Anas: the “ma-
jor” t.abaqa (al-t.abaqa al-ūlá) are his closest companions, the “intermediate”
t.abaqa (al-t.abaqa al-wust.á)—those who were in touch with Mālik b. Anas by
virtue of being Medinans, and the “minor” t.abaqa (al-tabaqa al-s.ughrá) are
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 41.
29As a sociological term, “cohort” is as confusing and controversial as the term “genera-
tion;” see, e.g., Turner, Bryan S., editor, The Cambridge dictionary of sociology (Cam-
bridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 233–235.
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The first “cohort” is always noticeably larger than 
the second one. As the cohorts of the founding 
fathers, they are inflated and include significant 
numbers of individuals who were not necessarily the 
followers of a founding father in question, but still 
were a part of his life. In most cases such “extrane-
ous” individuals are insignificant as such—there is no 
biographical data on them; they do not make it to 
the later collections that are not confined to specific 
professional groups—but they are important because 
they had some story to tell about the founding 
father.
Figure 1.6: The T. abaqāt “Curve”
those who were of young age when Mālik b. Anas passed away. The t.abaqas
that follow these first three are simply numbered, beginning with “first” (al-
t.abaqa al-ūlá).
30 A similar pattern is discernible in the H. anbal̄ı sources where
the “layers” of the H. anbal̄ıs in the collection of Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá
31 are centered
30See: al-Yah. s.ub̄ı, al-Qād. ı̄ ↪Iyād. , Tart̄ıb al-madārik wa-taqr̄ıb al-masālik li-ma↪rifat
a↪lām madhhab Mālik (Bayrūt: Dār al-kutub al-↪ilmiyya, 1998).
31Abū al-H. usayn Muh.ammad ibn Muh.ammad Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá, T. abaqāt al-H. anābila,
edited by ↪Abd al-Rah.mān b. Sulaymān al ↪Uthaym̄ın ([Riyadh]: al-Mamlaka al-
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around Ibn H. anbal and the leaders of the H. anbal̄ı community in Baghdad;
Ibn Rajab’s continuation of this collection gives up on the notion of t.abaqa
altogether and arranges its biographies into periods of 50 and 100 years, yet
in its name it remains a t.abaqāt collection.
32
All “true”33 t.abaqāt collections in my corpus have a feature in common: the
first “cohort” is always noticeably larger than the second one (See, Figure 1.6).
As cohorts of founding fathers, they are inflated and include a significant num-
ber of individuals who interacted with a founding father in question. (This is
the precise meaning of al-t.abaqa al-wust.á in al-Yah. sūb̄ı’s collection.) There
are prominent examples of such “extraneous” individuals—al-Bukhār̄ı and al-
Shāfi ↪̄ı in Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá’s T. abaqāt al-h. anābila, and Ibn H. anbal in al-Subk̄ı’s
T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya al-kubrá—but in most cases these individuals are insignif-
icant as such: later authors do not find them important and they do not make
it into collections that are not confined to specific groups. Yet such individuals
remain important for the formative period, since they had some story to tell
about the founding father (Ibn H. anbal’s “layer” is particularly overinflated in
Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá’s collection).34 As time passes and groups become more settled
↪Arabiyya al-Sa↪ūdiyya, al-Amāna al-↪Āmma lil-Ih. tifāl bi-Murūr Mi↩āt ↪Ām ↪alá Ta↩s̄ıs al-
Mamlaka, 1999).
32 ↪Abd al-Rah.mān ibn Ah.mad Ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl ↪alā t.abaqāt al-h. anābila, edited
by Muh.ammad H. āmid F̄ıq̄ı ([Cairo]: Mat.ba↪at al-sunna al-Muh.ammad̄ıya, 1952).
33Not those that simply have the word t.abaqa in the title, but are actually organized by
“layers.”
34In her study of women in biographical collections Ruth Roded encountered a similar
phenomena: women figure most prominently in the “cohort” of the Prophet (s.ah. āba). 1,700
women in Ibn Sa↪d’s Kitāb al-t.abaqāt al-kubrá is an unparalleled number; afterward the
numbers of women in biographical collections drop drastically, to the extent that they are
totally excluded from what she refers to as “centenary dictionaries.” See: Ruth. Roded,
Women in Islamic biographical collections: from Ibn Sa’d to Who’s who (Boulder [Colo.]:
L. Rienner, 1994).
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in their ways, t.abaqas turn into rather arbitrary periods of time. If one ac-
cepts t.abaqāt collections as the major tool of group legitimization,
35 it may
be tempting to think that the importance of the t.abaqāt genre will diminish
as groups become institutionalized and acquire other means of legitimization.
However, while in general, there seems to be such a tendency, the issue has
yet to be thoroughly studied.36
1.1.5 Working with the Corpus
Although relying on a small clearly defined corpus may strike most humanists
as a deficient research strategy, it offers a number of significant advantages
that overweight all possible downsides, especially if the main goal is to trace
long-term and large-scale patterns of historical change.
One of my major methodological premises is that each source must be stud-
ies in its entirety. Arabic biographical collections are so vast and so numerous
that it is hardly a problem—especially now, with so many digital libraries of
classical Arabic sources within just a few clicks away—to collect enough exam-
ples to “convincingly” argue practically any point. Thus, I am limiting myself
to specific biographical collections, which allows me to ensure that all relevant
information is extracted in its entirety and that the proportions of different
35The point most convincingly argued in: Michael Cooperson, Classical Arabic biogra-
phy: the heirs of the prophets in the age of al-Ma↩mūn (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), Chapter 1.
36The data on the genre of t.abaqāt from Hafsi’s study (although without the differentiation
between “true” t.abaqāt and other forms of biographical collections of professional groups)
was graphed by Kevin Jaques (see: Jaques (2006), Authority , 18, 20, 21). These graphs
show that the rapid rise of the genre in the 9th-10th centuries ce is followed by a clearly
visible decline; the genre skyrockets in the 14th-15th centuries (new territories under Islamic
rule? New conditions?) only to return back to its falling curve in the following centuries.
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manifestations of the same phenomena—as well as of their absence—reflect
those of my primary sources, not something completely different. In order to
avoid skewed reading, I neither quote nor rely on sources that are not included
currently in my corpus: if I cannot analyze the source in its entirety, I do not
use it at all, even if I have worked with it in a conventional manner. The
use of complete texts allows me to create a fixed historical universe and to
look at how different data correlate with each other, which should help me
to determine the place of specific phenomena more precisely, without either
overstating or understating their role in history.
1.2 Defining the Data
1.2.1 Main Assumptions: al-Dhahab̄ı’s Cat
Over the past year I have constantly run into two opposite opinions. The first
is that al-Dhahab̄ı’s data are not reliable—specific reasons have varied—and
therefore cannot be treated the way I propose; the second is that, in general,
al-Dhahab̄ı’s data reflect historical reality—specific reservations have varied—
and that quantitative analysis is a suitable tool to study it. Although the sec-
ond was more common, both views are ultimately unprovable, so Schrödinger’s
cat paradox is as good a solution as any attempt to argue one way or the other.
The Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961) offered a thought ex-
periment in order to problematize the premises of quantum mechanics: a cat
is locked in a box with a vial of poison that may be released with a 50:50
chance, but until the box is open the cat can be thought of as simultaneously
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dead and alive. We are long way from having a thorough assessment of the
entire Arabic biographical tradition, so “our box” will remain closed for quite
a while, in which case I prefer to think of “our cat” as alive. Whatever happens





































¯—a more thorough understanding of Islamic bi-
ographical tradition.
Any model rests on assumptions with regard to its data. As strategic sim-
plifications, these assumptions allow models to work; moreover, they become
particularly necessary when one is dealing with enormous data sets. The ini-
tial data set from any Arabic biographical source may consist of thousands
or tens of thousands of data points, which, after various permutations, may
grow into hundreds of thousands, if not millions. (For example, about 29,000
initial biographical data points from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām run into over 700,000
secondary data points after generating all possible pairs for collocation analy-
sis.) On such a scale, nuanced discussions about the nature of each and every
data point are neither possible nor practical. For this reason I propose a series
of assumptions regarding primary sources and the types of data that I use in
my computational analysis (dates, toponyms, “descriptive names,” linguistic
patterns etc.). As my study of these sources continues and my corpus grows,
I hope that these assumptions will evolve into more substantiated premises.
For the sake of time and space, I will dwell only on one source—al-Dhahab̄ı’s
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Partially, this is because it is the largest collection in my
corpus; partially, because I am relying on it for my large-scale analysis; and
partially, because I have studied it more thoroughly than any other collection.
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The two biggest interrelated issues are the reliability and representativeness
of biographical data in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (and pre-modern biographical collec-
tions in general).37 Namely, to what extent al-Dhahab̄ı’s data are objective,
correct and unbiased; and, to what degree of fairness these data represent the
entire Islamic world during different periods of its development. The real an-
swer to both of these questions is that we really do not know, but let’s ponder
some of these issues.
We can think about reliability and representativeness in terms of: factual
errors—the facts given are wrong; biased representation—the authors deliber-
ately polished, blemished or omitted certain data; [under]representativeness—
the authors objectively had no access to specific sources. All three are most
likely to be applicable to each and every biographical collection, but this is
hardly a binary problem and each source should be evaluated with each of
these criteria, and measured according to its relative weight.
The assessment of single sources is highly problematic. First, because with
conventional methods it will be based on an arbitrary selection of data points;
and second, because there is no proper frame of reference to put the assessment
of a single source into a larger perspective. In other words, in order to properly
assess any collection we need new computational methods that will allow us
to assess each and every collection in its entirety, while evaluating it against
the entire corpus of biographical literature, whose exact volume still remains
unknown (digitized biographical collections that are heavily biased toward the
37There is also, of course, the over-arching objection that data from pre-modern sources
cannot be taken at face value at all. This premise, however, is based more on the method-
ological assumptions of the cultural approach to primary texts, where texts are treated as
representing discursive practices rather than historical reality.
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Salaf̄ı/Sunn̄ı side make up about 500 volumes).
1.2.1.1 Factual Errors
Undeniably, data in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām may suffer from factual errors (such
and such a person lived in Spain instead of, say, Transoxania, or died in a year
different from what al-Dhahab̄ı offers us, etc.). To be fair to al-Dhahab̄ı, he
did a lot of checking and added several hundred cross-referenced biographical
notes, often stating that according to so-and-so, such and such a man died
in such and such a year, but he himself—i.e., al-Dhahab̄ı—thinks differently
for such-and-such reasons and therefore places him into the proper decade,
to which he further refers his readers. It would be unreasonable to deny the
possibility of factual errors—at least due to scribal or clerical errors—but it is
hard to measure the extent to which these errors might affect all 50 volumes of
his “History.” Ideally, al-Dhahab̄ı’s data in all their entirety must be compared
with other collections.38 For now, however, my working assumption regarding
this issue is as follows: factual errors do not amount to a critical mass that
would skew the entire data set in any significant way.
1.2.1.2 Biased Representation
al-Dhahab̄ı may have been biased towards specific socio-religious groups. In
his extensive overview of the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, Joseph de Somogyi stated that
although biographies in this source are not limited to one specific group, “as
a matter of course, preference is given to the madhhab of adh-Dhahab̄ı, the
38Because of the complexity and length of this source, I am skeptical about sampling as
a method of assessment.
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Shāfi↪ites.”39 However, the Hungarian scholar did not offer any evidence to
support this view, and his “matter of course” appears to be nothing but the
assumption of a de facto affiliation—something that we all tend to do. My
research shows that al-Dhahab̄ı’s “History” indeed includes more biographies
of the jurists of the Shāfi ↪̄ı school than of any other legal school. Yet, whether
this means that he favored the Shāfi ↪̄ıs, or that [t]his legal school was indeed
most prominent during the period that he covered, remains a valid question.
Moreover, there are only slightly over 2000 individuals with explicit legal af-
filiations in his “History”—i.e., less than 7% of his entire collection!—which
problematizes the issue of his Shāfi ↪̄ı bias. De Somogyi’s statement becomes
even more problematic in the light of other scholars’ research. For example,
Kevin Jaques presents al-Dhahab̄ı as a staunch defender of Ibn Taymiyya,
the famous representative of the H. anbal̄ı madhhab, with a strong bias against
the jurists in general, but especially the Shāfi ↪̄ıs. Thus, al-Dhahab̄ı argued
that the jurists “were too fixated on arguing about speculative legal method
(us. ūl al-fiqh) to give adequate attention to the problems of the community
(umma).”40 Jaques’ evaluation is based on al-Dhahab̄ı’s own words as well as
the opinions of Tāq̄ı al-d̄ın al-Subk̄ı (d. 749/1349 ce) and al-Sakhāw̄ı (d. 902/
1497 ce)—both famous Shāfi ↪̄ı scholars and biographers41 (the former knew
al-Dhahab̄ı personally and was his friend).42
While this evaluation appears more convincing than that of de Somogyi, its
39Joseph de Somogyi, ‘The Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām of adh-Dhahab̄ı’, Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland , 4 (October 1932), 847.
40Jaques (2006), Authority , 4.
41Ibid.; also with reference to: Franz Rosenthal, A history of Muslim historiography
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952), 371-378; see footnotes for details.
42De Somogyi (1932), ‘The Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām of adh-Dhahab̄ı’, 821.
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implications are problematic. The extent to which al-Dhahab̄ı’s bias, accord-
ing to Tāq̄ı al-d̄ın al-Subk̄ı, “contaminated his historical analyses and limited
the usefulness of his work”43 remains an open issue. Did it affect only his
interpretation of certain events and his opinions of certain individuals, or did
it go as far as to deform basic facts in biographies (i.e., factual errors), such as
when and where a person lived and died and what he was in social, economical
and religious terms? If so, did his bias affect all his biographies or only biogra-
phies of the most prominent individuals (a very small percentage) whose ideas
and legacy are most likely to be contested and claimed from different camps?
And last but not least, to what extent can one be consistently biased while
putting together over 30,000 biographies in a 50-volume biographical collec-
tion? Again, these questions are difficult to answer, although looking into the
longest biographies in his collection—statistical “outliers”—may shed light on
each author’s bias, assuming that authors put more time and effort in compil-
ing biographies of individuals toward whom they had strong feelings—whether
positive, or negative.
1.2.1.3 [Under]representativeness
al-Dhahab̄ı’s data may be skewed due to his limited access to biographical data
on scholars of particular regions and periods. In his brief introduction,44 al-
Dhahab̄ı writes that he included biographies of “the noteworthy from among
(al-kibār min) caliphs, military commanders, reciters of the Qur↩ān, ascetics,
jurists, transmitters of h. ad̄ıth, men of learning, sult.āns, waz̄ırs, grammarians
43Jaques (2006), Authority , 4.
44TI, 1:11–16
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and poets.”45 He then provides a list of over 45 titles (mostly the classics of
Islamic historiography), only to conclude with the phrase “and many others.”46
For the sake of brevity, if such a phrase can be applied to a 50-volume history,
al-Dhahab̄ı busied himself primarily with the biographies of “the men of fame”
(mashhūrūn)—otherwise it would have been a 100-volume history (though I
would be glad if it did!). Finally, al-Dhahab̄ı admits that he did not have at his
disposal histories of a number of lands—either because they have never been
written, or because they never fell into his hands. Considering al-Dhahab̄ı’s
extensive bibliography, it seems reasonable to assume that if a certain province
“disappears” for some period and then “comes back” represented in great
detail, it reflects the fluctuating level of its integration into the core, which
has been constantly shifting. Again, whether this was al-Dhahab̄ı’s whim
to ignore some province for a while, or his inability to find relevant sources,
or whether it was due to actual historical change, is impossible to know for
certain.
We do not know how thoroughly al-Dhahab̄ı re-used his sources and how
many biographies from these sources he included in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (nor
do we know how thorough his sources were). However, we will be able to get
insights into this issue as soon as text re-use tools become more available.
Designed to trace similarities between multiple texts, these tools compare over-
lapping bi-grams47—“pairs of words”—and thus allow getting a very thorough
and clear idea of how much one author could have “borrowed” from another.
45TI, 1, 12.
46TI, 1, 12–16.
47Also named shingles with a reference to thin pieces of wood or another material which
are fixed in overlapping rows to cover a roof or wall.
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Several such tools are being developed by the classicists and the term “text
re-use” is of their coinage. At the recent conference organized by the Digi-
tal Classics Association (University at Buffalo, SUNY, April 5-6, 2013),
Marco Büchler (U. Leipzig) presented one such tool that should be available
shortly.48
On top of this, one can think of [under]representativeness issue in political,
social, religious, geographical and many other terms, but in order to address
this issue from any of these perspectives we, again, have to thoroughly study
the entire corpus of Islamic biographical literature. For now, I can offer a
glimpse into the geographical coverage of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
1.2.1.4 Geographical Coverage
Looking at the toponymic data (for now, only toponyms proper) we can get
some insight into how thorough al-Dhahab̄ı was in geographical terms. Fig-
ure 1.7 shows numbers of biographies that mention toponyms with frequencies
five and higher (≈ 340 toponyms). Urban centers are grouped into regions and
scaled down by a factor of four to forefront regions.49 Overall, geographical
coverage appears to be quite significant, although in order to appreciate the
scale we need to walk through several maps.
48A team of graduate students led by Neil Coffee at U. at Buffalo is developing a tool—
Tesserae Project—to explore inter-textual parallels in Greek and Latin poetry. Tesserae
Project is available online, see: http://tesserae.caset.buffalo.edu/.
49On the maps of this Section groupings are purely mathematical; more histori-
cally precise maps will follow. Calculations are based on the Euclidean distance for-
mula using latitude and longitude coordinates of cities and regions ((distanceci−re =√
(longci − longre)2 + (latci − latre)2); coordinates for regions are, of course, approximate.
In this manner, each urban center was grouped with the closest region, which led to some
minor discrepancies (for example, Basra was grouped with Khuzistan, instead of Iraq, to
which it historically belongs), but overall mathematical grouping is quite accurate.
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Figure 1.7: Geographical Coverage of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Semi-transparent red circles show
numbers of biographies that mention toponyms belonging to these regions; black circles
show numbers of biographies that mention specific urban centers. Sizes of black circles
were reduced by a factor of 4 in order to make regions more visible. Regions roughly
correspond with major Islamic provinces, but grouping of urban centers into regions is
purely mathematical; more historically accurate maps will follow in the next part.
If we take a look at any historical map of the Islamic world, the geographical
coverage in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām does not appear very impressive. However, most
(all?) historical maps—including those from highly respected and very recent
publications—are problematic. For example, a rather conventional map of the
↪Abbāsid caliphate on Figure 1.8 suggests the continuity of populated regions,
which makes it confusing to those not familiar with the field and, frankly, not as
helpful to specialists as it could be. Trying to make sense of the maps discussed
above I was concerned to find a map that would show how the Middle East
was—or could have been—populated. What follows is my attempt to produce
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5. The qAbbasid empire in c. 800
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2011
The ῾Abbāsid empire in c. 800
Source: The New Cambridge
History of Islam
(Vol. I, p. xxxi)
Figure 1.8: Conventional Map of the ↪Abbāsid Empire.
useful.50
Since we do not have sufficient data for the pre-modern period, we may
experiment with contemporary geographical information. The National Geo-
spatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA) offers a constantly updated database
of geographical and geopolitical entities of all kinds—about 8.8 million as of
November 5, 2012.51 Their data on administrative units—settlements of all
levels—are extremely detailed. Using these data one can generate a map of
the modern inhabited world, which we can use as a starting point to think
about the Islamicate oikoumenē.
Figure 1.9 should illustrate how these data can be helpful. Each adminis-
50The ongoing project, Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients (TAVO) offers a
number of valuable maps, but they are impossible to incorporate effectively in digital re-
search. See: Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1977a); Tübinger
Atlas des Vorderen Orients (Berlin: Kai-Henning Gerlach, 2005b).








Figure 1.9: The Inhabited World: Using GIS data, one can build a map of the inhabited
areas. The map on the left shows how settlements shape the Nile Delta, the valley of the
Nile river, the Fayyūm Oasis, and, to a certain extent, the Suez canal; the darkest cluster
represents the Cairo metropolitan area.
trative unit—a settlement—is a point on the map: villages are simple objects
presented with single dots, while cities are complex objects composed of mul-
tiple dots forming dense clusters. The higher the density of settlements, the
darker the area on the map. On the left part of the sample map one can
clearly see how settlements shape the Nile Delta, the valley of the Nile river,
the Fayyūm Oasis, and, to a certain extent, the Suez canal; the darkest clus-
ter represents the Cairo metropolitan area. Overall, maps based on data from
NGIA show us areas of Earth that are currently inhabited, strongly implying
the boundaries of arable regions (with white areas corresponding to regions
unsuitable for agriculture). Projecting such maps back in time, we can think
of them as showing “inhabitable Earth”—the utmost limits of what people
could populate in the past. Keeping in mind that a number of modern areas
have been settled due to modern technological advancements, the extent of
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Figure 1.10: The Modern Inhabited World and Geographical Coverage of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
the inhabited pre-modern world can only have been smaller. Exactly how,
however, is a different question and historical projections for any area must be
informed by relevant historical data.
Figure 1.10 shows the map of the entire region that includes three layers
of data. The first layer (green) shows the data on settlements from NGIA.
The second one (dark green) shows modern highly populated urban areas.52
Thus, with these two layers we get a more precise map of the modern inhabited
world, with major cities quite easy to spot. The third layer shows data from the
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām—regions (semi-transparent red) and urban centers (black).
52The density of modern population is also vividly represented by the satellite im-
ages of Earth at night, see the NASA project “Earth’s City Lights” at http://
visibleearth.nasa.gov/; also see John Weiber’s “Bright Lights, Big Cities” at http:
//earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Lights/. These satellite images vividly repre-
sent densely populated areas that consume enormous amounts of energy. Such visualizations
work well for the representation of urban areas, but not for their rural counterparts. How-
ever, they complement each other very well. NASA satellite images served me as a source
of inspiration for creating the maps included into this section.
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With these three layers combined, Figure 1.10 shows that the geographical
coverage in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām corresponds to major populated regions with a
rather clear emphasis on regions with intensive agriculture—Lower and Upper
Mesopotamia (al-↪Irāq and al-Jaz̄ıra), north-eastern Iran (Khurāsān), Syria
(al-Shām), Egypt (Mis.r), Spain (al-Andalus) and north-western Africa (al-
Maghrib al-aqs.á).
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1.2.2 Data Types for Computational Analysis
1.2.2.1 Dates
The dates constitute perhaps the least problematic category of data. Undeni-
ably, there are errors here and there, but by and large scholars consider them
to be acceptably correct. Although again, we do not really know the scale of
factual errors for this kind of data. The main type of dates is death dates,
mainly since this is the most consistent kind of chronological data that bio-
graphical collections offer in general. Death dates require some adjustment,
since “the years of floruit” would correlate more closely with historical devel-
53The map of settlements corresponds very closely with the most recent maps of land suit-
ability for agriculture, see: Stelios Michalopoulos, Alireza Naghavi and Giovanni
Prarolo, ‘Trade and Geography in the Origins and Spread of Islam’, Working Paper 18438
(National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2012), 13, Stelios Michalopoulos,
‘The Origins of Ethnolinguistic Diversity’, American Economic Review , 102:4 (June 2012),
1513; the map is based on data assembles at the Center of Sustainability and the Global En-
vironment (SAGE) University of Wisconsin, see: Navin Ramankutty et al., ‘The Global
Distribution of Cultivable Lands: Current Patterns and Sensitivity to Possible Climate
Change’, Global Ecology and Biogeography , 11:5 (September 2002); interactive visualizations
based on the SAGE data sets can also be found online at http://www.earthstat.org/.
Also see: Andrew M. Watson, Agricultural innovation in the early Islamic world: the
diffusion of crops and farming techniques, 700-1100 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); although Watson does not have a unified map of
agricultural lands, his maps of specific crops strongly suggest the same picture. Also, see
the ongoing edition of (1977a)Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients.
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opments. In his model, Bulliet used the “twenty-five-year setback. . . to change
known death dates into approximate ‘prime of life’ dates.”54 Biographical data
in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām are already pre-grouped into ten-lunar-year periods. I
further regroup these data into 20 lunar year periods and then adjust death
dates by the period of 30 lunar years (back in time) to get to “the years of
floruit.”55
1.2.2.2 Toponymic Data
My main assumption regarding toponyms56 is that if they are mentioned in
a biography, this implies a connection of a protagonist to those places. At
the moment I cannot determine computationally the nature of connections
to specific places, i.e. whether a protagonist of a given biography was born
there, lived there for a prolonged time, visited it shortly or simply maintained
correspondence with someone who lived there. For now I consider the very
fact of connection more important than its exact nature. I act on the premise
that even if a protagonist simply exchanged letters with someone from place
X, it is a stronger connection to place X than no connection at all. Random
connections—i.e. those that would not form discernible patterns—are rendered
almost invisible by the analytical methods that I employ.
Identifying toponyms and toponymic nisbas is a complicated task, although
the problem is not so much in the identification of toponyms and toponymic
54See, Bulliet (1979), Conversion to Islam in the medieval period: an essay in quanti-
tative history , 11.
55For some specific purposes I group biographical data into periods of different lengths,
particularly in cases where data points become scarce, or when presenting data by 50-year
periods seems more convenient. Such groups are also adjusted by a 30 lunar year setback.
56On toponymic nisbas, see Section 1.2.2.3 below.
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nisbas,57 as in the disambiguation of instances when the same toponym or
nisba may refer to more than one entity.58 Luckily for us, this was as much
of a problem for the Arab historians then as it is for us now. Often they
would clarify the point to make sure that their readers knew exactly what
they meant. We can use this additional information to resolve ambiguity with
the algorithmic analysis of collocations.
For example, T. arābulus may refer to Tripoli in North Africa or to Tripoli in
Greater Syria. Occasionally Arab historians would refer to them as T. arābulus
al-gharb, i.e. Western Tripoli, and T. arābulus al-sharq, i.e. Eastern Tripoli.
Unfortunately, this is not always the case; yet the authors always leave us a few
crumbs to help us. We can look into what other toponyms and/or toponymic
nisbas co-occur in the same biography and use these data for disambiguation.
For example, if in a biography where Tripoli is mentioned we come across
Ifriqiya, but not al-Shām (Greater Syria), there is a high probability that the
reference is to Western Tripoli.
A temporary shortcut solution—a simpler, less robust one—may be to
exclude ambiguous nisbas and toponyms, until the above described algorithm
can be applied, and to rely only on the disambiguating data, especially since at
the moment I am going to talk mostly on the level of provinces. Accordingly,
here the reference to Ifriqiya or al-Shām would be more than enough.
57This can be done heuristically with toponymic n-grams (see, Figure 1.18) and regular
expression for nisba adjectives (see, Figure 1.5).
58In literary analysis one of the most common problems is disambiguating names of char-
acters and common words, such as, for example, Hope which can be the name of a character
and a notion.
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1.2.2.3 Nisbas, or Descriptive Names
One of the most serious methodological questions is how to interpret nisbas:
How can we be sure that someone named, say, al-S. affār was indeed a cop-
persmith? The answer to this question—or more precisely, the very question
itself—depends entirely on the primary research questions. As was stated
in the beginning, the main focus of this study is the institution of Islamic
preaching, and, more broadly, social institutions and social groups in general.
In Braudelian terms, we must look into “a social time,” not “an individual
time.” Dealing with “a history of gentle rhythms, of groups and groupings,”59
one shifts the focus from unique and rare characteristics to those that are
frequent enough to form patterns. So, if we expand on our al-S. affār exam-
ple, the question relevant to the goals of this study should be as follows: Is
the person named al-S. affār the only coppersmith in a specific region during
a specific period? If the answer is “yes,” this particular part of his identity
becomes irrelevant, since a lonely coppersmith is hardly going to represent
a significant social pattern. If the answer is “no,” and we indeed discover
a significant group of coppersmiths who might also share other “descriptive
names,” then this becomes both relevant and interesting. At the same time,
whether a specific person within a group of individuals identified as copper-
smiths was actually a coppersmith, or, in fact, a son—or even a grandson—of
a coppersmith, becomes less relevant. What is important is that we have
discovered a group of individuals who considered their affiliation with “cop-
59Fernand Braudel, On history, Écrits sur l’histoire. English (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980), 4.
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persmithing” significant enough to preserve it in their names. Whether they
used this name self-consciously, or if this is how they were seen by others—for
whatever reason—is a different question, but ultimately irrelevant.
My rationale regarding geographical affiliations is quite similar. As long
as, say, Naysābūr̄ıs—even though some of them are born and raised in a
city other than Nishapur—are seen by the people of that different city as
Naysābūr̄ıs, they effectively remain Naysābūr̄ıs. Most likely, such an associa-
tion will not last long, unless there remains some tangible cohesion within this
group, whether it is self-conscious or imposed from outside. Again, the most
important fact that the social historian can infer from the existence of such a
group of migrants is that during a specific period the city of Nishapur provided
conditions—economic, religious, political etc.—that gave rise to a group that
became strongly identified with this city. Of course, when we discover such
groups we need to make sure that we understand the nature of their affiliation.
One potential problem, however, is that some nisbas have multiple mean-
ings (al-H. anaf̄ı as a “tribal” nisba, and as a legal one) or may have changed
their meaning over time (e.g., al-Suhraward̄ı as a toponymic nisba, and as a
religious one).60 At the moment I do not have a satisfactory algorithm to deal
with such nisbas, although it seems that a new meaning replaces the old one
when the latter loses its relevance; fortunately, such complexities do not seem
60al-Suhraward̄ı that may refer to the town of Suhraward, or to the Suhrawardiyya, a S. ūf̄ı
brotherhood that takes its origin from Abū H. afs. ↪Umar al-Suhraward̄ı (d. 632/1235 ce), a
Baghdād̄ı shaykh whose family came from the town of Suhraward. The nisba al-Suhraward̄ı
is quite rare in general. There are only 24 individuals in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām—with 19 after
575/1180 ce, most likely describing the affiliation with the Suhrawardiyya. It seems that
insignificance of Suhraward as a geographical entity allowed for such transformation of
meaning: this town is mentioned 5 times in the entire Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām; it no longer exists
and its exact location is unknown. See, Plessner M., ‘Suhraward,’ in EI2.
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to be frequent.
Individuals with complex geographical affiliations constitute a special case
and they should be treated differently. It is not uncommon to run into a de-
scription of a person such as, for example, al-Naysābūr̄ı l-mawlid al-Baghdād̄ı
l-manzil , i.e. “al-Naysābūr̄ı by birth and al-Baghdād̄ı by residence;” in most
cases, however, one does not find any clarifying details, facing only the list of
toponymic nisbas.61 Such individuals—like those among us who hold multi-
ple citizenship—could be treated as belonging to all the localities denoted in
their descriptive names; again, on the social level the very fact of affiliation is
significantly more important than the exact nature of each affiliation. At the
same time, on the maps such individuals must be visualized differently.
How we can distinguish the meaning of nisbas in specific cases is yet another
issue. For example, how can we know whether khat.ı̄b is an honorific nickname
or a religious profession? This is yet another question difficult to answer
decisively, so my general principle is as follows: when periods feature only
single individuals with such nisbas, they are most likely used as honorific
titles; when, on the other hand, one sees a clearly discernible growth in the
numbers of such nisbas, they are most likely used as professional markers.
This does not mean that there would not be any honorific titles in the second
case; what is important, however, is that their numbers should remain too
insignificant to have any visible effect on the “professional” curve (on curves
see, Section 1.2.4). It should be noted that honorific titles are meant to single
61The order in which nisbas are given might have some implications of their meaning, but
at the moment I am not sure if the word order may be used as an abstract principle equally
applicable to all biographical collections.
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out individuals from the masses and applying the same honorific to dozens
if not hundreds of individuals does not seem an effective way of doing this,
especially if we keep in mind that Muslims never lacked inventiveness when it
came to giving out each other [dis]honorific nicknames.62
1.2.2.4 Linguistic Formulae, Wording Patterns
Whether we read sources closely or distantly, we identify a thing as something
specific only if it is named, described or referred to as such. Allusions that
do not occur elsewhere pointing to the same object—and thus not forming a
recognizable wording pattern—cannot be considered as identifiers. In other
words, no matter how we read our sources, we use specific words or phrases
as identifiers of specific objects.
From changes in wording patterns we can infer long-term patterns of a
different kind. The issue with such an approach is how we can know that
authors did not introduce anachronistic wording into biographical accounts
that they included into their collections. This is another question that is
difficult to answer decisively and at the moment I do not have an answer
to this question based on any quantifiable data. But since nobody else has
this kind of data, I can introduce yet another methodological assumption that
will have to be verified later through a massive comparison of all available
biographical collections.
All sources in the corpus are massive compilations. In Bulliet’s classifica-
62The most well-known examples are the names of famous poets and litterateurs, such as
Ta↩abbat.a Sharrā, al-Jāh. iz., al-Mutanabbi↩; the Kitāb al-ansāb of al-Sam↪ān̄ı is also full of
examples of idiosyncratic, often “politically incorrect” nisbas.
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tion they belong to the category of “tertiary collections”—large-scale compi-
lation projects that are based on earlier collections of various kinds.63 When
compiling such massive collections, authors tend to “stitch” things together
from texts that they have at their disposal. They often copy sections of bi-
ographies verbatim, rather than paraphrasing them, in most cases using a
specific title as their main source and supplementing it with information from
other ones that either corroborate the data from the main source or provide
some clarifying or contradicting details. Any scholar who has worked with
biographical collections had the experience of discovering biographies of the
same person in later sources that re-use sections from earlier sources with
no—or almost no—changes; even when changes are made, they can often be
characterized as omissions or inclusions, but not paraphrasing. “Copying” in-
stead of “paraphrasing” can also be considered plausible for two other reasons.
First, Islamic society is traditional in the sense that even an original thought
63In his comments to the earlier version of this chapter Professor Bulliet offered the
following classification of biographical collections (based on personal correspondence with
Richard Bulliet): Primary collections are the individual notes on teachers taken by h. ad̄ıth
scholars during the course of their studies. Secondary collections—when scholars died their
h. ad̄ıth manuscripts and their teacher notices became useless, as do our own college lecture
notes which we tend to lug around uselessly throughout our careers. These materials ended
up with the decedent’s family and were often deposited in mosque or madrasa libraries. At
some point, an ambitious local scholar would decide to go through such collections, collate
them, and list all of the shuyūkh found therein in alphabetical order. Tertiary collections—
these draw selectively on the secondary collections and filter them in some way, such as by
madhhab or death date. This also would include the chronicles that are heavily weighted
with obituaries. While some obituaries are doubtless written from first-hand knowledge,
it is clear that many are drawn from other collections and selected because of the date of
death. When no date of death is mentioned, as is often the case in primary and secondary
collections, those biographies do not make it into the annalistic collections. Quaternary
collections—Ibn Khallikān’s Wafayāt al-a↪yān is a good example here, but also included
are many of the tadhkira collections of S. ūf̄ıs and poets. These have strong authorial input,
consistent style, and fairly clear literary purpose. Unlike the first three categories, these fit
well into the category of adab.
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is often stitched from the words of earlier authorities, ideally universally ac-
cepted ones. Second, from the standpoint of sheer economy of labor, “copying”
would be more preferable as the less labor-intensive process; keeping in mind
the amount of work that the authors of these collections had to put in, copying
with omissions and inclusions, and occasionally supplemented by the author’s
own comments64 seems the most effective writing strategy. Hence my other
methodological assumption: the prevailing majority of biographies in “ter-
tiary” collections preserve the wording of original collections, thus retaining
linguistic formulae characteristic of specific time periods and regions. At the
moment this proposition is based on a small number of linguistic formulae,
and the fact that they are not haphazardly scattered over the entire Ta↩r̄ıkh
al-islām suggests consistent text re-use.
1.2.3 WordNets and Synsets
Closely related to the linguistic formulae and wording patterns is the concept
of WordNet. Originally, WordNet was a large lexical database of English—
a project that George A. Miller began at Princeton University in the mid-
1980s.65 In this lexical database, words—nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs—
are grouped into sets of cognitive synonyms that express distinct concepts. In-
terlinked by means of conceptual-semantic and lexical relations, these synsets
are a useful tool for computational linguistics and natural language processing
(NLP). Most importantly, these synsets allow for conducting complex inquiries
64Such comments are also often stitched together. For example, wa-qāla al-Khat.ı̄b al-
Baghdād̄ı thiqa, “al-Khat.̄ıb al-Baghdād̄ı said: trustworthy.”
65For more details, see: http://wordnet.princeton.edu/.
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into vast corpora. For example, if one is interested in finding all the relevant
data on, say, Iraq, it will be more efficient to use a toponymic synset that
includes all major places in Iraq and takes into account their nicknames and
alternative spellings.
The WordNet has become an indispensable tool for linguists and a number
of WordNets have been created for different languages over the years. Un-
fortunately, although quite unsurprisingly, there is no WordNet for classical
Arabic.66 Nonetheless, I do employ the main WordNet principle to inquire into
specific issues. For example, I rely on hierarchical lists of toponyms, where
satellite villages and city quarters are linked with their urban centers, while
urban centers are further connected with the provinces that they belong to. In
a similar manner, nisbas are organized into categories—e.g., tribal, toponymic,
occupational etc.—that branch into sub-categories (e.g., textile “industry” oc-
cupations, food “industry” occupations, etc.); toponymic nisbas are integrated
into the main toponymic hierarchy. My WordNet is still in its draft state, but
it does allow for designing of complex inquiries, which are inconceivable other-
wise: with these hierarchical synsets one can zoom out to the provincial level
of spatial analysis; or, trace not just specific nisbas, but the entire categories.
Additionally, I create and use synsets for specific purposes: for example, I
use a synset of terms related to preaching to ensure that the data on preach-
ing are carefully collected from my corpus;67 or a synset of family terms that
66A WordNet for modern standard Arabic is available: http://www.globalwordnet.org/
AWN/.
67Each source has been thoroughly searched with a script for all possible derivatives of
roots kh-t.-b, w-↪-z. , dh-k-r , d-↪-w and q-s.-s. and also for the forms of the word minbar . In the
process, the script has been continuously adjusted to ignore “false positives,” phrases that
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allows us to trace how the role of family ties, or households, changed over time.
1.2.4 Curves, not Numbers
In conclusion, I must make explicit one more methodological premise. Data
from Arabic biographical collections cannot be treated as statistical in modern
terms. After all, each collection is the result of the efforts of one individual,
even if he relied on a number of authors before him. Absolute numbers are
hardly reliable, particularly when one has to deal with collections that are
similar in chronological, geographical and socio-religious coverage, but differ
significantly in biography count. For example, the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām and Shad-
harāt al-dhahab are quite similar. Both cover the same major regions. Neither
is limited to specific social and religious groups. They do differ in chronological
coverage (Shadharāt al-dhahab covers the entire first millennium), but they
are comparable if one considers only the data for the first 700 lunar years.
Yet, when it comes to biography count, the difference is most significant:
over 30,000 biographies in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām versus about 8,500 in Shadharāt
al-dhahab (i.e., even fewer for the period of 700 lunar years).
Although data from these primary sources are hardly comparable in terms
of absolute numbers, it is tempting to expect comparable changes in the dis-
tribution of data points of the same kind. Using statistical methods, one
















ð, “al-Khat.̄ıb [al-Baghdād̄ı] consid-
ered him a trustworthy transmitter”). For example, from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām the “untrained”
script extracted over 7,000 biographies that might contain data relevant to preaching, while
with the adjusted script this number dropped to slightly over 3,000. Such adjustability allows
to considerably improve the quality of text-mining queries, gradually developing complex
searches that can be later applied to new sources.
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can generate curves (such as a LOESS curve) based on the density of the
distribution—such curves will most efficiently display significant changes in
data, thus making important patterns of historical change discernible. Ideally,
curves generated from the same kinds of data from different collections should
have similar shapes, although it is hard to say whether this is going to happen
consistently in the real world. Additionally, these curves can serve as a mea-
sure for the comparison of the content of various biographical collections. Last
but not least, such statistical curves smooth out “the noise of data,” helping
to exclude infrequent instances that are most likely to be external to the major
patterns of data distribution.
1.3 Defining the Method
1.3.1 Prior Studies: Relational Databases
The first studies of biographical collections relied on quantitative methods that
came into use in the 70s of the last century. On the wave of popularity of quan-
titative methods in history in general,68 scholars from different countries con-
ducted methodologically similar studies. Independently from each other, they
dived into the depth of biographical collections in search of historical truths. In
68On the fate of quantitative methods in history, see: John F. Reynolds, ‘Do
historians count anymore? The status of quantitative methods in history, 1975-1995’,
Historical methods, 31 (1998); interestingly, GoogleBooks nGram Viewer shows a ten-
dency very similar to the one described in Reynold’s article: http://books.google.
com/ngrams, search for “quantitative history.” GoogleBooks nGram Viewer traces the
usage of different phrases over time in millions of books; in 2012 GoogleBooks in-
cludes about 20 million books (according to Google estimates there were about 130
million books published by 2010, see: http://booksearch.blogspot.com/2010/08/
books-of-world-stand-up-and-be-counted.html).
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Israel, Hayyim Cohen studied the economic backgrounds of the early religious
scholars.69 In the USA, Richard Bulliet studied the social and religious élite
of Nishapur, and later the process of conversion to Islam;70 Richard Bulliet
also clearly conceptualized this approach in a separate study, demonstrating
its potential.71 Carl Petry studied the civilian élites of Mamlūk Cairo.72 In the
USSR, a group of Soviet scholars inspired by Piotr A. Griaznevich studied the
development of early Arabic historical and religious writings in different areas
of the Caliphate.73 The scholars of the Onomasticon Arabicum Project
69Hayyim J. Cohen, ‘The Economic Background and the Secular Occupations of Muslim
Jurisprudents and Traditionists in the Classical Period of Islam: (Until the Middle of the
Eleventh Century)’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient , 13 (1970).
70Richard W. Bulliet, The patricians of Nishapur: a study in medieval Islamic social
history (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Bulliet (1979), Conversion
to Islam in the medieval period: an essay in quantitative history .
71See, Richard W. Bulliet, ‘A Quantitative Approach to Medieval Muslim Biograph-
ical Dictionaries’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient , 13:2 (April
1970). A somewhat similar approach, although from the camp of literary studies, was
offered in Hartmut E. Fähndrich, ‘The Wafayāt al-A↪yān of Ibn Khallikān: A New Ap-
proach’, Journal of the American Oriental Society , 93 (1973). Unfortunately, Fähndrich’s
work never fruited into a suggested study.
72Carl F. Petry, The civilian elite of Cairo in the later Middle Ages (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1981).
73All from the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy
of Sciences of the USSR (currently, the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, www.orientalstudies.ru). Of four planned books, three were pub-
lished: all under the title of “Arabic Historiographical Literature in [ locations ] in the period
from [ century ] until [ century ].” Konstantin A. Boyko wrote a book on Spain, and later, an-
other one on Egypt; Stanislav M. Prozorov—on the Sh̄ı ↪̄ı literature in Iraq, Iran and Central
Asia. Unfortunately, written in Russian, they remained unknown to Western scholars (all
books have summaries in English). See, Konstantin A. Boyko, Arabskaia istoricheskaia
literatura v Ispanii: VIII-pervaia tret’ XI v, edited by Piotr A. Griaznevich (Moskva:
Nauka, Glavnaia red. vostochnoi literatury, 1977); Stanislav M. Prozorov, Arabskaia
istoricheskaia literatura v Irake, Irane i Srednei Azii v VII-seredine X v.: shiitskaia isto-
riografiia, edited by Piotr A. Griaznevich (Moskva: Nauka, Glavnaia red. vostochnoi
literatury, 1980); Konstantin A. Boyko, Arabskaia istoricheskaia literatura v Egipte, IX-
X vv., edited by Piotr A. Griaznevich (Moskva: Nauka, Glav. red. vostochnoi lit-ry,
1991). The last book was supposed to be written by Sergei B. Pevzner, but his index-card
database was lost in an accident and the project was reassigned to Konstantin A. Boyko.
Piotr A. Griaznevich worked on the forth book of the series—the Sunn̄ı historical and re-
ligious writings in Arabia, Syria and Iraq—but burdened with administrative duties and
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produced a series of publications on several biographical dictionaries.74
Of all these scholars, only Bulliet and Petry remained faithful to this ap-
proach and came up with more than just one study. The main reason for
this was that such studies were extremely laborious and time-consuming, even
with the help of early computers, which were anything but user-friendly. The
abundance of information was—and still remains—unfathomable, so it was
imperative to set strict boundaries to projects, which inadvertently limited
the promises of the approach itself. Even with strict boundaries carefully de-
termined, research was extremely time consuming and even the brave soon
opted out from this kind of study. From the middle of the 1980s until the
end of the 1990s there were almost no studies that relied on this approach.
In the late 1990s, advances in computer technologies and the availability
of personal computers stimulated a few more attempts (most notably the
Jerusalem Prosopographical Project founded and directed by Michael
Lecker;75 the [Netherlands] Ulama Project of John Nawas and Monique
other projects, never finished it.
74Graff and Pierre Bichard-Bréaud, Documents sur la mise en ordinateur des
données biographiques (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique,
1971); Jean Paul Pascual, Index schématique du Ta↩r̄ıh Baġdād (Paris: Éditions du
Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1971); Pierre Bichard-Bréaud, Traitement
automatique des données biographiques; analyse et programmation (Paris: Éditions du Cen-
tre national de la recherche scientifique, 1973b); Pierre Bichard-Bréaud, Nouveaux doc-
uments sur la mise en ordinateur des données biographiques (Paris: Éditions du Centre
national de la recherche scientifique, 1973a); Malti-Douglas and Fourcade (1976), The
treatment by computer of medieval Arabic biographical data; Everett K. Rowson and
Seeger Adrianus Bonebakker, A computerized listing of biographical data from the
Yat̄ımat al-dahr by al-Tha↪ālib̄ı, Onomasticon Arabicum. Série listing; 3 (Paris: Los An-
geles, Calif.: Centre national de la recherche scientique ; University of California, 1980);
the current condition of the project is reflected in: Christian Müller and Jacqueline
Sublet, Onomasticon arabicum. Prosopographie de l’islam médiéval, Aedilis - Bases de
données et logiciels (Paris-Orléans: IRHT - Aedilis, 2006); however, the traditional Ameri-
can expression “It’s alive!” is hardly applicable.
75On Michael Lecker’s work and his JPP, see his webpage: http://micro5.mscc.huji.
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Bernards,76 and, most recently, the Mamluk Political Prosopography
Project of Jo Van Steenbergen)77 but the potential of the approach is still
far from being realized.
The main problem with this approach was posed by the very advantage
it was supposed to exploit: the limitless quantifiable data available for anal-
ysis. Anyone attempting to implement this approach had to set very strict
limits in order to accomplish his/her research project. This problem related
to the number of sources, historical periods, geographical areas and clearly
formulated research goals. Again, this was at a time when computers were not
easily available, and even when they were they posed new kinds of problems
(no support for Arabic, coding issues etc.).78 One had to clearly define research
ac.il:81/JPP/homepage/. Overall, the JPP seems to be a rather conventional prosopo-
graphical database project, in many aspects similar to those on Ancient Rome, Byzantium
and Medieval Europe. It deals with early Islamic administration (ca. 622–800) and includes
1,650 persons. For a study based on this database (the only one?), see: Michael Ebstein,
‘Shurt.a chiefs in Bas.ra in the Umayyad period: a prosopographical study’, Al-Qantara
(Madrid), 31 (2010).
76According to the creators, the NUP database includes about 1,000 biographical profiles.
For the technical description of the project, see: John Nawas and Monique Bernards,
‘A preliminary report of the Netherlands Ulama Project (NUP): the evolution of the class
of ↪ulamā↩ in Islam with special emphasis on the non-Arab converts (mawāl̄ı) from the
first through fourth century A.H.’, in: Law, Christianity and modernism in Islamic so-
ciety. Proceedings of the Eighteenth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et
Islamisants ... Leuven ... 1996. Ed. U.Vermeulen & J.M.F.Van Reeth, volume 86 (Leuven:
Peeters, 1998); for studies based on the NUP database, see: Monique Bernards and
John Nawas, ‘The Geographic Distribution of Muslim Jurists during the First Four Cen-
turies AH’, Islamic Law and Society , 10:2 (January 2003); John Nawas, ‘A profile of the
mawāl̄ı ↪ulamā↩’, in: Patronate and patronage in early and classical Islam. Ed. Monique
Bernards and John Nawas (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005); John Nawas, ‘The birth of an
elite: mawāl̄ı and Arab ↪ulamā↩’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 31 (2006).
77Abbreviated as MP3, this project is hosted at the University of Ghent, Belgium; for
more details on the current state of the Project, see: http://www.mamluk.ugent.be/node/
4.
78Essentially, everyone had to develop a new coding system, but in the case of comput-
erized databases it was particularly important and complex task, especially if a group of
scholars was expected to be involved. To appreciate the scale of such an enterprise, see:
Malti-Douglas and Fourcade (1976), The treatment by computer of medieval Arabic
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goals, select a limited amount of sources, and carefully consider the kinds of
data required for the research. After careful planning one had to peruse the
selected sources, manually extract required information, and then record it
either in a paper medium, or code it for transfer to “the memory bank of a
computer,” to use an antiquated phrase. These technologically imposed limi-
tations also affected the usability of the extracted information: in most cases,
the potential of created databanks was exhausted by the end of the research
projects for which they were created.
Needless to say, these technical limitations got in the way of realizing the
promises that the approach offered. Later, when computers became personal
and more user-friendly, several more attempts were made to study large bodies
of biographical records. The change in computer standards, however, also
played a nasty trick, since previously digitized information now had to be
converted to a format readable by new machines. This did not always work out
well and some computerized databanks remained trapped on obsolete media.79
Relational databases were thought to be the ideal tool for studies of bio-
graphical collections. In very modern computational terms, the tremendous
amount of biographical information collected by Muslim authors over cen-
biographical data, which is a 100 page manual for the OAP. For an updated version of this
manual and modern application of the OAP with the use of MS Access, see: Müller and
Sublet (2006), Onomasticon arabicum.
79For example, this happened to Carl Petry’s databank, which still remains on magnetic
tapes and requires special equipment and expertise in order to be transferred to a modern
type of media (from personal conversations with Carl Petry); interestingly enough, old-
fashioned analog databases remained immune to these advancements in technology—Richard
Bulliet’s collection on McBee Keysort cards still serves him almost fifty years after his
project began (from personal conversations with Richard Bulliet). For an example of usage
of McBee Keysort cards in humanities, see, e.g., G. L. Anderson, ‘The McBee Keysort
System for Mechanically Sorting Folklore Data’, The Journal of American Folklore, 66:262
(October 1953).
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turies could be imagined as a huge analog biographical database, where ev-
ery biographical collection was a specific query.80 For example, al-Dhahab̄ı’s
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām can be viewed as a query that selects all available biographi-
cal records from all available regions of the Muslim world for the period from
the Prophet’s lifetime until 700/1301 ce, and arranges them chronologically
by decades; al-Khat.̄ıb al-Baghdād̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh Baghdād, as a query that selects
only biographies of those affiliated with Baghdād (what kind of affiliation is not
important), considers the period from the foundation of Baghdād (or, actually,
including the entire lifetime of Caliph al-Mans.ūr, the founder of Baghdād) un-
til the author’s death, and arranges them alphabetically by first name (sing.
ism), the least user-friendly type of arrangement; Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá’s T. abaqāt al-
h. anābila, as a query that limits biographical records to people affiliated with
the H. anbal̄ı community, considers the period from Ibn H. anbal’s lifetime until
the author’s death, applies no geographical limitations, and arranges records
by “cohorts” (For the tabular presentation of this point, see Figure 1.11).
It was expected that computerized databases would open up a new range
of questions that could be asked and that would hitherto have been unthink-
able “without 500 monks at hand.”81 In real life, however, they offered only
marginal advantages over the old-fashioned pen-and-paper systems. They did
80Query is the primary mechanism for retrieving information from databases that uses
questions presented in a predefined format.
81The quote is from: Ralph W. Mathisen, ‘Where are all the PDBs?: The Creation
of Prosopographical Databases for the Ancient and Medieval Worlds’, in: Prosopography
Approaches and Applications: A Handbook (University of Oxford, Linacre College Unit for
Prosopographical Research, 2007), 95. The article is an interesting overview of the use of
databases—both analog and digital—in history (prosopography, to be more precise); it is
also an excellent representation of the conventional relational database approach with all
its advantages and disadvantages. The main issue with them is eloquently expressed in the
very title of Mathisen’s article.
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SourcesAsQueries	
Variable/Source Ta᾿rīkh al-islām Ta᾿rīkh Baghdād Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila 
period from –52 AH 145 AH 164 AH 
period until 700 AH 473 AH 527 AH 
personalia all all Ḥanbalī jurists 
territories all Baghdād all 
arrangement chronological alphabetical generational 
 
	
Figure 1.11: Sources as Queries: Each biographical collection can be represented as a
query from the imagined all-Islamic biographical database. Having all biographical data
converted into a suitable digital format, it will be possible to generate such biographical
collections on the fly, which in itself might be an interesting experiment.
increase the speed and complexity of data retrieval, but offered no significant
improvements for the tedious process of entering data.82
Accordingly, the newcomers continued to suffer from the same limitations
as their analog predecessors. Their creation remained equally time consuming,
and for this reason a number of projects were never finished.83 This seems to be
true regarding the above-mentioned JPP and NUP, which have been created
over rather long periods of time, and which include a relatively small number
of biographic profiles (1,650 individuals in the JPP and 1,049 in the NUP).
Their “coefficient of efficiency”—in terms of numbers of studies based on them
and their impact on the field—is insignificant and plays into the hands of the
82In fact, in cases when a group of researchers was involved, it became even more compli-
cated. The OAP is a striking example of this: a new participant had to study a 100-page
Manual which thoroughly describes the process of extraction of information from biograph-
ical collections and coding it for further analysis. Following this Manual, one then must
meticulously collect information from each biography, sort it into up to 30 rubrics, code it
according to the developed system, then convert it to digital format. This procedure was to
be repeated as many times as there are biographies in a given biographical collection.
83On this issue see: Mathisen (2007), ‘Where are all the PDBs?’, where a number of
examples are mentioned, including Mathisen’s own database; despite this screaming fact,
the author remains a believer in the conventional relational database approach.
57
critics of prosopographical and quantitative studies. Another problem with
large scale database projects is that they often tend to take on a life of their
own, gradually transforming themselves from the means into the end itself.84
1.3.2 A Novel Alternative: Text-mining
The text-mining approach is cardinally different. Not a method with clearly
defines boundaries, it is rather an open-ended set of computational techniques
that allow for extracting meaningful information from unstructured texts. This
approach capitalizes on a number of developments of our digital age. The
wide support of the Unicode standard made it possible to apply text-mining
methods to oriental languages. Scripting languages commonly used in text-
mining—such as Python, Pearl, or R—allow one to work with an unlimited
number of texts and design complex analytical tasks. Combined with statis-
tical and linguistic methods, these tools offer limitless ways for studying vo-
luminous historical texts. Unlike traditional database approach, text-mining
allows to expand the databank of primary texts and incorporate new digital
methods and techniques as they became available. This is particularly impor-
84I myself had first-hand experience of dealing with conventional relational databases when
I suggested a computerization of the method used by Boyko, Griaznevich and Prozorov, the
above-mentioned group of Soviet/Russian Arabists. Working with my mentor Stanislav M.
Prozorov, I developed a database for the study of Arabic historical sources; however, its
earthly manifestation turned out to be quite different from what we both envisioned and
hoped for: as always, the bottleneck of the database was the process of entering data and
“without 500 monks at hand” it was incredibly inefficient and time-consuming task for a
lone graduate student (The project is described in details in: Stanislav M. Prozorov
and Maxim G. Romanov, ‘Principles and procedures of extracting and processing the data
from Arabic sources (based on materials of historic-and-biographical literature) / Original
title: Metodika izvlecheniya i obrabotki informatsii iz arabskih istochnikov (na materiale
istoriko-biograficheskoi literaturi)’, Oriens/Vostok , 4 (2003)).
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tant, since these methods are being developed and updated practically by the
minute. As some DH scholar recently pointed out: “The digital methods that
you need now are not the methods that you need now.”
Because of its nature, text-mining encourages—even demands—a seamless
connection between the primary texts and extracted research data, allowing
one to switch easily between quantitative and qualitative tasks. While the
structure of relational databases imposes strict limitations on what research
questions can be asked of data, the limitations of the text-mining approach
seem to lurk only in the ability of researchers to transform complex research
questions into working algorithms and then translate them into the scripting
language of their choice. In addition, this approach is universal and can be
applied to texts of any genre in any language. At the hands-on level, the text-
mining approach offers a more efficient work flow and allows one to begin the
analysis of data almost instantaneously, gradually increasing the complexity
of the research task that one undertakes. This opportunity to get valuable
glimpses has a strong empowering effect that encourages one to experiment
with data using new techniques and methods.
Text-mining relies on patterns, which, as repetitive, quantifiable and mor-
phologically similar structures, permeate the entire approach. In designing
any text-mining task, one first samples data to collect textual patterns that
encapsulate required information;85 then one translates these textual patterns
85Scholars of Islamic history discussed some of these patterns although in a quite dif-
ferent context. See, for example, Albrecht Noth’s discussion of “transitional formulae” in
Albrecht Noth and Lawrence I. Conrad, The early Arabic historical tradition: a
source-critical study (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1994), particularly Chapter 4; his
analysis of topoi and schemata is based on: Eckart Stetter, ‘Topoi und Schemata im
H. ad̄ıt¯
’, Inaugural dissertation, Universität Tübingen (Tübingen, 1965).
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into the language of regular expressions—another kind of pattern—which
the machine can interpret and use to locate and extract all instances of data
that fit the initial textual patterns (see, Figure 1.5 above). The extracted data
are then repeatedly reorganized, segmented and analyzed in order to discover
patterns of historical significance.
Every text-mining task is an algorithm translated into a specific formal
language. Somewhat similarly to the above mentioned 100-page Manual of
the OAP, algorithms present complex tasks as series of simple steps. Algo-
rithms are a crucial methodological part of this approach, since even small
mistakes may lead to wrong results. For this reason they should be explicitly
described whenever applicable. Algorithms also make this approach efficient:
with algorithms corrected or adjusted, the entire set of research data can be
regenerated anew—something unthinkable within the conventional database
approach.
Although the text-mining approach is quantitative in nature, its main ad-
vantage is that it allows one to improve qualitative analysis. Text-mining
techniques allow one to explore vast corpora of primary sources and discover
all thematically relevant sources, chapters and passages. Such exhaustive cov-
erage will make any close reading thoroughly contextualized and reliable.
In the preliminary quantitative study of extracted data, I rely on the prin-
ciples and techniques of exploratory data analysis. Pioneered in the 70s
by John Tukey,86 this statistical approach is based on the underlying assump-
86John W. Tukey, Exploratory data analysis, Addison-Wesley series in behavioral sci-
ence (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1977). Even though written in the pre-
digital age, this book is considered foundational for anyone seriously interested in data
analysis. For a quick fix, one can opt for a more concise representation of this approach
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tion that “the more one knows about the data, the more effectively data can
be used to develop, test and refine theory.”87 Exploratory data analysis
is based on the principles of openness and skepticism, calling for the analysis
of data without preformed expectations or theoretical assumptions, while re-
maining open to new ways of looking at the same data. Sociologists are well
aware of the questionnaire problem, whereby questions may frame responders’
answers. Questioning their sources, historians are not immune from this prob-
lem either. For this reason it is important to explore our sources to make
sure that research questions are relevant. This is particularly important in the
case of multivolume biographical collections, which, as the inside joke goes,
are easier to write than to read.
Exploratory data analysis is an iterative process of splitting data into
smooth and rough: the former represents some kind of regularity or pattern in
the data, while the latter is their irregular residue. However, since the bound-
ary between the smooth and the rough depends on a number of parameters,
often a priori unknown, it must be discovered experimentally. Exploratory
data analysis emphasizes visual representation of data, specifically over
summary statistics. Arguably, carefully designed visualizations can convey
the complexity of data without fracturing the subtlety of intricate connections
into a linear narrative, which readers may never be able to reassemble fully.
Moreover, in many cases visual display of data is the only way to bring to-
gether complex combinations of variables. Thus, visualizations are used here
for the social sciences: Frederick Hartwig and Brian E. Dearing, Exploratory data
analysis, A Sage university paper (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).
87Hartwig and Dearing (1979), Exploratory data analysis, 9.
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for “visual evidence, visual reasoning, and visual understanding.”88
Conceptually, text-mining approach fits nicely into the Fibonacci spiral
which graphically reflects the growth of complexity of research tasks (Fig-
ure 1.12). Unlike the conventional approach whereby one extracts all kinds of
information processing one biography at a time, repeating this process until a
specific source is exhausted, in the text-mining approach one extracts one kind
of information while processing all biographies of a specific source at once.
Such a change of perspective has two advantages. First, dealing with only
one type of information streamlines the entire process which is particularly
important since regular expressions and text-mining scripts must be con-
tinuously readjusted for better performance. Second, one can begin analysis
right after a specific kind of data has been extracted. Such a step-by-step
exploratory evaluation of data is helpful for guiding further research. More-
over, it encourages one to continue with the study, whereas with conventional
relational databases one usually gets a depressing feeling that this will never
end.
The sections that follow are meant to provide an overview of the method
and to demonstrate the general work flow. Some visualizations are the very
early versions and the following chapters will offer both updated and more
detailed representations of data. In the examples that will follow I use Ta↩r̄ıkh
al-islām of al-Dhahab̄ı, volumes 4–52, covering the period of 41–700 ah/662–
88This area of exploratory data analysis was largely developed by Edward Tufte in
his triptych about pictures of numbers, pictures of nouns & pictures of words: Edward R.
Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (Graphics Press, February 1992),
Edward R. Tufte, Envisioning Information (Graphics Press, May 1990), Edward R.
Tufte, Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative (Graphics
Press, February 1997) The quote is from: Tufte (1992), The Visual Display , 8.
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1.3.3.1 Step I: eTexts
First of all, eTexts must be prepared for text-mining scripts. The whole pro-
cess can be described as “normalization,” which in this context refers to two
different tasks. In terms of computational linguistics and natural language
processing (NLP), “normalization” refers to the disambiguation of spelling,
formatting and encoding irregularities of Arabic text.89 Since most NLP tech-
niques in their current state are inapplicable for our research purposes, the
most important task is to fix encoding irregularities, which arise when a typ-
ist uses Persian or Urdu keyboard layout to enter Arabic text: for example,
while kāf in most cases looks exactly the same in all three languages, in the
Unicode table they occupy different locations, and therefore, computationally,
are different symbols. The issue of spelling and formatting irregularities is
more efficiently solved with deNormalization algorithms.90
89The standard procedure of “normalization” includes cleaning out “noise” characters—
kasra, d. amma, fath. a, tashd̄ıd , kash̄ıda etc.—which interfere with the computational analysis
of texts. Additionally, spelling irregularities are “normalized.” Mainly, this includes incon-
sistencies in the usage of yā↩ and alif maqsūra (replaced with yā↩); different forms of alif
(replaced with bare alif ), and the spellings of medial and final h. amza (replaced with stan-
dalone h. amza): with all its possible variants h. amza is responsible for 85–90% of all spelling
mistakes in Arabic. Encoding irregularities refer to the problem when non-Arabic charac-
ters are used in the text. For more details on “normalization,” see: Nizar Y. Habash,
Introduction to Arabic natural language processing ([San Rafael, Calif.]: Morgan & Claypool
Publishers, 2010), 21–23.
90I discovered that it is easier—and faster which is more important—to read texts with
orthographic mistakes/irregularities than texts which were “normalized.” Orthographic
mistake/irregularity seems to give one a starting point to quickly shuffle through all the
possible variants, while dealing with the “normalized” text one’s mind get confused with
where to start and it takes several crucial seconds more to get to the right answer. It may
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In terms of text-mining “normalization” refers to providing meta-data—i.e.
data that describe data—for every unit of text. In this case, “normalization”
informs us about the context from which specific information was extracted,
thus making queries meaningful. Consider the following example: if one
searches for the word “preacher” (wā↪iz.) in any biographical dictionary, it will
result in hundreds or even thousands of hits; browsing through all the hits
will not necessarily lead to anything meaningful, provided one can actually
accomplish this. However, if the very same dictionary has been split into
biographies, the search will tell the number of people who were either preachers
themselves or had some connections with preachers. Furthermore, if the same
search is applied specifically to the onomastic section of each biography—a
section that occurs in the beginning of each biography and ends right before the
details on religious education—it will actually give us the number of preachers
in the dictionary. This will narrow down the number of biographies for close
reading, which is particularly important when dealing with four digit figures.
In practical terms, the task of “normalization” refers to tagging the struc-
ture of each eText. For example, in the case of a biographical dictionary, one
needs to mark titles of chapters (preserving hierarchy) and starting points of
biographical records. Tagging the structure is a rather tiresome task; however,
it allows preserving the entire eText of the source and has to be done only
not sound like a serious issue, but shaving off a few seconds from each operation that has
to be repeated hundreds or thousands of times saves a lot of time. “DeNormalization”
algorithms are applied only for search purposes: first, texts are stripped of formatting:
namely, punctuation marks are deleted—in the editions of pre-modern Arabic texts they
are often unreliable anyway—and the entire text block is transformed into a long string
of text; second, search strings are deNormalized with regular expressions, namely, if
there is any form of alif , it is replaced with all probable forms of this letter; with similar






 . الصاد حرف# ||| 
 .صدقة ابن الوزير أبي الرضا محمد بن أحمد بن صدقة # $ 
رة اظهير الدين أبو الفتح ولي نيابة الوز *284*42*# 
ببغداد وآان صدرا معظما وأبوه الوزير جالل الدين قد وزر 
 .للراشد باهللا توفي الظهير في حادي عشر رجب 
 .حرف الظاء # ||| 
 .ظافر بن الحسين # $ 
أبو المنصور األزدي اإلسكندراني ثم المصري الفقيه # 
المالكي تفقه بالثغر على العالمة أبي طالب صالح بن 






 #####BEGINNING OF CUBARON . 
 #####TITLE # KitabAnsab  #للسمعاني األنساب آتاب . 
 #####CHAPTER L1 # Chapter N02  #األلف باب . 
 #####CHAPTER L2 # Chapter N01  #يثلثهما وما األلفين باب . 
 #####TYPE # NISBA . 
 #####PAGES Vol.1 p.59 - Vol.1 p.60 . 
 #####NISBA # ARABIC  #اآلجري . 
 #####END OF CUBARON . 
 #####TECHNICAL TAGS # EMPTY . 
#NIS #اآلجري . 
 النسبة هذه المهملة الراء وتشديد الجيم وضم األلف بفتح# 
 والمشهور أيضا اآلجر درب إلى ونسبة وبيعه اآلجر عمل إلى
 يزيد بن خالد بن محمد بكر أبو القدماء من االنتساب بهذا





Figure 1.13: A snapshot from a tagged eText (Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām). Thanks to customiz-
able highlighting schemes in EditPad Pro, different structural elements are automatically
highlighted: 3rd level headings—with fuchsia, headings of biographical records—with dark
green, volume and page numbers—with red. Customizable highlighting schemes in EditPad
Pro can be easily adapted to highlight required information, which is an effective way to
ensure consistency of tagging as well as to save a lot of time on this tedious procedure.
once. The processed eText becomes machine-readable and can be used until
its research value is completely exhausted. This process can also be stream-
lined, first, by using short tags91 for the markup of all structural elements
and, second, by using highlighting schemes, which help to avoid typos and
which make structural elements easily visible (if tagged correctly, headings are
highlighted according to the user-defined conditions, see Figure 1.13).
After a certain eText is tagged, it can be parsed into separate blocks
(i.e., individual biographies, obituaries, events). Each of the newly generated
blocks will have two parts: the first one is a cubaron,92 the paragraph that
91E.g., “|” for chapters of the 1st level, “||” for chapters of the 2nd level, etc; “$” for
a biography of a man; “$$” for a biography of a woman. These tags can later be easily
transformed into TEI tags. In the case with Arabic texts, this is actually the best way
to follow, since angle brackets as well as other technical symbols behave erratically when
combined with Arabic letters; editing a TEI-style tagged Arabic text is particularly difficult
and incredibly frustrating.
92I borrowed this term from the Onomasticon Arabicum Project, where it is used
for a paragraph, which “gathers the totality of biographical and bibliographical information
concerning one sole person” (Malti-Douglas and Fourcade (1976), The treatment by
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contains tagged metadata extracted from the source; and the second one is an
eNas.s.,
93 the actual text of a biography or an historical event. Initially, the
cubaron contains only basic information: 1) the name of a source; 2) “path”
to an eNas.s. within the source (names of chapters and sub-chapters, in which
a specific eNas.s. was originally nested); 3) volume and page numbers of the
eNas.s. for easy reference (only if they were preserved in the original eText); 4)
the type of information that eNas.s. contains (i.e., biography, event, etc.). As
different text-mining scripts are applied, extracted data are collected in the
cubaron of every information block.
Consider the following example. Figure 1.14 shows a sample block from al-
Sam↪ān̄ı’s Kitāb al-ansāb with a cubaron that was updated with text-mining
scripts designed to extract vocalizations and definitions of nisbas. Highlighted
with light blue is the vocalization of this nisba, i.e., how it should be pro-
nounced properly; words highlighted with fuchsia show the beginning of the
definition of this nisba, while words in purple show where this definition ends.
The definition of this nisba also contains keywords that can be later used for
semi-automatic classification of this nisba as occupational—↪amal , “produc-
tion”, and bay↪, “selling”—and as toponymic—darb, “road.”
After the tagging is complete, one can take a closer look at first statis-
tics from the source in question. To begin with, one now knows the number
of meaningful blocks of information: volumes 4–52, covering the period 41–
700 ah/662–1301 ce, include biographical records on about 29,000 individuals
computer of medieval Arabic biographical data).
93From an Arabic word for “text,” nas.s. , by analogy with eText. The choice of both
cubaron and eNas.s. is arbitrary, but necessary, since the usage of more common words







 #####BEGINNING OF CUBARON . 
 #####TITLE # KitabAnsab  #للسمعاني األنساب آتاب . 
 #####CHAPTER L1 # Chapter N02  #األلف باب . 
 #####CHAPTER L2 # Chapter N01  #يثلثهما وما األلفين باب . 
 #####TYPE # NISBA . 
 #####PAGES Vol.1 p.59 - Vol.1 p.60 . 
 #####NISBA # ARABIC  #اآلجري . 
 #####VOCALIZATION  #المهملة الراء وتشديد الجيم وضم األلف حبفت . 
 #####DEFINITION  #درب إلى ونسبة وبيعه اآلجر عمل إلى النسبة هذه 
 . أيضا اآلجر
 #####DEFINITION INITIAL FORMULA  #النسبة هذه . 
 #####DEFINITION TERMINAL FORMULA  #االنتساب بهذا والمشهور . 
 #####END OF CUBARON . 
 #####BEGINNING OF eNass . 
#NIS #اآلجري . 
 النسبة هذه المهملة الراء وتشديد الجيم وضم األلف بفتح# 
 والمشهور أيضا اآلجر درب إلى ونسبة وبيعه اآلجر عمل إلى
 يزيد بن خالد بن محمد بكر أبو القدماء من االنتساب بهذا
  الفضل نعيم أبي عن حدث اآلجري
 #####END OF eNass . 
  
Figure 1.14: The sample block with an updated cubaron (Kitāb al-ansāb). Highlighted
with light blue, fuchsia and purple are the elements of textual patterns, which are used to
extract required information. Based on complex regular expressions, custom highlight-
ing schemes allow spotting sought-for information easily; the same regular expressions
are used in text-mining scripts. The rubrics VOCALIZATION and DEFINITION in the cubaron
contain the vocalization of the nisba al-Ajurr̄ı and its definition respectively. For statistical
purposes, transitional formulae are also extracted.
and descriptions of about 5,300 events.94
Another statistic that is worth looking at is the lengths of these biogra-
phies. It would be logical to assume that the length of a biography reflects
the importance of that person for the author, and, arguably, the significance
of the person for Islamic history in general. If we accept that the length of a
biography is proportional to protagonist’s status, then, using basic methods
from exploratory data analysis, we can split all the biographical records
94The actual number is most likely higher. Since my main goal was to tag biographies, I
was not as rigorous tagging events as I was with biographies. Tagging can be corrected at
any moment without disrupting the research process.
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TOP DOZEN OUTLIERS      decade length
Ibn Ḥanbal, the eponym of the Ḥanbalī school 250/865 17,673
al-Bukhārī, a Traditionalist  260/875 7,287
al-Shāfi῾ī, the eponym of the Shāfi῾ī school of law 210/826 6,821
al-Zuhrī, a Traditionalist   130/749 4,840
῾Abd Allāh b. al-Mubārak al-Ḥanẓalī, a Traditionalist 190/807 4,550
Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb, an Ayyūbid Sulṭān  650/1253 4,371
῾Abd al-Ghānī al-Maqdisī, a Ḥanbalī Traditionalist  600/1204 4,303
῾Umar II b. ῾Abd al-῾Azīz, the Umayyad Caliph 110/729 4,302
Abū-l-Qāsim b. Manṣūr al-Qabbārī (?), an Ascetic 670/1272 4,150
Ibn Tūmart al-Mahdī, a Marghribī Sulṭān 530/1136 3,869
al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, a Shāfi῾ī Traditionalist 470/1078  3,707














:: (t) traditionalist :: (r) ruler ::
Figure 1.15: “Modal” Biographies and Biographies-Outliers in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām into “modal” biographies and biographies-outliers.
The boxplot in Figure 1.15 presents the basic statistics about the distri-
bution of lengths, while the histogram displays the shape of the distribution.
Most importantly, 89% of the biographies—“modal” biographies—have fewer
than 144 words (with 50% in the range from 29 to 75 words, with the median
at 44), while the remaining 11% are statistical outliers. A derivative from the
statistical term “mode” that refers to the most frequent value in the popula-
tion, the word “modal” is used here to qualify biographies of the most typical,
“average” members of élites. Biographies that belong to the remaining 11%,
on the other hand, should represent cultural outliers—the most extraordinary
members of élites.95 Thus, “modal” biographies are most likely to contain rep-
95On cultural outliers, see Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success,
Reprint edition (Back Bay Books, June 2011).
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resentative information on larger social processes in the Islamic world. At the
same time, patterns discovered in in the biographies of outliers—the remaining
11%—are least likely to represent élites in general and therefore should not be
used for broad extrapolations.
Additionally, a close look at the biographies of outliers may help us get a
better idea of al-Dhahab̄ı’s biases in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Arguably, the longest are
the biographies of individuals toward whom the author had strong emotional
feelings—either positive or negative—which drove him to spend more time and
effort to write long, detailed accounts. The “top dozen”96 from al-Dhahab̄ı’s
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām looks quite interesting (Figure 1.15). A dozen is by no means
a statistically significant sample, but it should suffice to make my point.
Everybody in this dozen is a famous person, with an exception of Abū-
l-Qāsim b. Mans.ūr al-Qabbār̄ı, an ascetic from Alexandria who is kind of a
“dark horse” in this list. In terms of socio-religious roles, the list is clearly
dominated by the Traditionists (7 out of 12). At the very top we have Ah. mad
b. H. anbal, followed by al-Bukhār̄ı, and only then by Muh. ammad al-Shāfi ↪̄ı,
which might seem unexpected for a Shāfi ↪̄ı author who is expected to favor
his own kind.97 (All three are qualified primarily as imāms; Muh. ammad al-
Shāfi ↪̄ı is also qualified as faq̄ıh, “jurist”). The only other Shāfi ↪̄ı on this
list is al-Khat.̄ıb al-Baghdād̄ı, however, al-Dhahab̄ı goes on for about three
pages writing about him as an outstanding Traditionist before even mentioning
that he was one of the most prominent Shāfi ↪̄ı jurists. Thus, if al-Dhahab̄ı
96Dozen has no particular meaning here. I simply tried to find a round number that could
be reviewed quickly. It so happened that there are 12 biographies that are longer than 3,500
words.
97See, De Somogyi (1932), ‘The Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām of adh-Dhahab̄ı’, 847.
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favored any socio-religious group—however feeble this provisional conclusion
may be—he favored the preservers of Prophetic traditions, not jurists. Even
more interesting—in the light of al-Dhahab̄ı’s criticism of the jurists and their
inability to serve the umma98—is the presence of two H. anbal̄ıs in this list—
Ah. mad b. H. anbal himself and ↪Abd al-Ghan̄ı al-Maqdis̄ı, who were prominent
community leaders.99
1.3.3.2 Step II: Dates
With the eText converted into a machine-readable format, one can start the
extraction of data that can be used for more meaningful exploratory data
analysis. The complexity of algorithms for the extraction of dates will differ
depending on how dates are recorded in a given eTexts and what level of
details one wants to preserve. As to the first issue, the dates can be recorded
as text or as numbers; extracting numbers is much easier than extracting
complex phrases and converting them into numeric values. As to the second
one, in biographical dictionaries one comes across decades, years, months, days
of the month, days of the week and even the time of day. Developing text-
mining scripts for the extraction of such complex data is a tricky task, but not
impossible, and with a lot of detailed data of this kind very unconventional
research questions can be asked.
The easiest way to begin is to use the chronological division of a source
in question, if it is available. Luckily, al-Dhahab̄ı divided his “History” into
98Jaques (2006), Authority , 4.
99On the communal role of Ah.mad b. H. anbal, see: Nimrod Hurvitz, The formation of
H. anbalism: piety into power (London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
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LOESS curves help discerning larger
trends beyond the “noise” of data
(generated with R)
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Figure 1.16: Distribution of Biographies by Decades ce.
decades, which is more than satisfactory for our current purposes. Figure 1.16
shows the histogram of this distribution of biographies and several LOESS
curves that smooth out the “noise” of data allowing us to see larger trends.
This curve may reflect either actual historical changes that took place in the
Islamic world, or al-Dhahab̄ı’s inability to consult other sources on earlier pe-
riods, or his bias towards certain groups which he decided to ignore for some
reason, or some combination of the three.
The major curve reflects the death dates of individuals. For this reason, it
makes sense to adjust the curve to the left—30 years back in time, so to speak.
Thus adjusted, it will reflect the early years of those individuals who—young
and daring—would have been on the lookout to seize opportunities offered by
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Figure 1.17: Adjusted Biographical Curve.
time. The adjusted biographical curve then should also reflect the number of
these opportunities: the higher the number of opportunities, the higher the
number of the individuals who could take advantage of them.
Figure 1.17 shows that the adjusted curve follows major political devel-
opments in the Muslim world: the flourishing of the ↪Abbāsid caliphate, its
crisis and the end of the independence of the ↪Abbāsid caliphs; the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte
century—the Qarāmit.a who caused great unrest and even dared to seize the
Black Stone from the Ka↪ba; the Būyids who took power from the ↪Abbāsids;
the Fāt.imids who remained the main ideological rival of the ↪Abbāsids—both
real and rhetorical—until S. alāh. al-d̄ın ended their caliphate in Cairo; the
Sunn̄ı revival—the Saljūqs, the saviors of Sunnism, who took the ↪Abbāsids
under their wing; the golden age of H. anbalism; the brief independence of the
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↪Abbāsid caliphs, followed by their final fall and the rise of the Mamlūks. In-
terestingly, the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte century occupies almost the entire declining segment of
the curve, while the end of the Fāt.imid dynasty marks the point where the
curve returns to its highest point before the decline.100 Ideally, of course, one
needs to split this cumulative curve further into regional ones and to look into
how they correlate with historical developments in their respective regions as
well as in the Caliphate in general. I will return to regional analysis in the
next part.
1.3.3.3 Step III: Locations
With each biography contextualized chronologically, one is ready for the next
step, which is to contextualize them geographically. This task is much more
complicated then the preceding ones and the most complicated issue is how one
can computationally extract all meaningful toponyms from an unstructured
text. This issue can be solved with methods and techniques from computa-
tional linguistics, mainly frequency lists and n-grams. While the concept
of frequency list is quite self-explanatory, that of n-gram requires some
clarification. In general, n-gram refers to a contiguous sequence of items ex-
tracted from a specific text, where n stands for the number of these items:
bigram for two items, trigram for three, etc. N-grams can be used for a va-
riety of purposes: tracing word usage, language identification, machine trans-
lation, speech recognition, spelling correction, entity detection, information
100Anticipating things, the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte curve—generated and adjusted in the same manner—
spikes where the cumulative biographical curve drops.
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extraction, etc.101 Entity detection is of particular importance for current re-
search purposes. The main idea behind such usage of n-grams is that the
preceding words narrow down the possibilities of what the following words
can be. For example, if Arabic/Persian y-z-d is preceded by s-k-n, it is a geo-
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Ë). This basic principle
can be used to identify toponyms in classical Arabic sources heuristically (for
examples of toponymic n-grams, see Figure 1.18).
With the toponymic data extracted one can trace how the importance of
a specific place changed over time. Reviewing locations one by one, however,
is not very efficient since even the top hundred will take a lot of time and will
not necessarily help to see a bigger picture. The most efficient—and logical—
way to study this kind of information is to put it on a series of geographical
maps. This major task is composed of two smaller ones: first, one needs to
collect geographical coordinates for locations on the list; second, using some
kind of geographic information system (GIS), one needs to plot the ex-
tracted data on geographical maps. There is no ideal reference work for the
first task and one has to make use of all available resources, especially when
it comes to places whose location is known only approximately.102 Overall,
one has to use both old-fashioned references, such as Brill’s Encyclopaedia of
101N-grams are also actively used in protein and DNA sequencing. With the appearance
of Google Ngram Viewer humanists also began to use n-grams for research and teaching
purposes.
102GoogleMaps features satellite photographs whose resolution is high enough to see rather
detailed images of monuments of Islamic architecture, both those that survived and those
that are in ruins (for example, one can clearly see the ruins of al-Ma↩mūn’s palace about 2
miles north-east from the center of modern Bayramaly, Turkmenistan).
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Figure 1.18: Examples of Toponymic N-grams. Toponymic n-grams are
phrases that immediately precede toponyms, thus serving as indicators that
what follows them is most likely a toponym. N-grams can be used to identify
toponymic entities heuristically, which is particularly important, since differ-
ent sources will have different sets of toponyms and toponymic n-grams, as
the data in the table indicate; some n-grams are not suitable for a heuristic
search, since they can also be followed by the subject of the sentence (indicated
by the “∼” symbol).
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Islam and An Historical Atlas of Islam,103 and new digital resources, such as
iTouchMap.com and GeoNames.org.104 For the second task several GIS solu-
tions are available.105
If a biography mentions a certain place, it implies that the subject of the
biography is somehow affiliated with that place; some, in fact many, biogra-
phies mention more than one place. The maps that will follow consider all of
such locations. It is logical to assume that prominent places are mentioned
more often, since they offered more opportunities of an economic, political or
religious nature.
Evenly spaced across the entire period 41–700 ah/662–1301 ce, the follow-
ing series of four maps visualizes the frequencies of the top hundred toponyms
mentioned in biographies of al-Dhahab̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām: almost 13,000 bi-
ographies (44.4%); altogether these locations are mentioned in slightly over
25,000 biographies.106
Figure 1.19 shows the period 41–70 ah/662–690 ce, the earliest three
103William C. Brice, ‘An Historical atlas of Islam’ (1981); and its later, digital manifes-
tation edited by Hugh Kennedy, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.
umich.edu; also: H. usayn Mu↩nis, At.las ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (al-Qāhira: al-Zahrā↩ lil-i↪lām
al-↪arab̄ı, 1987).
104I prepared a detailed manual on how to search for coordinates for a Timemap assignment
within the course on “The First Millennium of the Islamic Near East (600–1600 ce)” taught
by Professor Michael Bonner at the University of Michigan, Fall 2012. Available at http:
//alraqmiyyat.org.
105I relied on R, a free and open-source statistical software with GIS capabilities. I could
not have done the coding for this part without Benjamin Schmidt’s post “Wide World of
Physics” at his blog “Sapping Attention” (http://sappingattention.blogspot.com) and
the help of Missy Plegue at the Center for Statistical Consultation and Research (CSCAR),
University of Michigan, who helped me to make sense of the code written by Benjamin
Schmidt.
106Only biographies that mention these places are been counted, i.e. if a certain place is
mentioned several times in a specific biography it is counted only once. This is an important
detail, since otherwise the picture might be quite different.
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Figure 1.19: Top 100 Toponyms: 41–70 ah/662–690 ce.
decades from the section of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām under consideration. One can
clearly see the major centers: Mecca, Medina, Basra, Kufa and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Damascus. The empire grows eastward toward northern Iran and Central
Asia, but the cities in those regions are not prominent yet. This will change
soon.
Two centuries later, 241–270 ah/856–884 ce (Figure 1.20), both northern
Iran and Central Asia gain prominence. Greater Syria, al-Shām, is now more
visible on the map of the Islamic world. Nothing significant seems to be going
on in the Iberian Peninsula, the Maghrib and Egypt (Mis.r). Former centers—
Medina, Basra and Kufa—begin to loose their prominence; Mecca will suffer
least because of its sacred status for the entire Islamic community. Yet, all
these cities are dwarfed in comparison to Baghdad, the capital of the ↪Abbāsid
caliphate which is about to plunge into the turmoil of disintegration. This dis-
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Figure 1.20: Top 100 Toponyms: 241–270 ah/856–884 ce.
integration seems to have significantly affected the numbers of notable people
in al-Dhahab̄ı’s “History,” for a few decades later the number of biographies
drops significantly and returns to its previous highest point only about two
centuries later (See, Figure 1.17 above).
Another two centuries later, 441–470 ah/1050–1078 ce (Figure 1.21), Is-
lamic Spain (al-Andalus) is clearly visible on the map. The western and north-
ern parts of al-↪Awās.im
107 are reconquered by the Byzantine Empire in the
middle of the 10th century ce. The temporary capital of the ↪Abbāsid empire,
Sāmarrā↩, practically disappears after the court is moved back to Baghdād.
The rule of the Būyids negatively affects Iraq, while most part of Iran, Central
Asia and Afghanistan continue to flourish during this period of the rise of the
Saljūqs.
107A region at the western part of the modern border between Turkey and Syria.
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Figure 1.21: Top 100 Toponyms: 441–470 ah/1050–1078 ce.
Figure 1.22: Top 100 Toponyms: 671–700 ah/1273–1301 ce.
The end of the period, 671–700 ah/1273–1301 ce (Figure 1.22), is dras-
tically different. Spain is being erased from the map of the Islamic world by
the ongoing Reconquista. Having flourished in the earlier periods, the eastern
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lands of the Muslim world—Iran, Central Asia and Afghanistan—fade away
in the aftermath of the Mongol invasions. Still a prominent spot on the map,
Baghdād will never recover from the Mongol sack of 1258 ce and by the last
decade covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām it will shrink into a tiny dot. Consolidated
under the Ayyūbids, Syria is now the seat of a new power—the Mamlūks, the
saviors of the Islamic world from the Mongol menace. Under Mamlūk rule,
Egypt appears prominently on the map—with Cairo ready to become the next
major center of the Islamic world.
These are just four maps and they hardly do justice to the toponymic data
from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. The best way to visualize these maps is to animate
them, which will allow to bring out the dynamics of change. The animated
map of these data—50 seconds of Islamic History—can be found online
at http://alraqmiyyat.org (see, “Dissertation Appendices”).108
Interpretation of these toponymic data is tricky and this explanation is
just a preliminary attempt at weaving them into a bigger picture. It is worth
noting, however, that the toponymic data from the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām are quite
similar to the representation of the Islamic world in Shadharāt al-dhahab of
Ibn ↪Imad (d. 1089/1678 ce).109
108Like static maps, each frame shows three decades ah with each following map over-
lapping with the previous two, i.e. frame 1 shows 41–70 ah; frame 2: 51–80 ah; frame 3:
61–90 ah, etc. It is worth watching this visualization more than once, each time concen-
trating on a specific region.
109See, Graph I in: Bulliet (1979), Conversion to Islam in the medieval period: an essay
in quantitative history , 8. Ibn ↪Imad’s biographical collection covers the entire first millen-
nium of Islamic history, but includes only ≈8,500 biographies, of which only ≈6,100 provide
information on the places of origin of their subjects. Ibn ↪Imad was also a Damascene, but
he spent a lot of time in Cairo; unlike al-Dhahab̄ı, he belonged to the H. anbal̄ı school of law.
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1.3.3.4 Step IV: Descriptive Names
In combination with the already available variables, heuristically extracted
“descriptive names” will help us obtain insights into different tribal, religious,
occupational and other groups that flourished in the Islamic world. Just as
geographical maps were helpful for the visualization of top hundred toponyms
over time, word clouds will help us to deal with large numbers of “descriptive
names.” The principle of the word cloud is quite simple: the more frequent
the word, the larger it is in the cloud. One of the most efficient tools for gen-
erating word clouds, Wordle110 is a very effective exploratory tool that allows
the user to get quick insights into large quantities of text. With temporal, to-
ponymic and onomastic data already extracted, one can zoom in to any group
of individuals that can be described with these kinds of data: specific legal
school, specific “secular” occupation, specific region, specific period or some
combination of the above. By looking into the co-occurrences of “descriptive
names” one can get a good idea of the composition of the entire group.
For now, however, let’s take a broad look at the identities of notable Mus-
lims and how they changed over time. Figure 1.23 shows that the majority of
Muslims during the period of 41–140 ah/662–758 ce were strongly affiliated
with the cities of Kufa (al-Kūf̄ı), Medina (al-Madan̄ı) and Basra (al-Bas.r̄ı);
to a lesser extent with Mecca (al-Makk̄ı) and the Syrian cities of Damascus
(al-Dimashq̄ı) and Homs (al-H. ims.̄ı), and also with Egypt in general (al-Mis.r̄ı).
110This free online tool, http://www.wordle.net/, has already become the subject of
over a dozen academic articles that explore how it can benefit both teaching and research.
Wordle creates aesthetically pleasing visualizations of quantitative data without the use of
numbers; the latter must have been the selling point for the humanists, who usually do not
have “a head for numbers.”
82
Figure 1.23: The Wordle of Islamic Names (41–140 ah/662–758 ce.
Clearly visible are names that emphasize affiliation with the Prophet (most
prominently, al-Ans.ār̄ı, “the Helper of the Prophet;” the words rasūl , “mes-
senger,” and nab̄ı, “the Prophet,” convey the same meaning).
Most striking, however, is the abundance of tribal affiliations with the tribe
of the Prophet understandably prevailing: banū Quraysh (al-Qurash̄ı), banū
Asad (al-Asad̄ı), banū Umayya (al-Umaw̄ı),111 banū Azd, or Asd (al-Azd̄ı),
banū Makhzūm (al-Makhzūmı̄), banū Thaq̄ıf (al-Thaqaf̄ı), banū Taym (al-
Taymı̄), banū Hāshim (al-Hāshimı̄),112 banū Sulaym (al-Sulamı̄), banū Hamdān
(al-Hamdān̄ı), plus at least another dozen tribes. This is by no means sur-
prising, since this was the tribal period of the Islamic society and non-Arab
converts had to become clients of Arab tribes: the word mawlá, “client,” is
the third most prominent “descriptive” name of this period. Religious knowl-
111The principal clan of banū Quraysh: that of the Umayyad dynasty (661–750 ce).
112Another clan of the Quraysh: that of the Prophet.
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Figure 1.24: The Wordle of Islamic Names (321–420 ah/934–1030 ce).
edge is marginally reflected in Muslim names (al-Qād. ı̄, al-Faq̄ıh); a word such
as amı̄r , “commander,” seems to emphasize the military nature of the early
Islamic community.
The overall situation in the middle of our period, 321–420 ah/934–1030 ce
(Figure 1.24), is quite different. First of all, the geography of names has
changed: while a significant number of Muslims are now strongly affiliated
with Baghdād (al-Baghdād̄ı), one can also see a significant presence of other
regions: Iran with its cities of Nishapur (al-Naysābūr̄ı), Isfahan (al-Is.bāhan̄ı),
Herat (al-Haraw̄ı), Rayy (al-Rāz̄ı), Merw (al-Marwaz̄ı) and many others; Spain
(al-Andalus̄ı) with Cordoba (al-Qurt.ub̄ı); Syria with Damascus (al-Dimashq̄ı),
and Egypt—still without any specific cities (al-Mis.r̄ı).
While tribal identities fade away, religious knowledge becomes an essential
part of Islamic identity. In addition to jurists (al-Faq̄ıh) and judges (al-Qād. ı̄),
who became much more prominent in this period, one can clearly see reciters of
the Qur↩ān (al-Muqr̄ı↩), “preservers” and transmitters of the Prophetic tradi-
tion (al-H. āfiz., al-Muh. addith, al-Thiqa), pietists of all kinds (al-Zāhid, al-S. ālih. ,
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Figure 1.25: The Wordle of Islamic Names (601–700 ah/1205–1301 ce).
al-↪Ābid, al-S. ūf̄ı), “public preachers” (al-Wā↪iz.), muezzins (al-Mu↩adhdhin),
Friday-preachers (al-Khat.̄ıb). The development of Islamic administration is
attested by such names as al-Waz̄ır, “minister,” and al-Kātib, “scribe.”
Secular occupations also become a part of the Islamic onomasticon: al-
Bazzāz (“textile dealer”), al-Warrāq (“paper seller,” “bookseller,” “copyist”),
al-Tājir (“merchant”), al-Qat.t.ān (“cotton dealer”), al-↪At.t.ār (“perfume mer-
chant”, “druggist”), al-S. ayraf̄ı (“money-changer”), al-S. affār (“coppersmith”),
although a different Wordle would be more efficient to visualize these data.
Affiliations with legal schools—al-Shāfi ↪̄ı, al-Mālik̄ı, al-H. anaf̄ı—begin to gain
prominence.
The names of the last century of our period, 601–700 ah/1205–1301 ce
(Figure 1.25), tell yet another story. The geography of names has shifted
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again: Damascus and Baghdad are the main cities of this period. Greater
Syria with its numerous cities is now the most prominent region. The impor-
tance of Egypt (al-Mis.r̄ı) is growing together with its city of Alexandria (al-
Iskandarān̄ı). Muslim Spain continues to fade away, while the eastern provinces
practically disappear.
Religious identities are now expressed primarily through affiliation with
legal schools—al-Shāfi ↪̄ı, al-H. anbal̄ı, al-H. anaf̄ı, al-Mālik̄ı. Piety becomes an
even more important part of Islamic identity (al-S. ālih. , al-Zāhid, al-↪Ābid);
one can also see that mysticism (al-S. ūf̄ı) gains momentum. The importance
of religious knowledge is still expressed through jurisprudence (al-Qād. ı̄, al-
Faq̄ıh), recitation of the Qur↩ān (al-Muqr̄ı↩) and transmission of the Prophetic
tradition (al-Muh. addith, al-H. āfiz.), but the priorities seem to have shifted. The
lineage of the Prophet and his close companions—al-Ans.ār̄ı, al-Qurash̄ı and
al-Shar̄ıf—becomes a significant part of social capital. In the previous period,
“public preachers” (al-Wā↪iz.) were quite prominent, but now they disappear,
passing the baton to Friday-preachers (al-Khat.̄ıb). Such names as al-Amı̄r,
“commander,” and al-Sult.ān, “sultan,” seem to reflect the contribution of the
military élites—the Zangids, Ayyūbids and Mamlūks—to the religious and
social life of the Islamic community.
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Chapter 2
Modeling Geography & Society
2.1 Geography
2.1.1 Modeling Geography
The Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām covers a rather long period and a rather large terri-
tory. In order to make analysis effective it is necessary to split this informa-
tion into manageable subsets. Newly available computational techniques allow
[re-]grouping spatial data in a flexible and efficient manner. The division of the
Islamic world that I propose here is tentative, since both pre-modern Islamic
men of learning and modern Western scholars often have different opinions
(or none at all) regarding each and every location; additionally, some places
could have belonged to different provinces during different periods. In model-
ing toponymic hierarchy I have relied primarily on Mu↪jam al-buldān, Kitāb
al-ansāb, and relevant articles from Brill’s Encyclopaedia of Islam. This is
hardly sufficient and, ideally, there should be another model in place, that
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should be built on data from the wide range of Arabic geographical1 and his-
torical sources and that should account for a number of different parameters,
including time and cost of travel between different places through all probable
routes. With such a model of the Islamic world in place it will be possible to
establish heuristically the natural boundaries among different regions, which
should lead in turn to a better understanding of the historical dynamics of the
Islamic world in general.2 What follows is a first step in this direction.
The color-coded map on Figure 2.1 shows that places belonging to dif-
ferent provinces3 form clusters with colored bubbles shaping the extent of
each province more effectively than most conventional maps. This division,
however, is too complex; besides, not every province in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām is rep-
resented with the same level of details, so it makes sense to further re-group
these provinces into analytical regions. This should allow us to see patterns
where data are scarce, and to get a more nuanced picture where data are overly
abundant.
1Such as, for example, Ah. san al-taqās̄ım f̄ı ma↪rifat al-aqāl̄ım of al-Muqaddas̄ı (4/10
th
century)—as well as other specimens of the “the routes and the realms” genre (al-mamālik
wa-l-masālik), which contain detailed descriptions of provinces and often estimate “time
costs” of travels between different locations.
2Implemented in ORBIS, these features allowed Walter Scheidel to demonstrate that
“the formation and eventual partitioning and disintegration of the Roman Empire were
broadly consistent with cost constraints.” See: Walter Scheidel, ‘The shape of the
Roman world’, Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics, 041306.
3Some locations do not clearly belong to any specific province. These are situated in
“empty regions” between provinces and serve as connecting hubs on the way from one to
another. For example, ‘Aydhāb on the African side of the Red sea shore that connects
Egypt with al-H. ijāz; Ayla and Tābūq that connect Syria and al-H. ijāz; Fayd on the way
between Iraq and al-H. ijāz; and T. abas—between Khurāsān and Fārs; Zaw̄ıla (or Zuwayla,
which actually belongs to Fazzān) and Tāhart on the way to Sub-Saharan Africa. I have
provisionally clustered such locations with what seemed to be the closest province. Some
closely located provinces are grouped and only one name is displayed on the map: J̄ılān
is grouped with al-Daylam, T. abaristān with Qūmis, Jurjān with Dihistān (all in northern
Iran); al-Urdunn is grouped with Filast.̄ın (modern Jordan, Israel and Palestine).
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Figure 2.1: Major Provinces in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. The upper map is based on the frequen-
cies of toponyms mentioned in biographies (all toponyms that are mentioned in at least
5 biographies are considered). The lower map is based on the frequencies of toponymic
nisbas (all nisbas that are mentioned in the onomastic sections of at least 10 biographies
are considered). The size of each bubble is proportional to the number of biographies that
mention specific locations or nisbas.
Figure 2.2 shows the division into clusters that will be used in further
analysis. Some clusters correspond to single provinces, while others combine
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Figure 2.2: Regional Clusters in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Compound clusters that include multiple
provinces are explained in the Table 2.3.
multiple regions. These clusters are described in Table 2.3.
Figure 2.4 visualizes the proportional representation of regional clusters on
a chronological graph. Although the graph makes clear that with the data
stretched over the entire period some regions become barely visible, it is well
worth keeping distant regions separate from each other. For example, the East
African Cluster appears as something of an overstatement, considering how few
data on this region are available in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. However, if one takes a
closer look4 one can notice that there is a minor presence of that cluster in
the early period—most likely due to connections with Abyssinia (al-H. abasha)
in the pre-Medinan period of Muh. ammad’s mission—and a more noticeable
presence due to the influx of African slaves (and eunuchs, in particular) into the
military and administrative élites of the period of 500–700 ah/1107–1301 ce.5
4If you are reading a PDF, you need to zoom in to notice this particular cluster.
5Most frequent nisbas that co-occur with al-H. abash̄ı, “Abyssinian,” for this period are
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Cluster Provinces
North African Cluster S. iqilliya (Sicily), Ifriqiya,
It.rabulūs, Barqa (Barka)
Egyptian Cluster Mis.r (Lower Egypt), al-Sa↪id (Upper Egypt),
al-Nūba (Nubia)
East African Cluster al-Sūdān (Sudan), al-H. abasha (Abyssinia)
South Arabian Cluster Tihāma, al-Yaman,
H. ad. ramawt, ↪Umān
Central Arabian Cluster al-H. ijāz, al-Yamāma,
Najd, al-Bah. rayn
Anatolian Cluster al-Rūm (Anatolia),
al-↪Awās.im
Caucasian Cluster Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Arrān, the North Caucasus
SW Iran[ian Cluster] Khuzistān/al-Ahwāz, Fārs




NE Iran[ian Cluster] Khurāsān
Central Asian Cluster Mā warā↩ al-nahr (Transoxania),
Khwārizm (Khorezm),
Farghāna (the Ferghana valley)
South Eastern Cluster al-Mafāza (SE Iran), Kirmān (SE Iran),
Makrān (SE Iran), S̄ı[j̄ı]stān (SE Iran),
Zābulistān (Afghanistan), al-Sind (Pakistan),
Hind (India)
Figure 2.3: Compound Clusters in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Ideally, there should be a flexible
algorithm allowing to re-regroup geographical data into clusters that represent different
periods more precisely.
Undeniably, this is a minor detail within the big picture, but keeping such
clusters separate6 will help us in tracing geographical connections within the
Islamic world.
khādim and t.awāsh̄ı (both are euphemisms for “eunuch”), and amı̄r, “commander.”
6And, perhaps, “orphan” locations as well.
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Figure 2.4: Proportional representation of regional clusters in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. The
graphs show the proportional representation of regional clusters based on toponyms (left)
and toponymic nisbas (right).
Differences in proportions between toponyms and toponymic nisbas that
represent the same region reflect the volume of traffic to/from that region:
the traffic is inbound if more biographies mention toponyms than toponymic
nisbas, and outbound if otherwise. Although this graph is not an efficient
way to analyze migration traffic (graphs and maps based on absolute numbers
will be more efficient), the Central Arabian Cluster will help to illustrate the
point. The numbers of individuals coming from this region—mainly from the
two sacred cities of Mecca and Medina—drops very significantly from almost
40% in the beginning of our period to about 2-3% around 250/865 ce and
remains at this level till the end of the period; yet the number of individuals
visiting these places—for pilgrimage (h. ajj ) and pious sojourn (mujāwara)—
remains within 8-9%, dropping only slightly at the very end of the period.
2.1.2 Regional Representation
Figure 2.5 shows the chronological representation of each geographical cluster
in absolute numbers (top) and in density of distribution of data points (bot-
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tom), which are useful for determining peaks of data. The representation of
several clusters is rather insignificant. These are mostly regions on the margins
of the Islamic world of our period—the further they are from the core the less
visible they are on the graph. The only exceptions are Andalusia and Central
Asia. The former is well represented due to its thriving and largely indepen-
dent scholarly culture, while the second is mainly due to its integration into
the core through northeastern Iran (Khurāsān). The well-represented clusters
can be divided into three major categories of early, middle and late bloomers.
Quite understandably, central Arabia, the cradle of Islam, is most promi-
nent in the early period. However, its rapid decline begins around 100/719 ce
and by 250/865 ce this region is diminished to a marginal province. Major ur-
ban centers7 of this region are, quite predictably, Mecca/Makka and Medina/
al-Mad̄ına—homes to 268 and 7948 individuals respectively. Medina’s status
as capital is clearly visible.
The center moves to Iraq early on and stays there for the most of the period
covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Iraq is rivaled in prominence only by Iran, with
all its clusters combined. The rapid growth of Iraq comes to the end around
250/865 ce. During this period its prominent urban centers are Basra/al-
Bas.ra (1665 individuals) and Kufa/al-Kufa (1515 individuals); however, they
are soon dwarfed by Baghdad—the new caliphal capital—and practically dis-
appear from the social map of the Islamic world by around 300/913 ce.
Baghdad (3895 individuals—the highest number!) remains the dominant
7In this section, major urban centers are homes to at least one hundred individuals.
8This number includes some false positives, since nisba al-Madan̄ı may occasionally refer
to cities other than Medina; this, however, does not affect the curve.
93
Figure 2.5: Chronological representation of geographical clusters in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām: ab-
solute numbers (top) and density plots (bottom).
urban center not only for Iraq, but for the entire Islamic world even after
the ↪Abbāsids lose their grip on power. Even more so, Baghdad’s peak as
an urban center actually occurs around 585/1190 ce. Starting around 200/
816 ce the province of Iraq goes into clearly visible decline, although the
number of scholars there still remains quite significant if compared to other
regions. Roughly 480/1088 ce is the beginning of recovery for Iraq, which goes
94
again into decline about 100 lunar years later. By the end of the period, Iraqi
élites drastically decrease in numbers, practically disappearing from the social
map of the Islamic world. Conventionally, the Mongol invasion is considered
the main cause, but, in fact, the ranks of the Iraqi élites start thinning before
that.9 Other major urban centers are Wāsit. (401) and Mosul/al-Maws.il (313).
With Khurāsān in the lead, Iranian clusters begin to gain prominence be-
tween 100/719 ce and 200/816 ce. Northeastern Iran does not have a clear
peaking point; instead, its curve reaches its highest point quite quickly around
200/816 ce and remains there, fluctuating slightly, for over three centuries,
and then, after 520/1127 ce, it goes into rapid decline. It takes longer for
northwestern Iran to reach its peak—around 350/962 ce—and then it slowly
goes down. Unlike northeastern Iran, it is still visible on the maps of the
Islamic world by the end of our period. The curve of southwestern Iran is
somewhat similar to that of northeastern Iran, although its curve reaches its
highest point around 280/894 ce, then goes into a temporary decline during
the 4th/10th century, recovers by 400/1010 ce and begins to go down slowly,
increasing its pace of decline around 520/1127 ce. The major urban centers
are: Nishapur/Naysābūr (1,105), Merv/Marw [al-shāhijān] (452), Herat/Harāt
(424), Balkh (171) and T. ūs (136) in northeastern Iran (Khurāsān); Rey/al-
Rayy (280), Hamadhān (254) and Qazw̄ın (118) in northwestern Iran; and
Isfahan/Is.bah. an (1,124) and Sh̄ırāz (100) in southwestern Iran. All the Ira-
9For example, the number of Baghdadis drops very significantly before the Mongol sack
of the capital city. Number of death reported for the 20 lunar year periods after 600/
1204 ce: 244 for 600–620 ah/1204–1224 ce; 256 for 621–640 ah/1225–1243 ce; 98 for 641–
660 ah/1244–1262 ce (the Mongols sack Baghdad in 656/1259 ce); 27 for 661–680 ah/
1263–1282 ce; 51 for 681–700 ah/1283–1301 ce. See, Appendices: Toponymic Nisbas,
nisba al-Baghdād̄ı.
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nian clusters practically come to naught by the end of the period covered in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
The two-peaked curve of the last “middle bloomer,” al-Andalus, seems to
correspond to the zenith of the Umayyad caliphate around 380/991 ce fol-
lowed by its disintegration and the recovery under the Almoravids and the
Almohads, beginning around 470/1078 ce and peaking around 590/1195 ce;
after that Andalusia is erased from the map of the Islamic world by the Chris-
tian Reconquista. The major Andalusian urban centers are Cordova/Qurt.uba
(633), Seville/Ishb̄ıliya (248) and Valencia/Balansiyya (141).
The “late bloomers” form what can be considered as one continuous macro-
region stretching from the Jaz̄ıra (Upper Mesopotamia) in the north, through
Syria (al-Shām) and Jordan (al-Urdunn), to Egypt (Mis.r) in the south. The
presence of these regions rises noticeably after 500/1107 ce. All these regions
also have their peaks of prominence—around 100/719 ce for Syria, around
200/816 ce for the Jaz̄ıra and Jordan, and around 300/913 ce for Egypt,
followed by equally noticeable decline until around 500/1107 ce. The major
urban centers are as follows: H. arrān (224) in the Jaz̄ıra; Damascus/Dimashq
(1,769), Homs/H. ims. (268), Aleppo/H. alab (231) and Hamah/H. amā (103) in
Syria; Jerusalem/al-Quds (315) in Jordan; and Alexandria/al-Iskandariyya
(211) in Egypt. By the end of the main period covered in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām,
Syria is the new center of the Islamic world.
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2.1.3 Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām vs. Shadharāt al-dhahab
Concluding this chapter, I would like to offer a look at al-Dhahab̄ı’s data from
a different perspective. In his study of conversion, Bulliet prepared a chart of
regional representation in Ibn ↪Imad’s Shadharāt al-dhahab. Using computa-
tional methods, al-Dhahab̄ı’s data can be regrouped in a similar manner for
comparison. Figure 2.6 shows both graphs.10
The similarities between these two sources are striking, to say the least,
especially if we consider that the biography count in these sources differs most
significantly: over 30,000 biographies in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām for the period of
700 lunar years (about 74% individuals with toponymic nisbas) versus about
8500 biographies in Shadharāt al-dhahab for the period of 1000 lunar years
(about 72% individuals with identifiable places of origin for the period of 100–
1000 ah/719–1592 ce).11
The comparative chart shows that these two vast biographical collections,
which were composed by individuals who lived over three centuries apart and
belonged to different ideological camps, tell us the same story about the re-
gional development of the Islamic world—the story that “does appear to cor-
respond rather closely to the generally accepted course of Islamic history.”12
These findings should tip the scales in favor of the idea that medieval Arabic
10Bulliet’s chart is slightly modified: regions are colored to match those on the chart
for Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām; additionally, periods not covered in both source are faded out. The
original graph can be found in: Bulliet (1979), Conversion to Islam in the medieval period:
an essay in quantitative history , 8.
11Bulliet noted the same kind of similarity between Shadharāt al-dhahab and Kitāb al-
↪ibar f̄ı khabar man ghabar, another al-Dhahab̄ı’s book. See, Ibid., 13. Unfortunately, I do
not have any quantitative data for this source to further comparison.
12Ibid., 12.
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biographical collections represent historical reality.
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Figure 2.6: Proportional Representation of Regions in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām and Shadharāt






























Figure 2.7: Models for geographical connections: dots are locations; c stands for the
central geographical location; a —for an additional central geographical point.
2.2 Connections
2.2.1 Modeling Connections
Places mentioned in the biography of a particular individual can be connected
in a graph that represents this individual’s geographical network. Placing such
a graph on a geographical map will give us a clear idea of that network.13
Figure 2.7 shows possible ways of modeling the geographical connections of
an individual. Subfigure (i) displays a model where the “central geographical
point” ( c ) is connected to all other locations mentioned in a biography. the
central geographical point here is a location referred to in a given individual’s
toponymic nisba: in a given example, the biography of certain individual from
Basra also mentions Kufa, Baghdad, Medina and Mecca. Subfigure (ii) is
another possibility: these connections take into account a given individual’s
itinerary. The obvious problem with these models is that toponymic nisbas are
13Again, if an individual simply maintained correspondence with some person from a
particular place, it is a stronger connection than no connection at all.
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not given for each and every individual, which makes determining the central
point problematic. The first toponym mentioned in a biography can be used
as the central point when toponymic nisbas are lacking, but this is likely to
negatively affect the precision of a model. Besides, establishing an itinerary
computationally is problematic: one can use the order in which toponyms are
mentioned in a biography, but there is hardly any guarantee that this order
actually reflects how a given individual visited these places (especially when
they are simply listed and no other details are provided). Subfigures (iii) &
(iv) offer a more balanced alternative. Arguably, by maintaining connections
with different locations, an individual brings them all together and Subfigure
(iii) shows that all locations can be treated as interconnected. In a case where
a certain individual’s toponymic nisba is known, it can be added to the graph
as a central point ( c ) and additional toponymic nisbas can be accommodated
as well ( a ). In cases where no toponymic nisba is given, one can still graph
the connections as shown on Subfigure (iv).14
Modeled in such a manner, the geographical networks of individuals can
then be aggregated into a cumulative network that will shed light on how the
entire Islamic world stayed connected and how connections between regions
changed over time.15 The compound geographical network can be further
divided into subsets representing specific combinations of periods, regions and
social groups.
14The obvious shortcoming of these schemes is that they represent individuals as if they
were traveling by air, without the consideration of actual trade routes that connected differ-
ent regions of the Islamic world. Unfortunately, at the moment it is impossible to add this
layer of data into analysis, if only because it is still unavailable in any formalized format
that can be incorporated into computational algorithms.
15There are 25,875 biographies (89.9%) that have at least one toponymic reference.
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Figure 2.8: Transregional Mobility in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Individuals whose biographies
mention at least two different regional clusters are considered transregionally mobile.
2.2.1.1 A Note on Transregional Mobility
The graphs on Figure 2.8 represent the issue of transregional mobility of Is-
lamic élites, showing how numbers of transregionally mobile and settled in-
dividuals were changing over time. Individuals whose biographies mention at
least two different regional clusters16 are considered transregionally mobile.
More detailed differentiation is difficult, since the mention of even two clusters
may imply a very impressive itinerary, especially if these clusters are as distant
as, for example, al-Andalus and Iraq. Overall, individuals with transregional
connections in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām constitute 33% (9,697) of the entire popula-
tion of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. The proportion of transregionally mobile individuals
fluctuates within the range of 22–46%, growing toward the end of the period.
Absolute numbers demonstrate a similar trend of growth toward the end of
the period.
16Regional clusters are shown on Figure 2.2 above.
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2.2.2 The Core of the Islamic World
Figures 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 show a chronological series of maps of
connections based on the data from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Each mini-map shows
data for a 50 lunar year period (and adjusted 30 lunar years back in time).17
Each circle represents a regional cluster: the yellow core visualizes the number
of individuals strongly associated with a regional cluster through their nisbas,
i.e. who were either born or spent a significant amount of time there. The red
“husk” shows the number of individuals who most likely visited a region: one
or more locations belonging to a regional cluster in question are mentioned in
biographies. Arcs visualize connections between regional clusters; depending
on the number of individuals with connections between two particular clus-
ters, arcs vary in their properties, namely, transparency, thickness and color.
Bleak thin arcs of green color stand for smaller numbers of individuals with
particular connections, while bright thick arcs of red color stand for larger
numbers of individuals with particular connections during a given 50 lunar
year period. Together, these properties allow for making single connections
practically invisible, thus excluding irregularities that do not form patterns.
The presence of green arcs connecting together most clusters on most maps
shows that, in general, the Islamic world remained interconnected through the
members of its religious, military, administrative and civilian élites over almost
the entire period covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. We, of course, need to keep in
mind that the number of individuals who maintained this interconnectedness
17Animated maps can be found in the “Dissertation Appendices” online: http://
alraqmiyyat.org/research/.
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Figure 2.9: Transregional Connections (50–190 ah/671–807 ce).
fluctuated between 22% and 46%. At the same time, red[ish] arcs strongly
suggest that the core of the Islamic world—by which we may understand
the most closely connected regional clusters—was constantly changing and
shifting.
For the earliest period, 20–70 ah/642–690 ce, the core is the triangle of
Central Arabia, Syria and Iraq, where the latter is quickly outgrowing the
others in importance. Unfortunately, for the early period—roughly up to 100/
719 ce—toponymic nisbas are not as frequent as they are in later periods, and
most individuals are identified primarily through tribal affiliations. This issue
complicates any geospatial visualization of biographical data; georeferencing
tribes and tribal nisbas might help, but at the moment it is not implemented.
By 80–130 ah/700–749 ce, Iraq (Lower Mesopotamia) clearly becomes the
center, while its strongest connections are still with Central Arabia and Syria.
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Figure 2.10: Transregional Connections (170–310 ah/787–923 ce).
Meanwhile, other regions begin to converge on it as well: the Jaz̄ıra (Upper
Mesopotamia), northwestern Iran, northeastern Iran, southwestern Iran and
South Arabia. By 140–190 ah/758–807 ce, connections between Iraq and
Egypt become noticeably stronger, while those between Iraq, southwestern
Iran and South Arabia in particular weaken. During the period 170–340 ah/
787–952 ce the core remains roughly the same: with Iraq in the center, Central
Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and the three main Iranian clusters strongly intercon-
nected.
320–430 ah/933–1039 ce is the period when the largest number of regional
clusters are brought together through transregional connections: now Andalu-
sia and Central Asia are strongly connected to the core—the former mostly
through Egypt, the latter through northeastern Iran.
By 470–520 ah/1078–1127 ce, Egypt splits from the core. Andalusia ap-
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Figure 2.11: Transregional Connections (290–430 ah/904–1039 ce).
pears to begin forming its own core with Maghrib and North Africa, par-
ticularly for the period of 500–610 ah/1107–1214 ce. These changes make
the main core take a temporary shift eastward—440–550 ah/1049–1156 ce—
toward Iran. Yet another shift—this time to the Mediterranean shore of Syria
and Egypt—seems to begin as early as 530/1136 ce and the triangle of Syria,
Egypt and Iraq become the core by the end of the period covered Ta↩r̄ıkh
al-islām; Iraq, however, is in continuous decline. Thick red “husks” of Syria
and Egypt strongly imply the migrations of scholars from other regions, whose
yellow cores are dwindling.
The shifts of the core resonate with the overall political/dynastic history of
the Islamic world during the period covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. There are no
exact chronological correspondences, of course. There hardly can be any, since
new dynasties do not change the social space of their new subjects overnight,
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Figure 2.12: Transregional Connections (410–550 ah/1020–1156 ce).
but their policies may, can and often do have an effect on the social space in
the long run. At the same time, new dynasties also come to power as a result
of some significant social, economic or environmental change.
2.2.3 Patterns of Transregional Connections
Toghether with the basic statistics and density graphs, the maps of connections
of individual clusters show18 that transregional connections are distributed in
accordance with what can be tentatively called “the proximity principle”: each
cluster is most densely connected with its closest neighbors, while the density
of connections with the most remote clusters is usually the lowest. At the same
time, adjustments for the core should always be taken into consideration: each
18Detailed description of regional clusters are provided in Appendix A and should be
consulted when necessary.
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Figure 2.13: Transregional Connections (530–670 ah/1136–1272 ce).
“mini-period”—a 50 lunar year period displayed on mini-maps19—has its own
constellations of connections, but they always seem to gravitate toward what
constitutes the core during this period (see Section 2.2.2 above).
An analysis of these connections shows that instead of being a pan-Islamic
commonwealth, the Islamic world was a commonwealth of commonwealths,
where the most remote regions were connected with each other through the
proxy of other commonwealths. If we treat any region as the center of a
commonwealth, its boundaries extend into the neighboring regions. Never
crisp and clear, these boundaries are more like a drop of India ink on wet rice
paper—their intensity fades as they bleed further and further into neighboring
regions. These boundaries were not constant either—the red arcs on mini-maps
show how the extent of each commonwealth shifted over time. For example,
19Chronological maps for each region are included in the Appendices.
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the commonwealth of northeastern Iran first extended to Arabia (20–130 ah/
642–749 ce), then it started shifting toward Iraq (as early as 110/729 ce),
gradually extending toward northwestern Iran, the Central Asian cluster and
Syria; around 500/1107 ce, when its own center started dwindling, it began
shifting more and more toward Syria. The commonwealth of northeastern Iran
barely touched Egypt at the end of the period and never extended as far as
the North African cluster, the Maghrib and Andalusia, although their fading
boundaries brushed against each other for short periods.
If we were to map these commonwealths, they would look like irregular
overlapping shapes with their boundaries fading into other regions. Until the
middle of the 7th/13th century, Iraq was the place where the boundaries of most
Islamic commonwealths overlapped. However, Iraq was too remote for the
western regions, as the boundaries of their commonwealths reached Egypt and
Syria, and only marginally Iraq. It seems that with the decline of the Iranian
provinces, “gravitational pull” naturally shifted toward Syria and Egypt.
There is no doubt that significant volumes of migration contributed to
creating and maintaining the sense of one shared space—geographically, cul-
turally, religiously, and, occasionally, politically. However, the proximity prin-
ciple is not always at play when it comes to transregional migrants. Although
the patterns of transregional migrations often mirror those of transregional
connections—especially in cases of well-represented regions, we can often see
significant numbers of transregional migrations between rather distant regions,
in terms of the ratio between regional connections and regional migrants (the
South Arabian Cluster is the most interesting example of this). In some cases
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these distant migrations may have resulted from the mere inability of an in-
dividual to return home, since travels in this period would cost a fortune and
last for years. Such migrations, however, would most likely be sporadic and
not form distinctive patterns. When, on the other hand, migrations form un-
interrupted blocks with discernible spikes, this must point to some significant
changes—be they of social, religious, economic or political nature. We should
keep in mind that some migrations could have been based on connections
which are not reflected in biographical sources (or, not extractable yet).
Although this “proximity principle” seems rather simple and intuitive, the
ability to actually demonstrate it on a large data set may have significant
implications for our understanding of how ideas (disembodied practices) and
practices (embodied ideas) could have been spreading within the Islamic world.
The “shingles” of commonwealths definitely offered plenty of opportunities for
ideas to travel between the farthest reaches of the East and West of the Islamic
world. For the spread of practices, however, these shingles would impose rather
strict limitations. Each practice needs its practitioners and for this reason is
least likely to make its way into a region with which it lacks strong connections.
Connections through the proxies may serve as conduits, but they are also very
likely to have a transformational effect—and the more proxies are involved in
the transmission, the more different a practice will be from its original form.
As I hope to show in later chapters, the practice of public preaching (wa↪z.)
develops most prominently in Iran and its spread remains confined to the limits
of the Iranian commonwealth—the number of public preachers drops as the
extent of the Iranian commonwealth fades.
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Figure 2.14: Peaks of Major Urban Centers of the Islamic East (at least 25 individuals
per center).
2.2.4 A Note on Urban Growth
The peaks of urban centers—periods when the largest number of individuals
associated with these centers flourished—seem to show best how the geography
of the Islamic world was changing over the first seven centuries of Islamic
history.
Figure 2.14 shows peaks of the major urban centers of the Islamic East
(at least 25 individuals per center). Placed on chronological maps, peaks of
urban centers in the East form a pattern: an expansion that reaches its limits
in Central Asia and Anatolia (the region of al-↪Awās.im) during 201–300 ah/
817–913 ce, a contraction to Iran and Iraq during 301–600 ah/914–1204 ce,
and a sharp turn toward the Mediterranean during 601–700 ah/1205–1301 ce.
During 601–700 ah/1205–1301 ce, urban centers of the Islamic East form a
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Figure 2.15: The Urban Crescent of the 7th/13th Century: Peaks of Urban Centers with
frequencies 10 and higher during 601–700 ah/1205–1301 ce.
continuous crescent-shaped cluster that brings together a number of provinces
into one macro-region (Figure 2.15). This crescent extends from Egypt (al-
Bahansā, Alexandria/al-Iskandariyya, Sakhā, and Damietta/Dimyāt.) in the
south, through Jordan (Ashkelon/↪Asqalān, Jerusalem/al-Quds, Nābulus), Syria
(al-Mizza, Damascus/Dimashq, Baalbek/Ba↪labakk, Hama/H. amā, Aleppo/
H. alab, Manbij), the Jaz̄ıra (H. arrān, Samsat/Sumaysāt., Amida/Āmid, Mārd̄ın,
Mayyāfāriq̄ın), the northern part of Iraq (Mosul/al-Maws.il, Irb̄ıl), the very
south of the Caucasian cluster (Hakkari/al-Hakkāriyya, Khoy/Khūy, Tabr̄ız,
Marāgha) in the north, and even touches northwestern Iran (Zanjān).
A similar shift toward the Mediterranean shore happens with the west-
ern urban centers a century earlier—during 501–600 ah/1108–1204 ce (Fig-
ure 2.16)—and it is most clearly visible in Andalusia. This shift towards the
Mediterranean shore could have been a consequence of the itinerant rule of the
Almohad caliphs who systematically moved back and forth between Andalusia
and the Maghrib.
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Figure 2.16: Peaks of Urban Centers in Andalusia and North Africa.
On a bigger scale though, discernible in the West as well as in the East, the
shift toward the Mediterranean can be interpreted as a sign of the formation of
the new Mediterranean commonwealth with the Italian “Maritime Republics”
(Genoa, Pisa, Venice, Almalfi and others) actively conducting trade between
Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.
2.3 Society
2.3.1 Modeling Society
The individuals whose lives are described in biographical collections were not
ordinary people. They were integrated into the life of society to a noticeable
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degree—somewhere on the scale from noteworthy to extraordinary. Almost
every biographical note contains some information on a sphere of life to which
its protagonist contributed—and “descriptive names” is the most manageable
indicator of this.
Major studies that use “descriptive names” for analytical purposes split
them into categories. Cohen’s classic study concentrates primarily on “secu-
lar occupations” during the first four centuries of Islamic history. He offered
a major division of occupational nisbas (textiles, foods, ornaments/perfumes,
paper/books, leather/metals/wood/clay, miscellaneous trades, general mer-
chants, bankers/middlemen) and supplied an extensive appendix with expla-
nations for about 400 nisbas and relevant linguistic formulae. Unfortunately,
the nisbas in Cohen’s appendix are not explicitly categorized and—since any
categorization involves pushing the boundaries, especially in instances that
stubbornly resist classification—the exact scheme remains somewhat unclear.20
Petry’s scheme is built on biographical data from Mamlūk Egypt (1258–
1517 ce). Petry divided his subjects into six major, often overlapping occu-
pational groups: executive and military professions, bureaucratic (secretarial-
financial) professions, legal professions, artisan and commercial professions,
scholarly and educational professions, and religious functionaries. Although
explicit classification is not given in the “Glossary of Occupational Terms,”
numerous tables provide enough information to form a rather clear idea about
the specifics of each category in Petry’s classification scheme.21
20Cohen (1970), ‘The Economic Background and the Secular Occupations of Muslim
Jurisprudents and Traditionists in the Classical Period of Islam: (Until the Middle of the
Eleventh Century)’.
21Petry (1981), The civilian elite of Cairo in the later Middle Ages. For the “Glossary,”
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Shatzmiller approached this issue from the much wider perspective of labor
in general. Her scheme covers a much wider variety of occupational names and
splits the entire society into three major sectors—extractive, manufacturing,
services—with each sector having its overlapping subcategories. Schatzmiller
offers an explicit categorization of each and every descriptive name.22
As is the case with any scheme, all three examples are designed to serve
specific purposes. Although immensely helpful, none of them are suitable
for the purposes of broader analysis: unlike the above-mentioned schemes,
the scheme needed here must take into account all meaningful descriptors,
not only those that can be classified as “occupations.” In other words, it
must consider anything that would allow discerning all potentially identifiable
groups so that their evolution could be traced. Some of these descriptors do
not pose significant problems, others are so complex that even presenting them
as ideal types might be highly problematic.
The list of “descriptive names” from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām is based on frequencies
and for the moment I consider nisbas that are used to qualify at least ten
individuals (slightly over 700). Thus, my list of descriptive names overlaps only
partially with those of Cohen, Petry and Shatzmiller. Figure 2.17 shows how
the categories of “descriptive names” from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām are interconnected
from the individual perspective.
The innermost layer of categories includes tribal, toponymic, ethnic and
physical descriptions. These are descriptors over which individuals have the
see pp. 390–402.
22Maya Shatzmiller, Labour in the medieval Islamic world (Leiden [The Netherlands]:
E.J. Brill, 1994); For extensive lists of names/occupations, see pp.101–168, 410–424.
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TRADE KNOWLEDGE POSITION STATUS
T K P S
Figure 2.18: Hierarchical Connections of the Middle Layer.
least control—in a sense that no one chooses into which tribe to be born, where
to be born, what ethnic group to belong to, and what physical peculiarities to
have or suffer from. To a certain degree these description are also acquirable—
in the early period being a Muslim meant being affiliated with an Arab tribe;
individuals were constantly moving around the Islamic world, changing their
toponymic affiliations; physical peculiarities could have resulted from life
experience. However, these are only probable—and thus secondary—cases
that would usually be piled up on top of primary, “by-birth” descriptions.
The first three categories— tribal, toponymic, ethnic—also tend to overlap.
The middle layer groups “descriptive names” in terms of acquirable qualities—
trade, knowledge, positition and status. These are not categories that rest
on the same level and their connections are better represented in an hierarchi-
cal manner (Figure 2.18). The main gateways to élites were trades (or “secular
occupations”) and knowledge[s]. However, practicing some trade alone was
almost never enough: biographical collections rarely—if ever—include individ-
uals who were involved exclusively in some specific “secular occupation.” In
order to climb up the social ladder a practitioner of any trade had to start
converting his economic capital into social—this was most commonly done
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through acquiring religious knowledge. Knowledge—as specialized training
in a specific area that would set an individual aside from the masses—opened
ways for acquiring positions and status[es]; it could also allow one to practice


























Figure 2.17: Interconnectedness of Descrip-
tive Names (Individual Perspective). Shifting
circles and dashed lines denote the intricate
interconnectedness of the three layers of name
categories.
The outermost layer represents
the major sectors to which a person
could belong in pre-modern Islamic
society: religious, administrative,
military, and “civilian.” The term
“civilian” is problematic, and is used
here essentially as a negative blan-
ket category that encompasses every-
thing that does not clearly belong to
the first three sectors. Descriptive
names often cross boundaries among
these categories and most individuals
do not clearly belong to one specific sectors, but rather balance between them.
For current purposes it will be more efficient to invert this scheme so that
“descriptive names” are presented from the social perspective. Now, each cat-
egory contributes to the composition of Islamic society, and every “descriptive
name” can be seen as a social role. These roles are likely to receive a centripetal
charge from individuals who attempt to expand their influence on society at
large; how close they get to the center—i.e., how much social influence they































































































Figure 2.20: Nisba Classification Examples.
historical circumstances that might be favorable to particular groups. Social
influence here is understood broadly as a pressure that forces someone to do
something that s/he otherwise would not have done; at this point I do not
make a distinction between physical threats and social pressures. Clearly, the
sword of an amı̄r, “military commander,” and the word of a shaykh, “religious
authority,” are different in their nature, but both may have equally serious
societal consequences.
Figures 2.20 & 2.21 should provide a visual clue to how these overlap-
ping categories are used in the classification scheme. On Figure 2.20: amı̄r,
“governor, commander,” and sult.ān, “sultan,” both belong to the military
sector of society. Amı̄r can be seen primarily as a position—in a sense that
there is somebody above who granted this position to a given individual;
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arguably, this position provides one with a relatively high status. Sult.ān
is the apex of the military hierarchy and thus is primarily seen as status
with significant influence over all other sectors. Kātib, “scribe,” and waz̄ır,
“vizier, prime minister,” belong to the administrative sector, where the for-
mer is a position with potential for social influence, while the latter is the
apex of the administrative hierarchy, which gives one significant resources to
influence society at large—hence, it is also status.23 Somewhat an equivalent
to amı̄r, ra ↩̄ıs, “chief, director,” is a denomination of high status in either
the civilian, the religious or the administrative sector (also position in the
latter). T. ab̄ıb, “physician,” stands for special training—knowledge—within
the civilian sector, which is also likely to fall into the categories of trade
and position, especially after hospitals (sing. bimaristān) become a constant
element of the Muslim cityscape.24 Qat.t.ān, “producer or seller of cotton,”
and qawwās, “bow-maker,” are both secular occupations—trades—and thus
belong to the civilian sector, although the latter—if bows are produced for
war-making purposes—may cross into the military one.
On Figure 2.21: shaykh, literally “elder,” and imām, “leader,” are the
markers of the highest religious status, although in the later period imām also
refers to a religious position of “prayer leader” that was only marginally influ-
23Some waz̄ırs rivaled their “employers” in influence. The most prominent examples
are the Barmakid family that served the ↪Abbāsid caliphs and Niz.ām al-mulk who served
Mālikshāh, the Great Saljuq sult.ān.
24There are 322 physicians in the ↪Uyūn al-anbā↩ f̄ı t.abaqāt al-at.ibbā* of Ibn Ab̄ı Us.aybi↪a
(d. 668/1270 ce) and quite a few physicians are Jews and Christians, judging by their names.
al-Dhahab̄ı’s count of physicians is about 200 which can be considered a very thorough
coverage, since Ibn Ab̄ı Us.aybi↪a’s book is devoted exclusively to the physicians (and as it
often happens, tends too overstretch the definition of the group), while al-Dhahab̄ı’s book
































































































Figure 2.21: Nisba Classification Examples.
ential in social terms. Faq̄ıh refers to knowledge of Islamic law, whereas social
influence is exerted primarily through other roles, such as qād. ı̄, “judge,” which
is always a position—or muft̄ı, “juristconsult,” which turns into a position
in the later period (not graphed). H. āfiz. denotes knowledge of Prophetic tra-
dition and high achievement (status) within this area of religious expertise.
Muh. tasib, “market inspector,” is an administrative position with strong re-
ligious underpinnings. Last on the list are khat.ı̄b, “Friday preacher,” and
wā↪iz. , “public preacher.” Both belong to the religious sector, but while the
former is always a position, the latter refers to a specific field of religious
knowledge that tends to become a position only during the later period.
Individuals in the Islamic biographical dictionaries usually wear many tur-
bans and are qualified with more than one “descriptive name.” Using the
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same method, each individual can be represented as a unique constellation of
trades, knowledge[s], positions and status[es] that are fitted into the dia-
gram of the four major sectors. Pushing this approach even further, we may
try to evaluate how the composition of Islamic élites—and, possibly, society at
large—changed over time, although conventional graphs may be more efficient
for this task.




























Figure 2.19: Interconnectedness of Descrip-
tive Names (Social Perspective). Shifting cir-
cles and dashed lines denote the intricate in-
terconnectedness of the three layers of name
categories.
Before proceeding, I need to return
to the cumulative biographical curve
from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Figure 2.22
shows the updated version of this
curve. It is formed and adjusted in
the same manner as the curve in Fig-
ure 1.16, although here biographies
are grouped into 20 lunar year pe-
riods (quantities of biographies are
shown at the bottom of the graph)
and the dataset is some 200 biogra-
phies larger—initially these biogra-
phies were excluded as cross-reference suspects (short notes that refer readers
to actual biographies in some other place of the collection).
The curve can be split into several periods, each beginning at a point that
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Figure 2.22: Updated Cumulative Biographical Curve. The row of numbers shows the
quantities of biographies per 20 lunar year periods, beginning with 41–60 ah/662–681 ce
and up to 680–700 ah/1282–1301 ce. Colored stripe designated period, each beginning with
a noticeable change in the curve’s direction.
marks a noticeable diversion of the curve. The number of biographies keeps
on growing quite rapidly until c. 160/778 ce, which marks the slowing of
growth. During c. 270–470 ah/884–1078 ce there is a steady decline. After
c. 470/1078 ce the curve starts recovering, reaching its highest point around
c. 570/1175 ce, after which it keeps on growing, but slows its pace by the end
of the period—with the second peak being somewhere after 700/1301 ce. For
convenience, many of the graphs that will follow will include the scaled-down
cumulative curve and color-coded periods.
The updated cumulative curve also has two additional dashed lines. The
normal distribution of data that represent any particular process usually has
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a bell-shaped form (the so-called bell curve).25 Curves with more than one
peak—two and more “overlaid bells”—are considered to represent mixed data
regarding the more than one process. This is exactly what we have in the
cumulative biographical curve based on data from the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, where
at least two major processes can be discerned.
2.3.1.1.1 Transformation of the Religious Class One of the possi-
ble interpretations is that these peaks reflect two different paradigms of be-
coming a religious scholar: the itinerant teacher-apprentice paradigm of the
early period is replaced by the settled madrasa paradigm of the late period.
The dashed lines offer projections for the two processes,26 suggesting that—
whatever these processes were—the second process began some time around
the peak of the first one; meanwhile the first one lingered well into the prime
time of the second.
2.3.1.1.2 The Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean Another pos-
sible interpretation of the dive of the curve may be related to demographical
changes within the Islamic society of our period. Some studies suggest such an
interpretation: the most recent one is Ellenblum’s The Collapse of the East-
ern Mediterranean27 that presents the period of 950–1072 ce as the period
of almost pan-Islamic dearth: agricultural crisis (in Iran, Iraq and, most im-
25This is one of the basic principles that are explained in any primer of statistics. For
explanations directly relevant to Islamic history, see: Bulliet (1979), Conversion to Islam
in the medieval period: an essay in quantitative history , 16–32.
26At the moment no math is involved in these projections, only Photoshop.
27Ronnie Ellenblum, The Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean: Climate Change and
the Decline of the East, 950-1072 (Cambridge University Press, September 2012).
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portantly, Egypt—“the granary of the ancient Mediterranean”), nomadization,
and population decline—all caused by the climate change directly or indirectly
through what Ellenblum calls “domino effects.” Unfortunately, testing such a
relation is extremely difficult, since demographic data on the pre-modern Is-
lamic world are practically non-existent. In part, this is an objective problem
of available sources, since we do lack primary sources that contain this kind of
information,28 but it is also a methodological issue, as very few attempts have
been made to model demographic processes using mathematical models.29
The only attempt at estimating the population of the pre-modern Islamic
world has been undertaken by European economists and historians Maarten
Bosker, Eltjo Buringh, Jan Luiten van Zanden.30 Their estimates of population
28We indeed can only envy the Roman historians who have a significant number of original
censuses. See, Wadād al Qād̄ı, ‘Population Census and Land Surveys under the Umayyads
(41-132/661-750)’, Der Islam, 83:2 (2006).
29This is something the Roman historians do, even though they are blessed with surviving
censuses. One of these models was actually designed to check the plausibility of censuses:
Peter Turchin and Walter Scheidel, ‘Coin hoards speak of population declines in
Ancient Rome’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 106:41 (October 2009); also see Scheidel’s chapter on demography in: Walter
Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard P. Saller, The Cambridge economic history of the
Greco-Roman world, Economic history of the Greco-Roman world. (Cambridge, UK ; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 38–86. A comparable chapter on the Islamic
world, on the other hand, lacks numeric data of any kind altogether (Suraiya Faroqhi,
‘Demography and migration’, in: Robert Irwin, editor, The New Cambridge History
of Islam: Islamic Cultures and Societies to the End of the Eighteenth Century, volume 4
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)). In general, there are very few attempts
to model demographic processes in our field. In this light, Agha’s study that estimates
the Arab population of Khurāsān relying on demographical “dependency ratios” is worth
mentioning: Saleh Said Agha, ‘The Arab Population in Hurāsān during the Umayyad
Period’, Arabica, 46:2 (April 1999).
30None of these scholars are Islamicists and, unfortunately, lands east of Iraq are not
included. See: Maarten Bosker, Eltjo Buringh and Jan Luiten van Zanden, ‘From
Baghdad to London: Unraveling Urban Development in Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa, 800–1800’, Review of Economics and Statistics, (May 2012). Different pre-
print versions are available online on authors’ webpages—these versions have more tabulated
data than the final published version. Their entire dataset is also available: I am grateful
to Maarten Bosker for sharing this dataset with me, and to Eltjo Buringh for answering my
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for the Middle East and North Africa seem to mirror the curve of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-
islām: 8th century 19,320 mln.; 9th century 20,583 mln.; 10th century 21,650;
11th century 18,500; 12th century 18,803; 13th century 20,808 (Figure 2.23).
These data demonstrates the decline of the population curve during the 11th
century and recovery in the 12th century: something Ellenblum’s study argues
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Figure 2.23: Estimates of the Population
of the Middle East and North Africa (800–
1400 ce). Based on the Bosker–Buringh–
van Zanden dataset (lands east of Iraq and
Andalusia are excluded).
It is tempting to conclude that
the biographical representation in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām reflects the overall
demographical situation in the Is-
lamic world, but before jumping to
this conclusion, the dataset of these
European scholars must be carefully
analyzed—more carefully than time currently permits.
2.3.1.1.3 “The Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte Century” The ebb and flow of Sunn̄ı élites—
and the absolute majority of individuals in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām are Sunn̄ıs—mirror
political/dynastic developments in practically every region. This should not be
taken as a direct relationship between the two; however, the lasting rule of any
dynasty would bring a period of stability—by which I simply mean that new
patterns of social relations would begin to form and possible career paths would
emerge. Soon individuals begin to take advantage of these developments, and
questions of how the information was gathered. The fact that such a scholar as Shatzmiller
uses their data in her research attests that nothing comparable is available (see: Maya
Shatzmiller, ‘Economic Performance and Economic Growth in the Early Islamic World’,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient , 54:2 (2011)).
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the more individuals join this game, the more social groups form and grow.
The policies of ruling dynasties contribute to the overall social climate, whether
they openly support particular groups, or [do not] leave them enough social
space to develop. As a result some groups flourish, while some go into decline.
The so-called “Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte century” falls entirely on the downward slope of the
cumulative biographical curve from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. The Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte dynasties—
most notably the Fāt.imids of North Africa and Egypt and the Būyids of Iraq
and Iran—did not cause the decline, but they both came to power during a
period of turmoil: dearth and famine in Egypt31 and the military “junta” in
Iraq. The Fāt.imids declare their caliphate in 909, conquer Egypt in 969 and
stay there until 1171. The Būyids come to Baghdad in 946 and carry on their
“guardianship” until the Saljūqs come to claim their place in 1055. The social
climate of the prolonged rule of these two regimes could not have possibly
fostered the growth of scholarly communities of Sunn̄ı persuasion.
The Būyids and Fāt.imids had different perspectives on Sh̄ı ↪̄ısm: the former
supported Twelver Sh̄ı ↪̄ısm, while the latter professed Sevener, Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı Sh̄ı ↪̄ısm.
This factor profoundly affected how Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte learned communities could develop
in their respective domains. With the Fāt.imids, who claimed to be Imāms, the
ultimate authority in religious matters, there was not much social space for the
development of a thriving scholarly community that would be comparable—at
least in numbers—to those of the Sunn̄ıs in other regions of the Islamic world.
After all, why have dozens of squabbling scholars when the Imām has all the
answers? It is not to say that there was no learned Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı community, but
31Ellenblum makes this argument in his latest book, see: Ellenblum (2012), The
Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean, 41.
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it was hierarchical and incorporated into the administrative apparatus of the
Fāt.imid state.
Unfortunately, practically no quantitative data are available on the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı
scholars of Fāt.imid Egypt. The only exception is, Poonawala’s “Biobibliog-
raphy”32 which lists 51 Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı authors from the pre-Fāt.imid and Fāt.imid
periods (c. 250–524 ah/865–1131 ce). It is hard to say to what extent this
number characterizes the learned Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı community in Fāt.imid Egypt, but
for comparison, we may look into the classical Sunn̄ı biobibliography. In his
Had̄ıyat al-↪ārif̄ın, Ismā ↪̄ıl Bāshā al-Baghdād̄ı (d. 1339/1921 ce) listed about
1,650 biobibliographies for the same period.33 As to the Sunn̄ı presence in
Egypt during the Fāt.imid period, it is clearly in decline—numbers of indi-
viduals with Egyptian nisbas go down starting around 300/913 ce and reach
their lowest point around 500/1107 ce, when connections between Egypt and
other regions practically get severed.34
Unlike the Fāt.imids, the Būyids claimed no religious authority for them-
selves, nor did they want to remove the ↪Abbāsid caliphs entirely from the his-
torical scene. They supported Sh̄ı ↪̄ısm, but more on a popular level by restoring
and building Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte shrines and instituting Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte commemorations—the mar-
tyrdom of the imām al-H. usayn (↪āshurā↩) and the festival of Ghad̄ır Khumm
32Ismail K. Poonawala and Teresa Joseph, Biobibliography of Ismā’̄ıl̄ı literature,
Studies in Near Eastern culture and society. (Malibu, Calif.: Undena Publications, 1977),
For the list of authors, see 467-468; their works are listed on pp.31-133. I am grateful to
Paul Walker for drawing my attention to this reference..
33The number of biographies in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām for the same period is about 12,170.
34There clearly were cases of conversion of Sunn̄ı scholars to Ismā ↪̄ılism. The most striking
example is qād. ı̄ al-Nu↪mān (d. 351/963 ce), one of the most prominent scholars of the
Fāt.imid state, who used to be a Mālik̄ı jurist (SAN, 16, 150). At the moment, however, I
have no means to estimate the rates of such conversions.
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commemorating the Prophet’s nomination of ↪Al̄ı as his successor.35 Although
they only marginally supported Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte scholars, the Būyids managed to create
a socio-political climate in which a Twelver learned community could develop:
quantitative data from the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte biographical collections suggests that the
learned community of the Twelver Sh̄ı ↪̄ıtes begins to grow rapidly in the Būyid
period and within their domain. Besides, the beginning of the Būyid period
coincides with the “Greater Occultation” (ghayba) that began in 329/942 ce.
Now, with no ways to reach their Imām, the Twelver Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte community was
ready for—and was in a desperate need of—a community of scholars who would
interpret their sacred texts in a way similar to that of the Sunn̄ı scholars.
In his comprehensive introduction to Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte Islam, Momen provides quan-
titative summaries of data on Twelver Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte ↪ulamā↩: 302 individuals in the
period up to 400/1010 ce, 146 during 401–500 ah/1011–1107 ce, 395 during
501–600 ah/1108–1204 ce, and 170 during 601–700 ah/1205–1301 ce. Al-
though such a crude grouping does not allow for any nuanced trend tracing,
I should not be too far off in pointing out that the Twelver learned commu-
nity peaks sometime during 400–600 ah/1010–1204 ce.36 According to the
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, the peak of individuals with the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte nisbas is around 470/
1078 ce—when the Sunn̄ı community hits the lowest point of its decline (more
details below).
35Moojan Momen, An introduction to Shi↪i Islam: the history and doctrines of Twelver
Shi↪ism (Oxford: G. Ronald, 1985), 82.
36These summaries are based on the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte biographical collections: Momen collected
the data for the first four centuries from al-Fihrist of Muh.ammad al-T. ūs̄ı (d. 460/1069 ce,
known under the honorific Shaykh al-t.ā↩ifa), and then—lumped into century-long periods—
from T. abaqāt a↪lām al-sh̄ı↪a of Āghā Buzurg T. ihrān̄ı (d. 1389/1969 ce), “one of the most
meticulous of modern Shi↪i scholars,” as Momen himself characterizes him. (See, Ibid., 83,
84, 91, 97).
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Figure 2.24: Individuals with the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte Nisbas.
Prozorov’s study of the historical writings37 of the early Sh̄ı ↪̄ıtes also sug-
gests a very small learned community during the pre-Būyid period. Prozorov
collected biographies of 70 early authors with Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte affiliations, all the au-
thors that he could excavate from the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte and major Sunn̄ı biographical
collections. Together, these authors could have written up to 1,500 books and
epistles of varying volume—according to biographical collections whose au-
thors listed their titles, or gave a lump sum of their literary output. However,
even if the books were actually written, only few of them survived. Prozorov
quotes al-Najāsh̄ı (d. 450/1059 ce) who decided to put together a biographi-
cal collection of Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte luminaries, Kitāb al-rijāl, because people were saying
that “the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıtes do not have their own books.”38
Biographical data from the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām are not particularly rich for
the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıtes, but some 500 individuals may be identified by their nisbas as
belonging to different Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte groups. The most frequent nisbas are: al-↪Alaw̄ı
37Prozorov (1980), Arabskaia istoricheskaia literatura v Irake, Irane i Srednei Azii v
VII-seredine X v.: shiitskaia istoriografiia; “Historical writings” are defined rather broadly
here, and the term itself was used largely to avoid ideological complications within Soviet
academia of the late 1970s.
38Ibid., 7.
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(221), al-H. usayn̄ı (135), al-Sh̄ı ↪̄ı (91), al-Rāfid. ı̄ (56), al-H. asan̄ı (56), al-Zayd̄ı
(28), al-Isma ↪̄ıl̄ı (25), al-Ja↪far̄ı (21), al-Mūsaw̄ı, al-Bāt.in̄ı (18), al-Imāmı̄ (10).
Arguably, some of these can be “ancestral” nisbas, that is they go back to the
name of one’s father or grandfather who does not necessarily have anything to
do with Sh̄ı ↪̄ısm. However, keeping in mind the very strong Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte connotations
of these names, the number of false positives in this set should be insignificant.
The curve of individuals with these names (Figure 2.24) is rather interesting
and shows that while the absolute numbers of these individuals steadily grow
throughout the entire period, there is a clearly visible “bump” of growth during
350–570 ah/962–1175 ce with the peak around 470/1078 ce—the lowest point
of the cumulative biographical curve. After 470/1078 ce, when the cumulative
curve begins its recovery, the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte curve goes down, returning to its earlier
rate of growth. The percentage curve shows this spike even more vividly,
although it suggests that the period of this spike starts earlier and lasts longer.
Geographically, this Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte spike is most visible in Iraq and Iran.
Discussions of Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte leanings are also rekindled during the “Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte cen-
tury.” Figure 2.25 shows that the frequencies of the word tashayyu↪ and its
forms spike during the period of decline of the cumulative curve between 270/
884 ce and 470/1078 ce.
2.3.1.2 Looking into Major Sectors
Introducing the categories of sectors—military, administrative, religious and
civilian—I hope to use them as markers of change within the composition of
Islamic élites. Society would remain healthier when more social groups are
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Figure 2.25: Discussions of Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte leanings (tashayyu↪) in Biographies.
Figure 2.26: Major Sectors of Islamic Society.
represented in the élites, since a more diverse population will be participat-
ing in the [re]negotiation of the rules of the game. This is what the share
and the diversity of the civilian sector—with a number of trades, crafts and
knowledge[s]—is meant to represent.
Figure 2.26 shows the cumulative curves of all four sectors. Although this
is still work in progress and algorithms for determining the administrative
and military sectors still need adjustment, the curves do agree with the major
trends that we expect to be confirmed by quantitative analysis.
The religious sector keeps on growing throughout the period. Occasional
fluctuations notwithstanding, it hits the 60% mark by the end of the period.
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One would expect this number to be higher, but a significant number of indi-
viduals participated in the transmission of knowledge without specializing in
specific fields of religious learning and thus did not not earn relevant nisbas.
This, of course, may result from irregularities in naming practices or the lack
of verbal patterns in my synsets.
The civilian sector is at its highest during 300–400 ah/913–1010 ce, when
it reaches a 30% share. By the end of the period it goes down to 20%. The
number of individuals involved in trades and crafts is about 24-25% at its
highest point around 400/1010 ce and goes down to 13-14% by the end of the
period.
The administrative and military sectors are not as significant in terms
of numbers, but the representatives of these sectors are in better positions
to make the most immediate and most striking impact on society at large.
Both sectors keep on growing, although while the growth of the administrative
sector is constant, albeit rather slow, the growth of the military sector is quite
remarkable, especially after 500/1107 ce. Overall, the share of the military
sector could have been reaching up to 10% during the later periods, which is
very significant considering that at some earlier periods this sector is lacking
altogether. The administrative sector may have hit the mark of about 8%
during the later periods.
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2.3.2 Major Social Transformations
2.3.2.1 De-tribalization
De-tribalization is one of the most striking processes that the onomastic data
show. Islamic society starts as a tribal society with up to 85% of individuals in
the earliest periods qualified through tribal affiliations. As the Islamic commu-
nity grows and spreads over the Middle East and North Africa, the number of
individuals with tribal identities rapidly goes down (Figure 2.27) and by about
350/962 ce only 20-25% of the individuals in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām have tribal
affiliations. From this point on—perhaps even earlier—tribal affiliations per-
severe in different capacities: some as dynastic (most prominently, the nisba
al-Umaw̄ı that spikes again after 350/962 ce in Andalusia), but in most cases
as status markers.
Such nisbas as al-Ans.ār̄ı
39 and al-Qurash̄ı make quite a noticeable come-
back. The numbers of al-Ans.ār̄ıs (this nisba is particularly frequent in An-
dalusia as well) begin to grow quite rapidly after 350/962 ce and the number
of al-Qurash̄ıs practically skyrockets right after 500/1107 ce. However, even
though their absolute numbers are much higher in the later periods, their per-
centage never reaches their early peaks: the highest peak of al-Ans.ār̄ıs in the
earliest periods is 18.32%, while the highest one in the later periods is only
6.53%; with al-Qurash̄ıs these numbers are 8.42% and 3.31%. Some other
tribal nisbas are re-claimed as well, but the overall number of individuals with
names that associate them with Arab tribes remains rather low, only briefly
39Although al-Ans.ār, “The Helpers [of the Prophet],” are not exactly a tribe, this group,
being a product of the tribal society of Arabia, in many ways functioned as such.
133
Figure 2.27: Individuals with Tribal and Toponymic Nisbas in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
going above the 30% mark.
Most tribal nisbas display rather distinctive orientations toward the East
or the West of the Islamic world. “Late bloomers” are most often oriented to-
ward the West (Figure 2.28). For example, such nisbas as al-Qays̄ı (208) and
al-Lakhmı̄ (183) feature most prominently in Andalusia (84 al-Qays̄ıs and 83
al-Lakhmı̄s); al-Tuj̄ıb̄ı (127)—in Andalusia (57) and Egypt (46); al-Makhzumı̄
(182)—in Egypt (33);40 al-Sa↪d̄ı (191)—in Egypt (50) and Syria (25). But
again, the percentages of “late bloomers” never reach those of the earlier pe-
riods.
The change in tribal identities can also be seen through the numbers of
unique tribal nisbas per period. In general, they display a similar trend. At
its highest the number of unique tribal nisbas fluctuates at around 115 during
the period 100–200 ah/719–816 ce. It drops to about 60 by 500/1107 ce
and then grows back to about 80—most likely through the re-appropriation of
old tribal nisbas that are now used as status markers as well as through the
introduction of Turkic and Kurdish tribal identities—but by the end of the
40The first major peak of the nisba al-Makhzūmı̄ is around 150/768 ce and geographically
it peaks largely in the Central Arabian Cluster (65 al-Makhzūmı̄s).
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Figure 2.28: Western Orientation of Some Tribal “Late bloomers.”
main period this number goes down to the 60–70 range.
2.3.2.2 Militarization
The reduction of central political authority took the form
of what was perhaps the most distinctive feature of the
Middle Islamic periods in general, as compared with other
times and areas in the Agrarian Age: its militarization.
Marshal Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Vol. II, p.64
Onomastic data from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām allows us to take a closer look at the
process characterized by Hodgson as militarization. The absolute numbers on
Figure 2.29 (left)41 show that the military sector of élites begins to grow rapidly
after 500/1107 ce—the numbers of amı̄rs included in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām are
41Unfortunately, at the moment my algorithms are not tuned well enough to trace all
individuals who belonged to the military sector. The nisba al-amı̄r should serve well as an
indicator: it is the most frequent “descriptive name” within the military sector and it is the
easiest to trace computationally.
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Figure 2.29: The Military Sector in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
staggering. Geographically, this spike of militarization is clearly visible in Iraq,
the Jaz̄ıra, Egypt, but in Syria more than anywhere.
The relative numbers in Figure 2.29 (right) allow for a more detailed
glimpse into how the military were treated by the learned class who com-
posed biographical collections that became sources of al-Dhahab̄ı’s “History.”
And the percentages tell a somewhat different story. Interestingly, the turning
points of the military curve coincide with those of the cumulative biographical
curve. The military curve, however, has three clearly visible sections, or peri-
ods. The first section, the early period up until 270/884 ce, shows the decline
of the military in Islamic society. This process of de-militarization went on
hand-in-hand with de-tribalization, during which the diversity of the Islamic
community grew, the ethos changed and swords and horses were exchanged for
pens and donkeys. 270/884 ce is the first peak of the cumulative biographical
curve: the highest percentage of the learned and the lowest percentage of the
military in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
During the middle period of 270–570 ah/884–1175 ce, when the cumulative
biographical curve takes a dive and then, after 470/1078 ce, begins to recover,
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the share of the military in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām grows slowly. This can be marked
as the beginning of [re-]militarization of Islamic élites. Unlike in the early
period, however, now the amı̄rs are not Arab[ian] warriors, but Turkic military
commanders.
After 570/1175 ce—when the cumulative curve recovers and continues
growing further—the percentage of military commanders in the élites begins
to grow as rapidly as their absolute numbers. This third period shows a
successful integration of the military into the élites and the their numbers
strongly suggest that religious scholars take even minor commanders seriously.
Military commanders do a lot to make a place for themselves in the dense
social space of the Islamic society: as their biographies show, they build
madrasas, hospitals (māristān) and establish other waqf institutions. More
and more often they participate in the transmission of knowledge, which schol-
ars report.
The military—the amı̄rs themselves and members of their families42—are
not the only ones building madrasas and, judging by the frequencies of their
mentions, their establishments are not the most prominent. However, they
definitely compensate for this in numbers: there are significantly more en-
dowments established by the military than by members of other groups.43,44
42Most prominently, women from their households, see, R. Stephen Humphreys,
‘Women as Patrons of Religious Architecture in Ayyubid Damascus’, Muqarnas, 11 (January
1994).
43See, for example: TI, 28, 311–312; TI, 29, 68–76; TI, 37, 57–58; TI, 37, 185–186; TI,
38, 157–158; TI, 39, 370–387; TI, 41, 161–164; TI, 42, 407; TI, 44, 220; TI, 45, 119; TI,
45, 164; TI, 45, 311–313; TI, 45, 359; TI, 45, 402–406; TI, 46, 87–88; TI, 46, 289; TI,
46, 431–432; TI, 47, 165; TI, 47, 308; TI, 49, 192; TI, 50, 264; TI, 51, 196–197; TI, 51,
369–370; TI, 52, 368; TI, 52, 409–411.
44On the military patronage, see also: R. Stephen Humphreys, ‘Politics and Architec-
tural Patronage in Ayyubid Damascus’, in: Clifford Edmund. Bosworth, editor, The
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Figure 2.30: Mentions of Most Prominent Madrasas.
Figure 2.30 shows the curves of the most frequently mentioned madrasas in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. The vizieral al-Niz.āmiyyas and the caliphal al-Mustans.iriyya
feature more prominently. However, their curves strongly suggest that their
prime time is over, while “military” madrasas—al-Z. āhiriyya, al-Amı̄niyya, al-
Nās.iriyya, al-Nūriyya, al-↪Ādiliyya and al-Qaymariyya and others—are on the
rise.
The “Fulān al-d̄ın” honorifics that in the earlier periods were reserved
for religious scholars become very common among the military, while the old
pattern of “Fulān al-dawla” practically disappears (see Figure 2.31).45 It is
Islamic world from classical to modern times: essays in honor of Bernard Lewis (Princeton,
N.J.: Darwin Press, 1989).
45Somehow, the “Fulān al-d̄ın” names still have a strong steel aftertaste. The most
common names of the “Fulān al-dawla” pattern are Sayf al-dawla, “Sword of the Dynasty;”
Nās.ir al-dawla, “Helper of the Dynasty;” Nas.r al-dawla, “Victory of the Dynasty;” Mu↪izz
al-dawla, “Strengthener of the Dynasty;” ↪Izz al-dawla, “Strength of the Dynasty;” ↪Ad.ud
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Figure 2.31: Patterns of Military Honorific Names: Fulān al-dawla, the most common
pattern in the middle period, gets replaced by Fulān al-d̄ın pattern in the later period.
not entirely clear whether these names are given to the military by religious
scholars or if they are self-claimed (most likely both), but the fact that the
military are listed under these honorifics in biographical collections implies
that at the very least religious scholars endorsed them.
Frequencies of such words as khal̄ıfa/amı̄r al-mu↩min̄ın, sult.ān and amı̄r
in biographies show that the 4th/10th century was a the period (Figure 2.32)
when scholarly attention started shifting from caliphs to sult.āns and amı̄rs who
were gaining more power and more social presence. This shift in frequencies
also neatly marks the end of the period which Hodgson characterized as the
High Caliphal Period (in his chronology: c. 692–945 ce),46 and the beginning
of the Earlier Middle Islamic Period (in his chronology: c. 945–1258 ce): the
era of sult.āns and amı̄rs.
al-dawla, “Support of the Dynasty;” Tāj al-dawla, “Crown of the Dynasty;” Bahā↩ al-
dawla, “Splendor of the Dynasty;” H. usām al-dawla, “Cutting Edge of the Dynasty.” The
most common names of the “Fulān al-d̄ın” pattern are: Sayf al-d̄ın, “Sword of Religion;”
↪Izz al-d̄ın, “Strength of Religion;” Jamāl al-d̄ın, “Beauty of Religion;” Badr al-Dı̄n, “Full
Moon of Religion;” Shams al-d̄ın, “Sun of Religion;” S. alāh. al-d̄ın, “Goodness of Religion;”
H. usām al-d̄ın, “Cutting Edge of Religion,” Qut.b al-d̄ın, “Pole of Religion;” ↪Alam al-d̄ın,
“Banner of Religion.”
46There is also a late peak that corresponds to the restoration of the independence of the
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Figure 2.32: Frequencies of khal̄ıfa, sult.ān, amı̄r.
2.3.2.3 De-civilianization
As was noted above (Section 2.3.1.2) the share of the civilian sector noticeably
decreases after 400/1010 ce. The diversity of crafts and trades within the
civilian sector reaches its highest point around 300/913 ce, when 85 different
trades and crafts are represented.47 After 300/913 ce the diversity goes down,
getting to the 60s range by the end of the period.
Looking closer into trades and crafts, it can be pointed that several sectors
are clearly distinguishable:48 textiles (1,495), foods (799), metalwork (331),
↪Abbāsid caliphate during the second half of the 6th/12th century, but it is short-lived.
47I should remind the reader that only nisbas that are used to describe at least 10 indi-
viduals are considered in this analysis.
48Largely following Shatzmiller’s classification, see: Shatzmiller (1994), Labour in the
medieval Islamic world ; these sectors often overlap.
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Figure 2.33: Diversity of Trades and Crafts: Numbers of unique nisbas referring to trades
in crafts by 20 lunar year periods.
“chemistry” (349),49 clothes (306), finances (278), paper/books (253), broker-
age (231), jewelry (218), and sundry services (170).
All sectors peak sometime between 300/913 ce and 500/1107 ce, but after
that they show steady decline—even in those rare cases when absolute num-
bers remain quite significant, their percentage unmistakably go down. Practi-
cally all individual nisbas show the same trend. Merchants (sing. tājir, 294;
Figure 2.35) constitute the only group that shows a different trend and their
numbers actually grow by the end of the period. This is, however, only because
this is a blanket category that encompasses all the above listed “industries,”
without emphasizing any specific one in particular. Figure 2.34 shows the cu-
49Trades that involve dealing with any complex compounds: al-↪At.t.ār, “druggist, per-
fumer;” al-S. aydalān̄ı, “apothecary, druggist;” al-S. ābūn̄ı, “soap maker/seller” etc.
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Figure 2.34: The Growth and Decline of Crafts and Trades.
mulative trend of involvement of religious scholars in crafts and trades. The
curve based on absolute numbers (left) shows that numbers of scholars—who
were either directly involved in specific crafts and trades or came from fami-
lies that made their fortune in those areas—remained rather high until 600/
1204 ce; relative numbers show that the steady downward trend in this sector
begins as early as 440/1049 ce—about three decades before the cumulative
biographical curve (470/1078 ce) starts recovering.
By the end of the period the emphasis in identities shifts, and while “secular
occupations” are still not uncommon among the learned,50 they are definitely
no longer the main focus of biographers, who instead pay more attention to
positions and family connections (see Section 2.3.2.4 below).
The geographical distribution of these professions is most puzzling. Es-
sentially, all “industries” display the same pattern: the larger the region, the
larger the presence of individuals involved in specific “industries.” Iraq al-
ways comes first, followed by Iran (representation by sectors varies slightly,
but northeastern Iran usually has highest numbers), then Syria and Egypt.
50The decline is not as staggering as, for example, Cohen’s study argued.
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Figure 2.35: The Growth of Merchants.
Such a geographical distribution of “industries” suggests that occupational
nisbas were used as necessary specifiers to distinguish among individuals in
large communities.51 This issue might be resolved by adding local biographi-
cal collections to the corpus and experimenting with data grouping until some
distinctive patterns can be discerned. Data from non-literary sources will be
crucial for advancing this inquiry, which requires undivided attention.
Whether this decline of the civilian sector is a result of the actual with-
drawal of the learned from trades and crafts, or, the loss of awareness of this
part of their identity, the general effect on the development of the religious sec-
tor would still be the same: the loss of connections with broader population.
It is not that religious scholars stopped maintaining connections with popu-
lace at large, but they gradually turned into a self-reproducing class whose
members were primarily concerned about their own group interests.
51Very similar to what Bulliet argued regarding toponymic nisbas: “For example Karkh, a
popular quarter of Baghdad, appears in the nisba al-Karkh̄ı when representation from Iraq
is high. When the proportion is smaller, the name of the major city itself is a common nisba.
In the example given, a later resident of Karkh would appear as al-Baghdad̄ı. Finally, when
the proportion is very low, the nisba will frequently be derived from the entire province, that
is, al-Baghdad̄ı becomes al-↪Irāq̄ı.” (Bulliet (1979), Conversion to Islam in the medieval
period: an essay in quantitative history , 12).
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2.3.2.4 Professionalization & Institutionalization
Professionalization and institutionalization of the learned class are another two
processes that take place during the period covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. These
processes have been discussed at length in academic literature,52 although in
most cases the emphasis is on institutionalization.53
Here “professionalization” is understood as the growth of complexity of re-
ligious learning that leads to its branching into specific disciplines, mastering
which eventually requires full-time commitment. Professionalization implies
the development of a community of specialists who maintain qualifying stan-
dards and ensure demarcation from the non-qualified; ideally, mechanisms of
monetary and status compensation for professional services should develop
during this process.
If we agree on recognizing the process of branching of the religious learn-
ing into specific disciplines as an indicator of professionalization, we may look
at the growth of religious specializations as indicated through “descriptive
52The most important studies: George Makdisi, The rise of the colleges: insti-
tutions of learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1981); Jonathan P. Berkey, The transmission of knowledge in Medieval Cairo: a social
history of Islamic education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Michael
Chamberlain, Knowledge and social practice in medieval Damascus, 1190-1350 (Cam-
bridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). To a large extent Berkey’s and
Chamberlain’s studies are responses to Makdisi’s “over-institutionalization.”
53It seems that Gilbert is the only one to use this term in her study of the learned
of Medieval Damascus: see, Joan E. Gilbert, ‘Institutionalization of Muslim Scholarship
and Professionalization of the ↪Ulamā↩ in Medieval Damascus’, Studia Islamica, 52 (January
1980). However, in her study this term appears to blend into institutionalization and both
become practically indistinguishable. Other scholars mention professionalization almost
exclusively with the reference to Gilbert’s work. See, for example: Chamberlain (1994),
Knowledge and social practice in medieval Damascus, 1190-1350 , 70; Daphna Ephrat, A
learned society in a period of transition: the Sunni ↪Ulama↩ of eleventh century Baghdad
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 104, 179.
144
Figure 2.36: Growth of Religious Specializations: Numbers of unique nisbas referring to
religious specializations by 20 lunar year periods.
names.” Figure 2.36 shows that the process of branching reaches its highest
point during 300–350 ah/913–962 ce, after which the number of specializa-
tions remains on the same level and fluctuates only slightly.
Although completely devoid of both buzzwords, Melchert’s study is per-
haps the most valuable insight into the process of professionalization.54 In
his book on the formation of the Sunn̄ı legal schools (madhhab), Melchert
offered three major criteria: the recognition of the chief scholar (ra ↩̄ıs), com-
mentaries (ta↪liqa) on the summaries of legal teachings (mukhtas.ar), as a proof
of one’s qualification, and a more or less regulated process of transmission of
legal knowledge, through which the achievement of required qualification is en-
54Christopher Melchert, The formation of the Sunni schools of law, 9th-10th cen-
turies C.E. (Leiden ; New York: Brill, 1997).
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Figure 2.37: References to Waqf Institutions in Biographies.
sured. Chronologically, Melchert placed this process for the Shāfi ↪̄ıs, H. anbal̄ıs
and H. anaf̄ıs in Baghdad of the late 9
th—early 10th centuries.55 Keeping in
mind this coincidence of Melchert’s close reading of legal t.abaqāt and my dis-
tant reading of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, we may—at least tentatively—consider 300/
913 ce to be a turning point in the process of professionalization.
Data from the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām shows that professionalization of religious
knowledge (around 300/913 ce) is not directly related to scholars’ abandoning
their gainful occupations in the civilian sectors, as this process will start only
around 430/1039 ce. However, professionalization failed to bring about one
very important thing, namely more paid positions for the learned. This must
55The failure of the Mālik̄ıs Melchert explains by their being too closely linked to
the caliphal patronage and when the caliphs were eclipsed, so were the Mālik̄ıs. See:
Melchert (1997), The formation of the Sunni schools of law, 9th-10th centuries C.E.,
176.
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have forced men of learning into difficult position where they had to maintain
a delicate, but uncomfortable balance between keeping up with higher stan-
dards of religious learning and earning living. The financial difficulties that
professionalization imposed on the life of a scholar may have become quite a
discouraging factor for the young who were considering career paths. Keeping
in mind that the decline of the main curve begins c. 270/884 ce—i.e. roughly
around the time when the number of religious specializations reaches its high-
est point—it is tempting to consider that professionalization has something
to do with this decline. After all, a full-time commitment to study religious
sciences leaves one no time to earn a living through gainful occupations in the
civilian sector. Charging money for teaching religious subjects was considered
illicit, and there are hardly any indications that the number of positions for
religious specialists grew to compensate for this unfortunate development. To
succeed in such conditions, one had to be either extremely resolute or come
from a wealthy family to afford the career of a scholar. And since both of
these are in limited availability in any society, this could explain the decline
in numbers of biographies.
The introduction and spread of waqf institutions is considered a turning
point in the institutionalization of the learned. The salaried positions of these
institutions offered a solution to the complication of professionalization. Fre-
quencies of references to waqf institutions in biographies (Figure 2.37) show
that they—most importantly the madrasas—become a noteworthy detail of
biographies soon after 400/1010 ce, about 100 lunar years after the turning
147
Figure 2.38: References to Relatives. The graph on the left shows the major categories
of relatives, while the on on the right shows the same data combined into one graph.
point in professionalization, and a very important one after 500/1107 ce.56,57
However, by offering salaried positions, the waqf institutions also recon-
figured the structure of the learned class, which in the long run had a very
negative effect. In his study of medieval Damascus,58 Chamberlain convinc-
ingly argued that salaried positions (manās. ib) became one of the major object
of contention among the learned who were now concerned about winning and
holding as many of these positions as it was possible. One of their strategies
was to ensure that the positions stayed within a family—household—which
led to the formation of the dynasties of religious scholars and, in the long run,
the transformation of the religious class into a rather closed social stratum, to
which the word “clergy” became more and more applicable as time went on.
56Early mentions of zāwiya refer to yawm al-zāwiya, a battle between Ibn al-Ash↪āth and
al-H. ajjāj that took place outside Basra (bi-l-bas.ra) in 82/702 ce (TI, 6, 8–16). As is the
case with many historical events in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, this battle becomes a chronological
point of reference and is mentioned in some biographies afterwards. Needless to say that
the word zāwiya also has other meanings.
57The decline of the frequency of the word madrasa should not be interpreted as a decline
of this institution, but rather as a change in the form of reference in general: most madrasas
are referred to by their “al-Fulāniyya” names (see Figure 2.30).
58Chamberlain (1994), Knowledge and social practice in medieval Damascus, 1190-
1350 .
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As the data from the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām indicate (Figure 2.38), the role of fam-
ily connections unmistakably increases after 400/1010 ce. The tribal nature
of early Islamic society explains the high frequency of references to close rela-
tives in the early periods. However, references to parents are most frequent—
largely to fathers59—which is understandable, considering the importance of
lineage through the male line within tribal society. But again, the curve of
references goes down steadily between 120/739 ce and 380/991 ce, mirror-
ing the curve of tribal identities that also goes down while the number of
biographies keeps on growing. After 380/991 ce references to family members
practically skyrocket, and even increase in pace slightly around 500/1107 ce.
Unlike in the early period, references to most members of the immediate family
become very common: parents (the word “parent,” wālid[a], become particu-
larly common), siblings (brothers and sisters—akhū, ukht), children (sons and
daughters—ibnu-hu, bintu-hu, etc.), and, to a lesser extent, spouses (husbands
and wives—zawj[a]). The same trend can be seen in the references to uncles,
aunts, grandparents and grandchildren. These shifts—not just the growth of
frequencies, but also the growth of varieties of familial references—may be
interpreted as a shift of scholarly attention from the lineage to the household.
If we accept these rates of frequencies as an indicator of the formation of
households, than it appears that scholarly households begin growing earlier
than waqf institutions. The growth of scholarly families thus may have been
caused by professionalization and then boosted by institutionalization.
59The most common references are the forms of abū, “father.” Since this word is also
the essential part of kunya, an extremely common patronymic element of the Arab/Muslim
name, only its forms with pronominal suffixes—such as abū-hu, “his father”—are considered.




3.1 Defining the Subject
3.1.1 Lost in Translation: “Preaching”
Preaching in Islam is a complicated phenomenon that appeared through time
and space in different forms and guises. The number of studies that have the
word “preaching” in their titles or keywords is rather significant, which may
lead one to believe that “preaching” in Islam has already received its deserved
share of scholarly attention. However, a even cursory examination of these
studies shows that this impression is far from correct and as one takes a closer
look the long list starts to thin out rather quickly.
To begin with, the word “preaching” itself is problematic, since in any
cultural and confessional context it can be used to refer to forms of communi-
cation that range from an act of delivering a religious sermon to an informal
“secular” address that seeks in the same way listener’s transformation and is
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referred to as “preaching” only figuratively. Even with the figurative use of
the term set aside,1 there still remain a number of different religious practices
which this term may refer to; these also range significantly from missionary
activities in general, to a formal sermon delivered by an official cleric, to an in-
formal conversation on religious issues where one side assumes the leading role,
thus becoming “a preacher.” For this reason one quickly discovers that even
in the same historical, cultural and confessional context, studies of preaching
often have little in common.
Things get even more complicated when the already ambiguous English
word “preaching” is used to render several different Arabic terms: khut.ba,
qas.as. , wa↪z. (or tadhk̄ır) and da↪wa. Although the boundaries among these
notions may be quite blurry, we should begin by discussing them as distinct
preaching practices—as it is often done in academic literature. If viewed as
ideal types in the pre-modern context, these forms of preaching had differ-






mÌ'@) took place in congregational mosques (sing. jāmi↪) on
Fridays (sing. yawm al-jum↪a)—“Sundays of the Muslims”—and was deliv-
1One of the first works to have the word “preaching” in its title was actually a general
history of Islam in disguise, see: Thomas W. Arnold, The preaching of Islam: a history
of the propagation of the Muslim faith (Westminster: A. Constable and co., 1896). In
addition, one also comes across studies that use references to Islamic preaching to build the
main argument, which is only remotely related to preaching per se. For example, Asghar
Fathi argues for the unique role of the pulpit (minbar) as a public forum in Islam, however,
his main goal is to address the theoretical gap in the study of public communication in
modern and traditional societies. See, Asghar Fathi, ‘The Role of the Islamic Pulpit’,
Journal of Communication, 29:3 (September 1979); Asghar Fathi, ‘The Islamic Pulpit
as a Medium of Political Communication’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 20
(1981). Such studies do not add much to the studies of Islamic homiletics, yet contribute
to the distorted image of the field.
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ered either by the ruler himself or an officially-appointed preacher (khat.ı̄b) to
the congregation of male Muslims of legally responsible age. The main goal
of this practice was to re-affirm Islamic unity (jamā↪a) by means of a brief,
formalized address. If led by an officially-appointed preacher, this address
would include the name of the leader of the Islamic world—or, later, of a
specific region of it—simultaneously legitimizing his rule and confirming the
community’s allegiance to him. In the Sunn̄ı context this practice has existed
almost uninterruptedly throughout history. Since the Sh̄ı ↪̄ıtes believe that the
khut.ba is to be delivered by the imām, the Twelver community—whose imām
went into Occultation—soon gave up on this practice; meanwhile the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı
communities who believed in their living imāms seem to have maintained this
practice, although the Fāt.imid caliphs rarely delivered khut.bas themselves and,




®Ë@) is conventionally understood to refer to an early, controver-
sial practice of popular storytelling: an informal, low-scale, spontaneous gath-
ering that took place in naturally crowded locations such as market places,
where a qās.s.—essentially any eloquent daredevil—would entertain a crowd,
very likely for a personal gain. The exact definition of qas.as. still eludes schol-
ars, since the term may refer to religious storytelling, battlefield preaching and
politically charged “lectures” (in the Umayyad and early ↪Abbāsid periods),
while practitioners of qas.as.—“storytellers” (qus.s. ās. , sing. qās.s.)—came from
2See, Paul E. Walker, Orations of the Fatimid caliphs: festival sermons of the Ismaili
imams: an edition of the Arabic texts and English translation of Fatimid khutbas (London ;
New York: I.B. Tauris; In association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies; Distributed in
the U.S.A. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
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the widest variety of backgrounds, ranging from vagabonds eloquent enough
to take advantage of entertainment-hungry crowds, to the appointees of the
caliphs, who used “storytellers” to propel their agenda.3
Da↪wa (

èñ«YË@) stands for the “propaganda” of a specific political-cum-
religious cause, often in support of some individual or a family that claimed
the right to supreme leadership in the community. If such propaganda was
successful and resulted in the establishment of a new ruling house, it would be
abandoned, as was the case with the ↪Abbāsid da↪wa. A prominent exception,
however, were the Fāt.imids, who turned the da↪wa into one of their principal
religious institutions. As a result, in the pre-modern context da↪wa refers al-
most exclusively to the semi-clandestine “call” to the Qarmat.̄ı/Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı cause
4
that took place largely in a private setting, where a “caller” (dā ↪̄ı/dā↪iya)
tried to sway the discussant towards his cause, taking advantage of his trust
and, depending on the situation, appealing to deep emotional feelings toward
the family of the Prophet or using careful logical arguments intertwined with
crafty sophisms. Strongly associated with the Fāt.imid dynasty of Egypt, the
da↪wa was treated by the ↪Abbāsids as the main ideological threat—both real
and imagined—and the accusation of being a dā ↪̄ı could lead to imprisonment5
and was sometimes used to eliminate rivals.
3On these issues and relevant studies, see: Khalil Athamina, ‘Al-Qasas: Its Emer-
gence, Religious Origin and Its Socio-Political Impact on Early Muslim Society’, Studia
Islamica, 76:76 (1992).
4See, Canard M., ‘Da↪wa,’ in EI2; also, Hodgson M.G.S., ‘Dā ↪̄ı,’ in EI2, Wal-
ter P.E., ‘Dā ↪̄ı (in Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı Islam),’ in EI3.
5E.g., the [in]famous mystic Abū H. usayn b. Mans.ūr al-H. allāj (d. 309/922 ce) was
crucified alive under the accusations of being a Qarmat.̄ı dā↪iya; at his execution it was
announced: “This is one of the Qarmat.̄ı missionaries, be aware of him!” (SAN, 14, 313–
354; also TI, 23, 8–9; SAN, 15, 47. See also: See, e.g., Alexander D. Knysh, Islamic
mysticism: a short history (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 68–82.
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Over time, although it is not entirely clear exactly when and how, this
term lost its strong Sh̄ı ↪̄ı connotations and became the dominant term for
“preaching” in modern Sunn̄ı Islam. Most studies of contemporary Islamic
preaching deal with the modern form of da↪wa—an unofficial, anti-state and
sincere “call” to Muslims to live according to Islamic norms. In this regard,
dā ↪̄ı is routinely juxtaposed with khat.ı̄b, where the former is a true believer
concerned with the well-being of all Muslims, while the latter is a servant of
the oppressing state. At the same time, in the modern context da↪wa also
stands for “missionary activities” in the broad sense of the word; arguably,
“preaching” may be implied, but often is not even mentioned.6
Wa↪z. (
	





JË @), its relatively rare counterpart—
refers to a pre-modern form of preaching, which is often translated into English
with an additional qualifier, such as “popular,” “admonishing,” “[ex]hortatory”
or, as in my case, “public.” It is often viewed as a practice that grew out of
qas.as. . Yet, unlike its “predecessor,” wa↪z. evolved to fit its Islamic garments
perfectly. Wa↪z. sermons were delivered by preachers (wu↪↪āz. , sing. wā↪iz.) who
only occasionally were officially appointed to this job: they would address the
public in general, including Muslims and non-Muslims of both sexes and all
ages, and strive to bring their listeners to emotional catharsis and spiritual
transformation. In its heyday, wa↪z. gatherings would often take place in open
locations in order to accommodate large crowds of people, who would occa-
6Such explanation of da↪wa is often the only interpretation of this concept, see, e.g.,
Larry Poston, Islamic da↪wah in the West: Muslim missionary activity and the dynamics
of conversion to Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); also see: “Da↪wa,” in
Martin, Richard C., editor, Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world (New York:
Macmillan Reference USA: Thomson/Gale, 2004), 170–174.
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sionally be willing to pay a small fortune to secure the best “seats.” So as
not to interfere with khut.ba, wa↪z. sermons were expected to be organized on
days of the week other than Friday. Once a prominent part of urban life, wa↪z.
gradually disappeared from the map of Islamic spirituality. Although some
scholars talk about the existence of wa↪z. in the modern context,
7 this practice
appears to be the least known form of preaching even among Muslims.
3.1.2 Major Studies of Islamic Preaching
Linda Jones’s latest book8 includes the most up-to-date detailed discussion of
bibliography on pre-modern Islamic preaching, so I will limit myself to a brief
overview of major contributions that determine the state of the field and help
me to build the argument for why another study is needed.
Studies of Islamic preaching in the pre-modern context deal with different
preaching practices in specific historical and regional contexts. From early on
scholars of Islam paid attention to preaching practices, but the earliest study
that dealt exclusively with preaching goes back to the articles of Johannes
Pedersen. Merlin Swartz studied wa↪z. in the context of late ↪Abbāsid Iraq,
and in particular, he focused on the career of the famous Baghdād̄ı preacher
Ibn al-Jawz̄ı (d. 597/1201 ce). In the late 60s, Swartz prepared an edition and
translation of Kitāb al-qus.s. ās. wa-l-mudhakkir̄ın, one of Ibn al-Jawz̄ı’s many
books on wa↪z. .
9 His dissertation and monograph were followed by a series of
7Usually it is mentioned rather briefly and is never the main subject; see, for example,
Patrick D. Gaffney, The Prophet’s pulpit: Islamic preaching in contemporary Egypt
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 32–33; Athamina (1992), ‘Al-Qasas’.
8Linda G. Jones, The Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World, 1st edition
(Cambridge University Press, July 2012).
9Merlin L. Swartz, ‘Ibn al-Jawz̄ı, a study of his life and work as a preacher: including
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articles on Islamic homiletics,10 including one that offered a periodization of
wa↪z. .
11 Jonathan Berkey focused his studies of wa↪z. and qas.as. principally on
Egypt and the Fertile Crescent (roughly 1000–1500 ce).12 Daniella Talmon-
Heller studied both khut.ba and wa↪z. in several works that focus on Zangid
and Ayyūbid Syria (1146–1260 ce).13 Linda Jones also studies both major
manifestations of preaching but her work is mostly concentrated on Islamic
Spain and North Africa (11–15 centuries ce).14 Tahera Qutbuddin contributed
an extensive article on early Islamic khut.bas
15 and a monograph on Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı
a critical edition and translation of his Kitāb al-qus.s.ās. wa↩l-mudhakkir̄ın, with introduction
and notes’, Ph. D thesis, Harvard University (1967); Merlin L. Swartz, Ibn al-Jawz̄ı’s
Kitāb al-qus.s. ās. wa↩l-mudhakkir̄ın. Including a Critical Edition, Annotated Translation and
Introduction (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq Éditeurs, 1971).
10Merlin L. Swartz, ‘The rules of the popular preaching in twelfth-century Bagh-
dad: according to Ibn al-Jawz̄ı’, in: Prédication et propagande au Moyen Age: Islam,
Byzance, Occident: Penn-Paris-Dumbarton Oaks Colloquia, III, session des 20-25 octobre
1980 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1983); Merlin L. Swartz, ‘Arabic rhetoric
and the art of the homily in medieval Islam’, in: Religion and culture in medieval Is-
lam. Ed. R.G.Hovannisian & Georges Sabagh (Giorgio Levi della Vida Conferences, 14)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
11Merlin L. Swartz, ‘Preaching, Islamic’, in: William C. Jordan and Joseph R.
Strayer, editors, Dictionary of the Middle Ages (New York: Scribner, 1982).
12Jonathan P. Berkey, ‘Storytelling, preaching, and power in Mamluk Cairo’, Mamluk
Studies Review , 4 (2000); Jonathan P. Berkey, Popular preaching and religious authority
in the medieval Islamic Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).
13For example, see: Daniella Talmon-Heller, ‘Islamic preaching in Syria during the
Counter-Crusade (twelfth-thirteenth centuries)’, in: In laudem Hierosolymitani: studies in
Crusades and medieval culture in honour of Benjamin Z.Kedar. Ed. Iris Shagrir, Ronnie
Ellenblum and Jonathan Riley-Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007b); Daniella Talmon-
Heller, Islamic piety in medieval Syria: mosques, cemeteries and sermons under the
Zangids and Ayyūbids (1146-1260) (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2007a).
14Linda G. Jones, ‘Ibn ↪Abbad of Ronda’s Sermon on the Prophet’s Birthday Cel-
ebration: Preaching the Sufi and Sunni Paths of Islam’, Medieval Sermon Studies, 50
(2006); Linda G. Jones, ‘La predicación cristiana y musulmana: puente entre la teoloǵıa
ortodoxa y la religiosidad popular’, in: Evangelització i d. a↪wa”: fronteres entre musulmans
i cristians. [Ed.] Joan Mart́ınez Porcell, Rachid Aarab (Barcelona: Facultat de Filosofia de
la Universitat Ramon Llull, 2007a); Linda G. Jones, ‘Witness of God: exhortatory preach-
ers in medieval al-Andalus and the Magreb’, Al-Qantara: Revista de Estudios Arabes, 28
(2007b), and, most recently: Jones (2012), The Power of Oratory .
15Tahera Qutbuddin, ‘Khut.ba. The evolution of early Arabic oration’, in: Classical
Arabic humanities in their own terms. Festschrift for Wolfhart Heinrichs on his 65th birth-
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da↪wa poetry.16 Preaching in the Fāt.imid/Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı context received its share
of scholarly attention from Paul Walker who studied extensively the khut.bas
of the Fāt.imid caliphs;
17 and Heinz Halm who dealt with the institution of
da↪wa within the history of the Fāt.imids and their caliphate in general.
18
Studies of preaching in the modern Islamic world focus on the khut.ba and
even more so on the da↪wa (and its variant forms, e.g. tabl̄ıgh in the South-
East Asian context).19 Cultural anthropologists—most prominently Patrick
Gaffney,20 Richard Antoun21 and Charles Hirschkind22—have made a signifi-
cant contribution to the study of contemporary Islamic preaching. Occasion-
ally a neglect of Islamic history prompts anthropologists to false discoveries,23
but their studies do offer invaluable insights that can help improve our under-
day, Beatrice Gruendler, with the assistance of Michael Cooperson edition (Leiden: Brill,
2008).
16Tahera Qutbuddin, al-Mu↩ayyad al-Sh̄ırāz̄ı and Fatimid da↪wa poetry: a case of com-
mitment in classical Arabic literature (Boston: Brill, 2005).
17Walker (2009), Orations of the Fatimid caliphs: festival sermons of the Ismaili imams:
an edition of the Arabic texts and English translation of Fatimid khutbas.
18See, for example, Heinz Halm, The empire of the Mahdi: the rise of the Fatimids
(Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), 22–44; Heinz Halm, The Fatimids and their tra-
ditions of learning (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris in association with the Institute of
Ismaili Studies, 2001), 56–70.
19See, for example, Masud, Muhammad Khalid, editor, Travellers in faith: studies
of the Tabl̄ıgh̄ı Jamā↪at as a transnational Islamic movement for faith renewal (Leiden ;
Boston: Brill, 2000).
20Gaffney (1994), The Prophet’s pulpit .
21Richard T. Antoun, Muslim preacher in the modern world: a Jordanian case study
in comparative perspective (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).
22Charles Hirschkind, The ethical soundscape: cassette sermons and Islamic counter-
publics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
23Hirschkind treats the opposition of khut.ba and da↪wa as the official message versus
dissent counter-message as a unique modern phenomenon, failing to see a similar di-
chotomy between khut.ba and wa↪z. . Despite this and a few other historical shortcom-
ings, Hirschkind’s study offers a particularly valuable perspective on the subject. See also:
Charles Hirschkind, ‘Hearing modernity: Egypt, Islam, and the pious ear’, in: Veit
Erlmann, editor, Hearing cultures: essays on sound, listening, and modernity (Oxford ;
New York: Berg, 2004); Hirschkind (2006), The ethical soundscape.
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standing of pre-modern preaching. Informed by a rather different theoretical
framework, these insights also come from the very different nature of sources
available to the scholars of the moderns world: anthropologists can see, listen
and interact with their subjects, while we are limited to artifacts with rather
unfriendly interfaces that have managed to survive the vicissitudes of time.
Anthropological studies can help us bridge what Linda Jones characterized
as “[t]he unavoidable gap between live preaching event, evidence of which in
most cases is irretrievably lost, and the surviving written text” of sermons,24
especially if solid points of reference can be established.25 Different theoret-
ical concepts employed by anthropologists of the Middle East, primarily the
Habermasian concept of the public sphere26 and its “alter ego,” the notion of
counterpublic, also provide a valuable theoretical framework.27 Despite the
fact that Habermas wrote about the European “bourgeois” society, there are
striking structural similarities between the formation of the public discourse in
Europe and the formation of religious discourse in early Islam. In a nutshell,
in both cases those involved in trade were the most active agents of starting
and maintaining public discourse; in both cases this became possible through
the formation of literary languages as universally understood means of com-
munication; in both cases this discourse was public, i.e. outside the control of
24For more details, see: Linda G. Jones, ‘Problems in the study of medieval Islamic
sermons’, al-↪Us.ūr al-Wust.á: the Bulletin of Middle East Medievalists, 17 (2005).
25For example, there is a rather solid link between Ibn al-Jawz̄ı and a modern Egyptian
preacher ↪Abd al-H. amı̄d Kishk: the latter used homiletic materials from Ibn al-Jawz̄ı’s
collections and preaching strategies that closely resemble those described by Ibn al-Jawz̄ı.
26See, Jürgen Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry
into a category of bourgeois society, trans. by Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1991).
27See, e.g., Charles Hirschkind, ‘Civic Virtue and Religious Reason: An Islamic Coun-
terpublic’, Cultural Anthropology , 16 (2001).
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the political authorities, and had its designated loci in the urban setting; in
both cases, the demise of public discourse was brought about by the process
of professionalization and specialization. Benedict Anderson’s notion of imag-
ined communities28 as well as different concepts of embodiment,29 also provide
useful analytical frameworks.
3.1.3 Subject of the Current Study
With quite a few monographs on different aspects of Islamic preaching, why
do we need another one? In a nutshell, we are still missing its history. All
major works on Islamic homiletics are case studies that touch upon the issues
of the longue durée and institutional history only in passing.30 On the one
hand it is justified by the objective difficulty of locating relevant data that
have a nasty habit of being scattered all over pre-modern Arabic sources that
rarely come in one volume; while on the other hand, it is predetermined by
the fact that the case study is the main form of research in our field and we
are trained to think within its confines.
To write a history of Islamic preaching one needs to look at preaching
as an institution. Since this notion tends to lead to misunderstandings, it is
necessary to dwell on it. My thinking about social institutions in general is
informed mainly by the sociological theory of Peter Berger and Thomas Luck-
28Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism (London; New York: Verso, 1991).
29For an overview, see: Hirschkind (2004), ‘Hearing modernity: Egypt, Islam, and the
pious ear’.
30The issue of origins is usually addressed and, as a rule, discussed in many details, but
this is where attempts to trace the formation, evolution, continuity and fate of different
preaching practices usually end.
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mann31 that can be summarized in the following manner. Every institution
is “a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors.” These
reciprocal typifications of actions are built in the course of a history shared
by its actors. The actors perform their roles and this performance represents
the institutional order, making the institution manifest itself in actual expe-
rience. The knowledge of the actors about the institution exists largely on
the pre-theoretical level, with theoretically sophisticated legitimations—texts
that seek to explain the “logic” of the institution—appearing only at particular
moments of the institutional history.
With our main subject shifted in this manner, our approach to the primary
sources must be re-evaluated as well. Most studies are based on close reading
of texts directly related to preaching—unsystematic prescriptive texts,32 col-
lections of sermons, preaching manuals—and augmented by the supplemen-
tary reading of chronicles and biographical dictionaries. Such an approach
seems problematic. First, with its focus on texts that are directly related to
preaching—and depending on their genre we can treat them as theoretically so-
phisticated legitimations or de-legitimations of preaching—we are likely to lose
sight of the historical process in which the institution itself has been forming.
With their strong normative charge, such texts offer visions of Islamic preach-
ing that better represent agendas of their medieval authors than historical
reality. Written by exceptional individuals, such texts, to quote a literary his-
31For a detailed discussion, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social
construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge (New York: Anchor Books,
1990), 47–128.
32By unsystematic I mean texts that address only specific aspects of preaching without
offering a thorough picture: h. ad̄ıths, fatwás, social critique etc.
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torian, are “rare and curious works, that do not repeat themselves;” they are
exceptional and “close reading makes [them] even more exceptional,”33 taking
us further away from history.
Collections of sermons offer texts that are more valuable for the history
of Arabic literature—homiletics as a literary genre—than for the history of
preaching as a social institution. Studying them, one is left to wonder about
the extent to which particular sermons were integral to the institution of
preaching on the social, geographical and chronological levels.34
Biographical collections and chronicles, on the other hand, appear to be the
most valuable sources for recreating the institutional history of Islamic preach-
ing. By their nature, they are plentiful in bits of data regarding most—if not
all—aspects of life in Islamic societies. Because of their nature, they are least
likely to be systematically “censored,” especially when data on the same topic
come in small bits and pieces scattered over multiple volumes. Even though
scholars always work with chronicles and biographical collections, their chrono-
logical and geographical limits and unsystematic treatment do not allow for
full use of their potential. That said, my study is an attempt to read a short,
but rather extensive corpus of biographical collections—twelve titles, over 120
volumes, about 45,000 biographical accounts—without any imposition of tem-
poral or spatial boundaries. Although the chronological boundaries of my
research—661–1300 ah—are declared in the title, they are determined by the
33Moretti (2007), Graphs, Maps, Trees, 3.
34Paratextual data from the manuscripts of such collections would be immensely valuable
in this regard. However, for the institutional history of preaching one needs data from
hundreds of such manuscripts—an interesting venue I hope to pursue some time in the
future.
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chronological coverage of my corpus. Relying largely on distant reading35 of
these sources, I intend to study all direct and indirect accounts of preachers
and their activities, with the main goal of putting together a history of Islamic
preaching as an institution. Considering the time constraints, however, this
is a long-term goal, while in the current part the main emphasis will be on
the chronology and geography of the major preaching forms. It is important
to begin with these two perspectives, primarily because they are largely over-
looked in academic studies of preaching, but also because in its current state
of development computational reading is best suited to these particular tasks.
3.1.4 Identifying Preachers
The most problematic issue one instantly runs into is how to identify preach-
ers. The problem with onomastic data in the case of preaching is that while a
person may have been involved in some preaching activities, this does not nec-
essarily get reflected in that person’s name. In many cases preaching was only
an occasional involvement, while person’s primary identity belonged to some
different area. This is particularly evident in the case of “Friday preaching”
(khut.ba), which most commonly was a part-time appointment and therefore
would only occasionally become permanent part of one’s identity.36 A similar
“part-time” involvement in other forms of preaching was rather common as
35Offered by the literary historian Franco Moretti this approach puts extra emphasis on
commonalities and patterns that can be discovered and traced within a significant body of
data, and de-emphasizes things that are rare and unique—since when they are emphasized,
they become even more rare and more unique. See, for example, Franco Moretti, Distant
Reading, 1st edition (Verso, June 2013); Moretti (2007), Graphs, Maps, Trees.
36Regionally, this is most strikingly visible in the biographies of Andalusian scholars.
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well.
Thus, in order to identify all textual evidence relevant to preaching, it is
necessary to take a more in-depth approach. Since I am interested in tracing
the development of preaching practices in general, I will be looking into all
possible references that occur on the electronic pages of my 12-source corpus.
In order to identify such references I am looking for all derivatives from five
major roots that are used to describe major preaching practices: kh-t.-b, q-s.-s. ,
w-↪-z. , dh-k-r and d-↪-w. With false positives manually excluded, the analytical
algorithm yields some 3,600 biographical records and event descriptions where
relevant actions, individuals or objects are mentioned. Such a body of data is
significant enough to allow us to expect that patterns will be revealed that are
representative of historical reality. However, the forms of descriptions pose
problems and this is yet another methodological issue that we need to deal
with.
“Descriptive names” that I use as markers for different kinds of preaching
may also have “adjectival” usage and thus can be interpreted both as profes-
sional [nick]names and as mere qualifiers—especially when they are used in the
indefinite form and/or as complements of the verb kāna, “to be.” For example,
kāna khat.ı̄ban can be interpreted as “he was a [Friday] preacher,” or simply
as “he was eloquent.” One would expect that such cases as kāna khat.ı̄ban
bal̄ıghan mufawwahan would make things easier: the last two compliments of
kāna mean “eloquent” and they are never used as professional markers, which
strongly suggests that khat.ı̄ban here is also used as a simple adjective. How-
ever, the fact that such adjectival usage may also be corroborated by other
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kinds of descriptions—for example, khat.aba f̄ı jāmi↪ Dimashq, “he preached
in the congregational mosque of Damascus”—makes the complete dismissal of
adjectival descriptions problematic. That said, it makes sense to consider all
forms: after all, in order to be viewed as a khat.ı̄b one must have performed
some actions that others could describe with the khut.ba-related vocabulary.
At the same time, one must keep in mind that the definitive interpretation of
specific cases of adjectival usage, especially when nothing else corroborates a
particular interpretation, will always remain problematic.
Individuals may also be qualified with compound descriptors. These come
as verbal phrases: qāma khat.ı̄ban, “he stood up addressing/preaching to [peo-
ple]”; waliya-l-khit.āba, “he was appointed to the office of khat.ı̄b;” kāna ya↪iz.u-
l-nās, “he was admonishing people;” takallama bi-lisāni-l-wa↪z. , “he spoke
with the tongue of admonishment;” kāna yad↪ū-l-nās ilá..., “he was calling/
summoning people to...;” kāna yudhakkiru-l-nās, “he was exhorting people
[by making them remember what they forgot].” Compound descriptors also
come as noun[-adjective] phrases: khat.ı̄bu-l-jāmi↪, “khat.ı̄b of the congrega-
tional mosque;” wā↪iz.u Baghdād, “the admonishing preacher of Baghdad;” min
du↪āti-l-ismā ↪̄ıliyya, “one of the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı missionaries;” s. āh. ibu-l-da↪wa, “the
head of the mission/‘revolution’;” [la-hu] majlisu-l-tadhk̄ır, “he held the as-
sembly of exhortation.” Although these compound descriptors appear more
definitive than simple adjectival ones, they may also describe single actions or
short-term involvements. Besides, compound descriptors are noticeably less
frequent than simple ones. Narrative descriptions are rather rare as well, and
may be problematic in the same way. If one is to rely only on biographies with
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more than one descriptor that would corroborate each other, the pool of over
2,100 biographies will dry up quickly.
A solution to this problem may lie in the analysis of all available data in
their initial narrative form and in an algorithmically reconstructed form that
can be graphed and mapped. In other words, it can be done, first, through the
analysis of linguistic patterns used in descriptions of what may be a preaching
activity or practice (thus, the initial definition of “preaching” is very broad);
second, through the quantification of linguistic patterns in conjunction with
their contextual markers that specify their usage and meaning, which will allow
us to discern pivotal moments in time that mark social and religious changes.
Readjusted in such a manner, the biographical curves of preachers of different
kinds will help us to reinterpret initially inconclusive descriptors.
As Figure 3.3 shows, for the history of preaching Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām remains
the main collection of the corpus. Other sources will be used for comparative
perspective and further detailed inquiries. It should be noted that even though
biographical collections of the legal schools often offer much more detailed
biographies of individuals involved in different forms of preaching, they not
necessarily offer more details on the preaching activities of these individuals.
3.1.5 A Note on the Geography of Preaching
Major forms of preaching display regional patterns (Figure 3.1). The most
staggering difference is between the khut.ba and the wa↪z. in their westward and
eastward orientations. However, even though the numbers of preachers of all
styles are rather impressive, they are not significant enough for the analysis
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Figure 3.1: Geographical Patterns of Major Preaching Forms. The tadhk̄ır is omitted since
it is largely synonymous with the wa↪z. and their geographical patterns are very similar. NB:
Each map has its own scale.
at the level of regional clusters that has been used in the previous sections.
Since the most staggering difference in preaching practices is between the west
and the east of the Islamic world, in some sections it will be more efficient
to think in larger geographical categories. For this purpose I am regrouping
regional clusters into four macro regions grouped around the following core
provinces—North Africa and Andalusia, Syria and Egypt; Iraq and Arabia;
Iran and Central Asia (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: Four Macro Regions of the Islamic World. Regional clusters are regrouped into
four macro regions that are clustered around the following major provinces: North Africa
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Figure 3.4: Nisbas of the Du↪āt (34) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (20–670 ah/642–
1272 ce).
What the corpus offers on individuals involved in da↪wa-related activities
has rather little uniformity. Although the da↪wa is most commonly associated
with Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı missionary activities, there are very few individuals who can be
identified as Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı du↪āt . The remaining majority is utterly variegated in
social, religious and other possible terms ( Figure G.1). Geographically, Iraq
(and Baghdad in particular) features very prominently; however, since this
region surpasses all the other provinces of the Islamic world in perhaps all
aspects of social and religious history, this is of little help (Figure 3.5).
Such a variety of affiliations for a relatively small number of biographees
who are spread thinly across the entire period covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām makes
it very difficult to establish patterns. The only common denominator stems
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from the meaning of the root d-↪-w , “to call, to invite,” which in these cases
signifies attempts to win new supporters of one’s cause. One can distinguish
two major contexts where da↪wa-related vocabulary is used: “political” and
“religious.” Such a division is rather tentative, since the political context is
primarily about leadership—a topic which is never devoid of religious rhetoric;
while the religious context is mostly about theological issues, which may also
have political connotations. This division is more about which of these two
contexts prevail. The Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı da↪wa is a unique combination of the two: while
its religious underpinnings are undeniable, most of what one finds in the corpus
is of political nature.
In the early period, when it comes to issues of leadership in the community,
da↪wa-related actions most commonly feature in the context of khut.ba-related
actions: one “addresses” people and “calls” them to support oneself or one’s
nominee (khat.aba wa-da↪ā ilá nafsi-hi, or khat.aba wa-da↪ā ilay-hi). This po-
litical usage of da↪wa is traceable back to the fitna of Ibn al-Zubayr (d. 72/
692 ce or 73/693 ce).37 Ibn al-Zubayr claimed the caliphate for himself after
the death of Yaz̄ıd b. Mu↪āwiya in 64/685 ce38 and a number of governors
supported him and “called” people to pledge allegiance to the new caliph.39 As
the “commander of the faithful” (amı̄r al-mu↩min̄ın), Ibn al-Zubayr delivers
37TI, 5, 435–448; the act of da↪wa seems to have combined both da↪wa ilay-hi, “calling
[people] to him” and da↪wa/du↪ā↩ la-hu, “saying a supplication prayer for him” (SAN, 3,
244).
38TI, 5, 442.
39In Homs, Qinnasr̄ın, Damascus, Kufa (SAN, 3, 242; SAN, 3, 546; TI, 5, 36); also:
SAN, 3, 546; TI, 5, 36. Some Khārijite group in Egypt also “called” people to support him
(SAN, 3, 547; TI, 5, 39).
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Figure 3.5: Geography of Dā↪iyas from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
addresses-cum-sermons,40 and leads people on the hajj.41 However, his “call-
ing” to win the support of Muh. ammad b. al-H. anafiyya
42 and Ibn ↪Abbās43
failed. In the turmoil of the fitna some of the Umayyad governors44 and rebels45
“called” to themselves, and so did the Umayyad caliphs.46
By extension, the da↪wa is related to the establishment of new dynasties.
In such cases, however, the da↪wa is often the movement itself. The leaders
of such movements “call” others to join their cause and help them bring new
claimants to power. The rhetoric of such “calls” is usually dressed in terms
of pious religious reform and the restoration of justice, which are also usually
40TI, 5, 35–36.
41TI, 5, 300.
42SAN, 4, 118; TI, 5, 43; TI, 5, 441.
43TI, 5, 441.
44TI, 5, 131–137 and TI, 5, 46; TI, 7, 162–163 and SAN, 5, 53; TI, 6, 15; SAN, 6, 61.
45SAN, 4, 146–150; TI, 5, 331.
46SAN, 5, 376–378; SAN, 6, 75–78 and TI, 8, 534–537.
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forgotten if/when the dynasty is established. The ↪Abbāsids were brought
to power by such a da↪wa movement,47 led by Abū Muslim al-Khurāsān̄ı (d.
137/755 ce),48 who is most commonly referred to as s. āh. ib al-da↪wa, “the
leader of [the ↪Abbāsid] da↪wa movement.”49 After coming to power, the
↪Abbāsids were contested by similar da↪wa movements,50 although none of
them shattered their authority as much as did the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı da↪wa movements,
with the Fāt.imids encroaching from the west and the Qarmat.̄ıs from the south.
The usage of da↪wa-related vocabulary in the descriptions of biographees
(by all the authors in the corpus, not only al-Dhahab̄ı) falls more into the
religious context and strongly suggests a rather similar idea: a minority’s at-
tempts to split off new followers from the majority. This is the primary role
of anyone described with the da↪wa-related vocabulary. At the same time, the
term dā↪iya is most commonly used in a way that suggests negative connota-
tion: individuals characterized as dā↪iya summon to what can be classified as
“heresy” from the standpoint of mainstream Sunnism. In these cases the goal
of da↪wa-related actions is to win new supporters for theological schools, such
the Mu↪tazil̄ıs51 and the Murji ↩̄ıs52; or specific theological issues, such as “free
47The descendants of the Khurāsān̄ı backbone of the ↪Abbāsid da↪wa are called abnā↩
al-da↪wa, “the sons of da↪wa,” to whom Ibn H. anbal belonged (SAN, 11, 184).
48SAN, 6, 49–74; TI, 8, 581–584. Abū Muslim also acts as a khat.ı̄b, and asks the ascetic
Ibrāh̄ım al-S. ā↩igh for admonishment (wa↪z.).
49SAN, 5, 464; SAN, 6, 49; SAN, 6, 161; SAN, 7, 307; SAN, 7, 388; SAN, 8, 346–349;
SAN, 13, 469; SAN, 16, 84; TI, 8, 25; TI, 8, 26; TI, 8, 334–335; TI, 8, 446; TI, 8, 581;
TI, 8, 67; TI, 9, 196; TI, 10, 21.
50SAN, 10, 191–192; TI, 13, 29–30; TI, 20, 241; TI, 14, 12–13; TI, 13, 67; TI, 14, 22;
SAN, 10, 191; TI, 15, 29; TI, 15, 388; TI, 25, 231; TI, 20, 19; TI, 20, 241.
51TI, 9, 238–243; TI, 20, 43; TI, 23, 584–585; TI, 26, 606; TI, 30, 73–74; TI, 33, 95–96;
TI, 33, 248–256; TI, 36, 486–490. See also: SAN, 6, 125–128; SAN, 10, 553; SAN, 15,
255–256; SAN, 16, 224–225; SAN, 16, 396–397; SAN, 18, 489–490; SAN, 20, 151–156;
SAN, 22, 28; JM, 2, 8–10.
52TI, 10, 418–419; TI, 14, 227–229. See also: SAN, 9, 513–516; SAN, 10, 453–457;
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will” (qadar);53 “anthropomorphism” (tajs̄ım),54 “createdness of the Qur↩ān”
(khalq al-Qur↩ān),55 or “reprehensible innovations” (bid↪a, pl. bida↪) in gen-
eral,56 which often include all of the above. There is a great deal of overlap,
of course, and in many cases the difference seems to lurk exclusively in the
authorial emphasis, but it is difficult to shake off this negative connotation. At
the same time, belonging to “heretical” theological communities or professing
“heretical” theological views does not automatically make one a dā↪iya—this
term emphasizes an active engagement with non-partisans in order to convert
them.57
There are only very a few cases where da↪wa-related vocabulary is used
to describe individuals who belong to the Sunn̄ı fold, and most of these cases
also seem to fall into the category of a minority facing the majority.58 For
example, individuals are described as those who brought the Sunna of the
Prophet to their land, protected it and “called” people to hold fast to it;59 or
they “called” to their legal school (most often among the H. anbal̄ıs
60). The
meaning of “calling to Islam” in general is extremely rare and occurs mostly
SAN, 10, 540–541.
53TI, 28, 160; TI, 9, 238–243. Also: SAN, 7, 105–106.
54TI, 19, 310–315.
55TI, 17, 40–46; TI, 17, 199–200. See also: SAN, 10, 199–203; SAN, 10, 272–290; SAN,
11, 169–171.
56TI, 32, 218–219; TI, 19, 310–315. See also: SAN, 9, 434–436.
57In this regard, the following emphasis is interesting ↪Imrān al-Qat.t.ān al-Bas.r̄ı (d. 170/
787 ce) was a H. arūr̄ı Khārijite, but he was not dā↪iya (SAN, 7, 280–281). Another similar
example: SAN, 7, 149–156. Also, TM, 1, 91.
58The form dā ↪̄ı seems more frequent than dā↪iya, although the numbers are not sufficient
enough to argue for any significant difference between the two.
59SAN, 11, 405–406, SAN, 11, 405–406, SAN, 12, 112–114 and SAN, 12, 224–232; TI,
30, 224–229 and TShK, 4, 271–293; SAN, 19, 278–279; TI, 40, 341–342; TI, 49, 206–207;
TM, 2, 229–231.
60SAN, 15, 90–93; SAN, 18, 503–518 and DhTH, 1, 19–27; TI, 41, 292–293; SAN, 22,
47–52, TI, 44, 182–191 and DhTH, 1, 220–225; TI, 52, 337.
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during the lifetime of the Prophet.61
There are only a few Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı du↪āt among thousands of biographees, and
these are only the most prominent figures of the Qarmat.̄ı,
62 Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı,63 and
Nizār̄ı movements.64 At the same time, if the history of the Fāt.imid da↪wa was
not written by the Fāt.imids themselves, one can hardly expect more from the
Sunn̄ı authors. In general, it seems that al-Dhahab̄ı included the biographies
of only the main main figures involved in major—mostly violent—encounters
of the Sunn̄ı world with different groups of the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ıs: the Fāt.imid conquest
of North Africa and Egypt, the Qarmat.̄ı domination over eastern Arabia, S. alāh.
al-d̄ın’s [re-]conquest of Egypt, and the struggle against the unreachable Nizār̄ı
stronghold at al-Alamūt.
On the other hand, references to the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı du↪āt65 and the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı da↪wa
in general are quite plentiful, both in the descriptions of events and biogra-
phies. Figure 3.6 shows two major spikes of discussions of the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı da↪wa
in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām: the first one around 300/913 ce (more precisely, 270–
320 ah/884–933 ce), and the second—around 500/1107 ce (most tensely
61For example, the Prophet himself “called” people to Islam (TS, 1:21–22). He also sent
Khālid b. al-Wal̄ıd as a dā ↪̄ı to the Arab tribes in order to convert them to Islam (SAN,
1, 371). Abū Hurayra lamented to the Prophet that his mother is deaf to his “calling” to
Islam (SAN, 5, 593; TI, 4, 353). “Calling to God” (kāna yad↪ū ilá-llāh) is not uncommon,
but such phrases are either too generic, or they stand for “calling to [the dā↪iya’s version
of] God.”
62Such as Abū Tāhir Sulaymān al-Qarmat.̄ı (d. 302/915 ce), ↪Adw Allāh Malik al-
Bah. rayn, who led the raid on Mecca with 700 horsemen, killed pilgrims on the Sacred land,
plucked out the Black Stone, and filled Zamzam with dead corpses (SAN, 15, 320–325);
also on the Qarmat.̄ıs: TI, 25, 13–17.
63SAN, 14, 58–59; SAN, 15, 141–152; TI, 22, 133–135; TI, 39, 387–388.
64SAN, 21, 182–190; TI, 41, 325–335; TI, 48, 197–198.
65Yet, most of these du↪āt are nameless: SAN, 10, 106; SAN, 14, 224; SAN, 15, 132;
SAN, 17, 181; SAN, 18, 132; SAN, 18, 429; SAN, 18, 497; SAN, 20, 322; TShK, 5, 320;
TShK, 6, 130; TI, 28, 267; TI, 33, 237; TI, 34, 15; TI, 34, 29; TI, 36, 43; TI, 38, 297;
TM, 2, 161.
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Figure 3.6: References to the Ismā ↪̄ıl̄ı Da↪wa and Du↪āt in Tarikhislam.
during 450–500 ah/1059–1107 ce). The first one reflects the formative and
expansive periods of the Qarmat.̄ı and Fāt.imid da↪wa-movements. During the
second, however, da↪wa is most commonly used as a synonym of khut.ba, in
its symbolic meaning of confirming the legitimate ruler of the realm. The
establishment of the Fāt.imid da↪wa meant primarily that the name of the
reigning Fāt.imid caliph would be mentioned in the Fridays sermons. During
400–500 ah/1010–1107 ce urban centers and provinces between the ↪Abbāsid
and Fāt.imid capitals—mainly Greater Syria, Arabia, and Iraq
66—went back
and forth between the two powers. These shifts are mainly described as: in
66In 450/1059 ce the Fāt.imid da↪wa was established even in Baghdad, the very heart
of the ↪Abbāsid caliphate (SAN, 18, 217; TI, 30, 30; TI, 30, 251). In 451/1060 ce, the
khat.ı̄b of the Mans.ūr congregational mosque who was delivering khut.bas in the name of the
Fāt.imid caliph al-Mustans.ir under the orders of al-Basās̄ır̄ı was removed from his position
(TI, 30, 273–274).
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such-and-such a place the ↪Abbāsid khut.ba/da↪wa was interrupted and the
Fāt.imid khut.ba/da↪wa was established, or vice versa; this, however, was often
accompanied by a great deal of violence.67
It should be noted that the terms da↪wa and khut.ba are often used in-
terchangeably during this period and applied to both the Fāt.imids and the
↪Abbāsids. This temporary interchangeability may have resulted from what
the psychologists call “a priming effect:”68 if a chronicler was writing about
both the ↪Abbāsid khut.ba and the Fāt.imid da↪wa, that which was mentioned
first could affect the word usage for the second. The word da↪wa allowed such
interchangeability, since in addition to the major meaning of “calling,” it may
also stand for “supplication.” This is exactly what a khat.ı̄b does while deliv-
ering a khut.ba: he says a “supplication” for the recognized ruler, although the
more common term for such supplication is du↪ā↩ (and the verbal form is da↪ā
la-hu, “calling [for God’s blessings] unto him,” instead of da↪ā ilay-hi, “calling
[for people’s support] for him”). After the Fāt.imids are removed from Egypt
in 567/1172 ce, da↪wa almost never features as the synonym of khut.ba.
67It would be interesting to map these developments, which would allow to see the dy-
namics of this struggle for the symbolic hegemony over the world of Islam between two great
dynasties.
68Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 1st edition (Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
October 2011), 50–58.
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Figure 3.7: Geography of the Khut.abā↩.
3.3 Khut.ba
3.3.1 Chronology and Geography
The geographical distribution of those who can be identified as khut.abā↩ has a
strong westward leaning (Figure 3.7). Keeping in mind that the khut.ba—the
Friday sermon—is an obligatory practice, this distribution cannot possibly
represent the actual numbers of Friday preachers, but rather the attention
devoted by the biographers and chroniclers to this religious office.
The chronological distribution of khut.abā↩ suggests three periods: the early
period until c. 250/865 ce, when the curve goes down; the middle period
between c. 250–550 ah/865–1156 ce, when the curve steadily goes up; and
the late period after c. 550/1156 ce, when the curve slows its climb and even
goes down slightly (Figure 3.8).
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Figure 3.8: The Chronological distribution of the khut.abā↩ in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
The chronological distribution of khut.abā↩ in the macro regions (Figure 3.9)
give us a slightly different picture. The numbers of khut.abā↩ in all macro re-
gions begin to grow soon after c. 300/913 ce—the turning point that may
well mark the beginning of professionalization of the religious class (see Sec-
tion 2.3.2.4). After c. 500/1107 ce all the khut.abā↩ curves start mirroring the
cumulative curves of their respective macro regions.
It should be noted that on the Iraq-Arabia curve, Arabia is present only in
the very early period, almost completely disappearing by c. 300/913 ce. The
end of the curve of khut.abā↩ for this macro region is the only one that looks
slightly more optimistic than the cumulative curve of this region. The reason
for that is the growth of the importance of the Jaz̄ıra and the northern part
of Iraq (which is closer to the Jaz̄ıra than it is to central Iraq). This region is
not as significant as the central part of Iraq, with its urban centers clustered
where the Tigris and the Euphrates come closest to each other. Their growing
numbers cannot compensate for the decline of the cumulative curve of the
macro region when the center is in decline, yet they are significant enough to
affect the curve of the khut.abā↩.
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Figure 3.9: Chronological Distribution of the Khut.abā↩ in Macro Regions. The two graphs
on top show the cumulative curves for the same macro regions (given for comparison).
3.3.2 Addresses-cum-Sermons
Khut.abā↩ as “tribal orators” existed in pre-Islamic Arabia.
69 Eloquent individ-
uals, these orators represented their own tribe in verbal exchanges with other
tribes. Unlike poets (sing. shā↪ir) or soothsayers (sing. kāhin), orators do not
seem to have had any connections to the unseen world and their eloquence
was a gift that did not cause their tribesmen to keep their distance. What one
finds in the early period (until c. 250/865 ce) is that khut.ba-related actions
are more about “delivering an address” in general, rather than “delivering a
sermon.”
The Prophet Muh. ammad “addressed” his followers in this manner; how-
69For the detailed discussion, see: Qutbuddin (2008), ‘Khut.ba. The evolution of early
Arabic oration’.
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ever, this religiously charged content added a new dimension to the traditional
tribal orations, turning them into religious sermons. In this regard, the early
period is transitional and the early khut.abā↩ of the Islamic community should
be viewed as “orators-cum-preachers,” who combined the old form of address
with the new religious content.
One does find some who represented the old more than the new. For
example, Thābit b. Qays is described as the khat.ı̄b of the Ans.ār, the Medinan
companions of the Prophet. On behalf of all the Yathrib̄ıs, he “addressed”
(khat.aba) the Prophet upon his arrival to Yathrib/Medina in order to confirm
their agreement.70 Later, when the delegation of the tribe of Tamı̄m arrived,
the Prophet asked Thābit b. Qays to respond to their khat.ı̄b in kind (qum
fa-ajib khat.ı̄ba-hum), which he did splendidly, to the delight of the Prophet
and all the Muslims.71 Suhayl b. ↪Amr is described as the khat.ı̄b of Quraysh,
who “addressed” (qāma khat.ı̄ban) the Meccans after the Prophet’s death with
an “address” in support of Islam similar to that of Abū Bakr al-S. iqq̄ıq in
Medina (bi-nah. w min khut.bati-l-s. idd̄ıq bi-l-Mad̄ına), thus silencing all discord
and helping Islam prevail.72




73SAN, 1, 194; SAN, 1, 309; SAN, 1, 87; SAN, 2, 433; SAN, 2, 86; SAN, 10, 280;
TI, 5, 203; TI, 5, 340; TI, 15, 236; SAN, 2, 433; SAN, 2, 86; SAN, 10, 280; TI, 5, 203;
TI, 5, 340; TI, 15, 236. One should keep in mind, however, that of all the sources in my
corpus only al-Dhahab̄ı’s Siyar a↪lām al-nubalā↩ covers the period of Muh.ammad’s mission;
as I discussed above, I had to exclude the first three volumes that cover this period from
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām because their structure makes computational analysis extremely difficult.
Including early biographical collections, such as Kitāb al-t.abaqāt al-kubrá of Ibn Sa↪d, will
allow to shed more light on the early period of preaching.
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mon examples from this period are of the transitional “orator-cum-preacher”
kind. The prevailing majority of those who actively engage in khut.ba-related
actions (about 50 in total)74 are individuals with positions of high leader-
ship within the community—first of all the Prophet himself,75 then the early
caliphs76 and their governors and other representatives,77 and, more rarely,
those who contest those already in power and claim their positions for them-
selves or their nominees.78 The nisbas of these individuals show that the
74Numbers are given for Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, while references are to all relevant biographies
in the corpus.
75SAN, 1, 209; SAN, 1, 481; SAN, 2, 108; SAN, 2, 157; SAN, 2, 513; SAN, 2, 88;
SAN, 3, 251; SAN, 3, 47; SAN, 4, 116; SAN, 4, 457; SAN, 5, 257; SAN, 6, 194; SAN,
6, 33; SAN, 12, 237; SAN, 13, 157; SAN, 13, 82; SAN, 14, 507; TI, 4, 34; TI, 52, 76;
SAN, 1, 232; SAN, 1, 483; SAN, 2, 403; SAN, 2, 531; SAN, 3, 149; SAN, 3, 256; SAN,
3, 393; SAN, 3, 451; SAN, 3, 462; SAN, 4, 201; SAN, 4, 570; SAN, 5, 171; SAN, 5, 90;
SAN, 6, 310; SAN, 7, 139; SAN, 10, 589; SAN, 12, 151; SAN, 12, 237; SAN, 13, 557;
SAN, 14, 181; TShK, 8, 109; TShK, 9, 64; TI, 4, 188; TI, 5, 78; TI, 6, 173; TI, 6, 213;
TI, 6, 458; TI, 9, 290; TI, 9, 541; TI, 9, 598; TI, 13, 200; TI, 32, 207; TI, 37, 430; TI, 46,
415; TH, 1, 349; TH, 2, 163; TH, 2, 242.
76SAN, 3, 119–162; SAN, 4, 35–40; SAN, 4, 246–249; SAN, 5, 114–148; SAN, 5, 374–
376; SAN, 7, 83–90; TI, 4, 306–317; TI, 5, 435–448; TI, 6, 135–145; TI, 6, 377–382; TI,
6, 496–501; TI, 7, 187–206; TI, 9, 21–33; TI, 9, 465–472; TI, 10, 434–445; SAN, 6, 45;
SAN, 17, 146; TI, 4, 168; TI, 8, 337; TI, 15, 229; TI, 28, 43; SAN, 2, 191; SAN, 4, 500;
SAN, 4, 502; SAN, 5, 396; TShK, 8, 32; TI, 5, 35; TI, 5, 311; TI, 5, 319; TI, 5, 325; TI,
5, 326; TI, 6, 32; TI, 6, 270; TI, 6, 489; TI, 8, 334; TI, 8, 413; TI, 8, 535; TI, 9, 322; TI,
9, 370; TI, 10, 122; TI, 13, 16; TI, 13, 310; TI, 20, 239; TI, 24, 59; TI, 24, 35; TI, 29, 390;
TI, 48, 407; TI, 52, 10; TH, 2, 118.
77SAN, 1, 93–124; SAN, 1, 304–307; SAN, 2, 494–496; SAN, 3, 18–21; SAN, 3, 21–
33; SAN, 3, 241–245; SAN, 3, 331–359; SAN, 3, 411–412; SAN, 3, 444–449; SAN, 3,
479–482; SAN, 3, 545–5; SAN, 4, 86–97; SAN, 4, 140–145; SAN, 4, 181–182; SAN, 4,
496–500; SAN, 4, 603–604; SAN, 5, 53; SAN, 5, 425–433; SAN, 5, 444–445; SAN, 6,
207–208; SAN, 10, 108–109; TI, 4, 117–124; TI, 4, 207–210; TI, 4, 212–221; TI, 4, 224–
230; TI, 4, 306–317; TI, 4, 324–325; TI, 5, 131–137; TI, 5, 202–205; TI, 5, 227–234; TI, 5,
260–262; TI, 5, 524–528; TI, 6, 214–216; TI, 6, 314–327; TI, 6, 485–490; TI, 7, 111–112;
TI, 7, 161–162; TI, 7, 162–163; TI, 8, 82–85; TI, 8, 111; TI, 8, 411–413; TI, 8, 476; TI, 8,
484–485; TI, 8, 534–537; TI, 8, 552–553; TI, 8, 567–568; TI, 8, 581–584; TI, 11, 345–348;
TI, 12, 68–69; TI, 13, 83–86; TI, 14, 203–205; TM, 1, 379; DM, 1, 227.
78SAN, 3, 321–326; SAN, 3, 409–411; SAN, 4, 151–152; SAN, 4, 401–409; SAN, 6,
49–74; SAN, 6, 78–81; SAN, 6, 210–218; SAN, 13, 129–136; TI, 5, 35–36; TI, 5, 435–448;
TI, 6, 485–490; TI, 8, 581–584; SAN, 4, 583; TI, 5, 27; TI, 5, 343; TI, 5, 61; TI, 6, 10;
TI, 9, 322; TI, 10, 37; TI, 12, 13; TI, 24, 65; TM, 1, 516; SAN, 6, 45; SAN, 12, 550; TI,
5, 44; TI, 13, 79; TI, 20, 36.
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Figure 3.10: Caliphs, Governors, and Rebels as The Early Khut.āba↩.
khut.ba is about power and leadership: the most frequent nisbas are al-Amı̄r,
al-Umaw̄ı, al-Qurash̄ı, and al-↪Abbās̄ı (see Figure E.4). Figure 3.10 illustrates
this point in chronological perspective, showing that the engagement of the
top leadership in khut.ba-related activities is most prominent in the earliest
decades and clearly comes to naught by the end of the early period. This
process goes hand-in-hand with the de-tribalization of the Islamic society (see
Section 2.3.2.1), when the ethos of a tribal warrior—of which the pre-Islamic
khut.ba was part and parcel—transforms itself into the ethos of a religious
scholar. The middle period brings the new model of the khat.ı̄b, although this
one will also be closely connected with the powers-that-be of the Islamic world.
As soon as the Islamic community starts disagreeing about its rightful
leader and the successor to the Prophet, da↪wa-related vocabulary becomes
more and more frequent, featuring mostly within the framework of the khut.ba-
related actions: different groups and individuals “address” people and “call”
them to join their cause and pledge allegiance to a new leader.79
79Da↪wa-related vocabulary in the sense of “the call to Islam” (the most common contem-
porary usage) is very infrequent throughout the corpus with more examples in the period
of the Prophet’s lifetime. For example, the Prophet himself “calls” people to Islam (TS,
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Figure 3.11: Nisbas of the Khut.abā↩ (51) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (20–250 ah/642–
865 ce).
A common feature of the descriptions of all preaching-related actions in the
early period is that they are, by and large, descriptions of single events80 that
lack any indications that they are one of the many that a biographee habitually
performed. In the case of the khut.ba-related actions their repeated nature
may be implied, since it is practically always about caliphs, their governors, or
pretenders addressing their actual or potential subjects. Accounts from other
biographies and descriptions of events support the reoccurring nature of such
addresses-cum-sermons. There are plenty of references to the khut.bas of the
early Islamic leaders—this is where one occasionally finds valuable details on
the circumstances of these preaching events, but in most cases they are only
that she refuses to listen to him (SAN, 5, 593; TI, 4, 353).
80SAN, 1, 113; SAN, 1, 194; SAN, 1, 474; SAN, 2, 466; SAN, 2, 496; SAN, 3, 253;
SAN, 3, 351; SAN, 3, 410; SAN, 3, 446; SAN, 3, 480; SAN, 5, 444; SAN, 14, 231;
TShK, 3, 197; TI, 4, 226; TI, 5, 348; TI, 27, 190; TM, 1, 471; TM, 1, 486; JM, 2, 266;
TT, 1, 332; SAN, 15, 89; TShK, 3, 347; TI, 24, 155.
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chronological markers akin to the pre-Islamic ayyām, “days [of battles].”81
One rarely finds indications as to when and where exactly an address-cum-
sermon took place, although the assumption that khut.ba-related events would
most commonly take place on Fridays in mosques is quite justified. After all,
Friday was the day of the week when all adult men were expected to gather
in a congregational mosque, which would be the best opportunity for a leader
to reach most of the community at once.
Khut.ba-related events also seem to have been more “political” in nature:
calling people to pledge allegiance to oneself or one’s nominee;82 cursing op-
ponents and enemies;83 or bringing the community up to speed on the lat-
est events.84 They seem to revolve around the issues of leadership85 more
than anything, even though there is always some religious element to these
addresses-cum-sermons.
81References of this kind are particularly frequent in the case of ↪Umar b. al-Khat.t.āb’s
khut.ba at al-Jābiya (a place about 50 miles south of Damascus), which is also referred to as
yawm al-Jābiya: SAN, 4, 132; SAN, 4, 280; SAN, 4, 360; SAN, 4, 594; TI, 5, 209; TI, 5,
409; TI, 5, 515; TI, 5, 544; TI, 5, 555; TI, 6, 64; TI, 6, 240; TI, 6, 512; TI, 7, 79. On the
importance of al-Jābiya, see, Lammens, H.; Sourdel-Thomine, J., ‘al-Djābiya,’ in EI2.
Other references to sermons as chronological markers: SAN, 4, 201; SAN, 4, 564; SAN,
5, 230; SAN, 5, 393; SAN, 6, 310; SAN, 7, 139; SAN, 12, 151; TI, 6, 55; TI, 6, 173; TI,
6, 213; TI, 6, 458; TI, 7, 49; TI, 8, 190.
82SAN, 3, 137; SAN, 3, 243; SAN, 4, 229; TI, 9, 23; TI, 11, 240; TI, 20, 230.
83SAN, 6, 212; TM, 2, 74; TI, 6, 43; SAN, 4, 407; SAN, 15, 99; SAN, 12, 549; SAN,
12, 602; SAN, 13, 315; SAN, 13, 474; SAN, 15, 132; TShK, 3, 391. This practice becomes
even more common in the middle and late periods.
84SAN, 4, 502; TI, 6, 270.
85TI, 13, 38; TI, 13, 39; TI, 13, 39.
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3.3.3 The Game of Thrones
The beginning of the middle period (c. 250/865 ce) for the khut.ba is marked
by several significant changes. First, the caliphs and governors abandon the
practice of delivering khut.bas personally, and delegate this role to subordinates.
Second, in the sources the khut.ba itself becomes primarily a symbolic practice
of confirming the legitimate ruler and a local community’s allegiance to him.
Third, men of learning begin to feature more and more often as khut.abā↩.
As to the powers-that-be, the shift takes place sometime during the period
200–300 ah/816–913 ce. During the early period, the caliphs are contin-
uously reported as khut.abā↩: all the Rightly-Guided caliphs,
86 most of the
86Abū Bakr (r. 11–13 ah/633–635 ce): SAN, 1, 194; SAN, 1, 357; SAN, 1, 483; SAN,
2, 191; SAN, 4, 95; TH, 2, 242; ↪Umar (r. 13–23 ah/635–645 ce) SAN, 1, 394; SAN, 1,
452; SAN, 1, 483; SAN, 1, 545; SAN, 2, 191; SAN, 2, 92; SAN, 3, 510; SAN, 4, 132;
SAN, 4, 223; SAN, 4, 280; SAN, 4, 32; SAN, 4, 360; SAN, 4, 594; SAN, 4, 95; SAN,
5, 135; SAN, 7, 101; SAN, 10, 620; SAN, 11, 445; TShK, 2, 324; TI, 5, 209; TI, 5, 409;
TI, 5, 502; TI, 5, 515; TI, 5, 544; TI, 5, 555; TI, 6, 64; TI, 6, 240; TI, 6, 512; TI, 7, 79;
TI, 7, 194; SAN, 1, 394; SAN, 1, 452; SAN, 4, 132; SAN, 4, 280; SAN, 4, 360; SAN,
4, 594; TI, 5, 209; TI, 5, 409; TI, 5, 515; TI, 5, 544; TI, 5, 555; TI, 6, 64; TI, 6, 240; TI,
6, 512; TI, 7, 79; ↪Uthmān (r. 23–35 ah/645–656 ce): SAN, 2, 191; SAN, 4, 564; TI, 6,
511; TI, 7, 49; and ↪Al̄ı (35–40 ah/656–661 ce) SAN, 2, 191; SAN, 3, 203; SAN, 3, 260;
SAN, 4, 153; SAN, 5, 393; TI, 4, 220; TI, 5, 549; TI, 8, 190; TI, 11, 119.
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Umayyads,87 [Ibn al-Zubayr (d. 72/692 ce or 73/693 ce)],88 and the early
↪Abbāsids,89 as well as some of the Fāt.imid caliphs.
90 In 279/893 ce we still
find the surprised reaction of the chronicler reporting that when the caliph
al-Mu↪tad. id (r. 279–289 ah/893–903 ce) prayed with the community, he did
not deliver a khut.ba.
91 By the time of the caliph al-Rād. ı̄ (r. 322–329 ah/935–
942 ce) this had become the norm: when the caliph was asked to deliver a
khut.ba,
92 he found himself in a tricky situation. Apparently, he had no idea
what he was supposed to say when he got to the point of saying the du↪ā↩
for the ruling caliph, i.e., for himself.93 This episode shows that by the time
of al-Rād. ı̄, the khut.ba was no longer something the ↪Abbāsid caliphs would
87Mu↪awiya (r. 41–60 ah/662–681 ce) more than anyone: SAN, 2, 535; SAN, 2, 559;
SAN, 3, 100; SAN, 3, 109; SAN, 3, 121; SAN, 3, 225; SAN, 3, 241; SAN, 3, 271; SAN,
3, 529; SAN, 4, 568; SAN, 5, 230; SAN, 13, 458; TI, 4, 169; TI, 4, 312; TI, 5, 132; TI, 5,
225; TI, 5, 272; TI, 5, 297; TI, 5, 464; TI, 8, 508; TI, 9, 240; SAN, 3, 139; SAN, 5, 323;
TI, 4, 149; TI, 4, 308; TI, 4, 39; TI, 5, 466; TI, 5, 539; TI, 8, 576; TH, 2, 147; Mu↪āwiya’s
status as a khat.ı̄b is often discussed through the saying of the Prophet, where one letter









¯ ): SAN, 3, 149; SAN, 4, 568; TI, 4, 312; TI, 9, 240; SAN, 3, 150. Yazid
I (r. 60–64 ah/681–685 ce): SAN, 4, 37. ↪Abd al-Malik (r.): SAN, 4, 247; TI, 5, 311;
TI, 5, 319; TI, 5, 325; TI, 5, 326; TI, 6, 138. al-Wal̄ıd (r. 86–96 ah/706–716 ce): SAN,
4, 500; TI, 6, 489; TI, 6, 500; TI, 10, 122; TI, 10, 122. Sulaymān is reported to have
preached every Friday (96–99 ah/716–718 ce): TI, 6, 270; TI, 6, 379; TI, 6, 379. ↪Umar
II (r. 99–101 ah/718–720 ce): SAN, 5, 123; TI, 6, 474; TI, 7, 194; TI, 8, 226. And Yaz̄ıd
III (r. 126/745 ce): SAN, 5, 375.
88TI, 9, 322.
89al-Saffāh. (r. 132–136 ah/750–754 ce): SAN, 5, 444; SAN, 6, 78; TI, 8, 336; TI,
8, 413; al-Mans.ūr (r. 136–158 ah/754–776 ce): SAN, 7, 84; SAN, 15, 157; TI, 9, 468;
TI, 25, 214; al-Mahd̄ı (r. 158–169 ah/776–786 ce): TI, 9, 370; TI, 10, 436; al-Rash̄ıd (r.
170–193 ah/787–810 ce): TI, 13, 310; and al-Ma↩mūn (r. 198–218 ah/814–834 ce) TI, 15,
229.
90 ↪Ubayd Allāh al-Mahd̄ı (r. 279–322 ah/893–935 ce): TM, 1, 516. al-Mans.ūr (r. 334/
946 ce–341H): SAN, 15, 157; TI, 25, 214; al-↪Az̄ız (r. 365–386 ah/976–997 ce): SAN, 15,
168; TI, 27, 130. al-H. ākim (r. 386–411 ah/997–1021 ce): TI, 28, 43.
91TI, 20, 239.
92In 324/937 ce he was also forced by his rebelling slave soldiers to deliver a khut.ba (TI,
24, 35).
93In the dead of the night he sent for a famous preacher to help him out, which the latter
did (TH, 2, 118).
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routinely practice. Among other things, al-Rād. ı̄ is described as the last caliph
who delivered Friday sermons.94
As for the governors, the curve also shows that their engagement with the
khut.ba comes to an end during the period 200–300 ah/816–913 ce. al-Dhahab̄ı
reports with what can be interpreted as a bit of surprise about the amı̄r Asad
b. Nūh. , a governor of Balkh, who first kept the office of khat.ı̄b for himself,
then decided to give it to one of the most pious scholars of Balkh, Khalaf b.
Ayyūb (d. 205/821 ce).95 This may be a clue that by this time governors
would usually delegate this office to somebody else.
Most of the passages that mention the khut.ba in the middle period are
about its symbolic meaning. Numerous passages that deal with the symbolic
khut.ba, describe it in the passive voice—khutiba la-hu, “a khut.ba was pro-
nounced in his name”—and one finds details on the actual preachers who were
delivering these sermons only when developments took unexpected turns. Fig-
ure 3.12 shows how the frequencies of the symbolic usage of khut.ba changed
over the middle and late periods: all three curves peak during 400–550 ah/
1010–1156 ce. Considering that these curves reflect the frequency with which
the powers-that-be took largely the same provinces from each other, these
curves can be treated as the indicators of overall instability in such significant
regions as Iraq and Greater Syria. The graph also shows that these peaks of
regional instability correlate with the cumulative biographical curve (and in
94SAN, 15, 103; TI, 24, 268; TI, 24, 35; TH, 2, 118. One, however, finds that the caliph
al-T. ā↩i↪ (r. 363–381 ah/974–992 ce) delivered at least one khut.ba (SAN, 15, 119; TI, 27,
287).
95Khalaf b. Ayyūb did not accept it, even more so, as any pious scholar should, he tried
to avoid the amı̄r at the best of his abilities (SAN, 9, 542; TS, 1, 271).
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fact, with the curves of Iraq and Greater Syria). In other words, the number
of biographies drops in these core regions simultaneously with the rise of the
symbolic khut.ba.
The symbolic usage of the khut.ba is traceable back to the early period, but
it is in the middle and late periods that it becomes prominent, perhaps even
primary. The curve of the caliphal khut.ba—even though it groups together
the Spanish Umayyads, the ↪Abbāsids and the Fāt.imids—is largely about
the struggle for the symbolic authority over the Islamic world between the
↪Abbāsids and the Fāt.imids. During the period of roughly 400–500 ah/1010–
1107 ce, urban centers and provinces that lie between the Fāt.imid and the
↪Abbāsid capitals—mainly in Greater Syria, Arabia and Iraq96—go back and
forth between the two dynasties. The volume of occurences of the symbolic
khut.ba for the macro regions of North Africa and Andalusia, and Iran and
Central Asia is rather insignificant.
This tug of war between the ↪Abbāsids and the Fāt.imids reaches its apogee
in 448/1057 ce, when al-Basās̄ır̄ı (d. 451/1060 ce),97 one of the military
leaders under the Būyids, pledged his allegiance to the Fāt.imid caliph al-
Mustans.ir bi-Llāh (r. 427–487 ah/1037–1095 ce) and started conquering the
cities of Iraq and establishing the Fāt.imid khut.ba—in 448/1057 ce in Mosul,
98
96TI, 26, 220; TI, 26, 254–255; SAN, 16, 271; TI, 26, 258; TI, 26, 406–408; SAN, 16,
307–308; TI, 27, 29–30; TI, 27, 234–235; SAN, 15, 176; TI, 28, 5–7; TI, 30, 371–373; TI,
33, 228; TI, 30, 24–25; SAN, 18, 132–133; TI, 30, 25; TI, 30, 29–30; TI, 30, 32; TI, 30,
48–50; SAN, 17, 633–634; SAN, 18, 307–318; TI, 33, 228; TI, 30, 30–31; SAN, 18, 217;
TI, 30, 30; TI, 30, 251; TShK, 5, 247–253; SAN, 15, 140; SAN, 15, 186–196; SAN, 18,
110; TI, 30, 36–37; TI, 31, 7–8; SAN, 15, 190; TI, 31, 21; TI, 31, 29–30; SAN, 15, 193;
TI, 31, 32–33; SAN, 18, 431–432; TI, 32, 37–38; TI, 33, 47; TI, 34, 32; TI, 34, 33–34; TI,
34, 15–16.
97SAN, 18, 132–133, also see: TShK, 5, 247–253; SAN, 15, 138–141; SAN, 18, 307–318.
98TI, 30, 25.
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Figure 3.12: The Symbolic Usage of Khut.ba in the Middle and Late Periods.
Kufa,99 and Wasit100 in 448/1057 ce; in 450/1059 ce in Basra,101 and then in
Baghdad, the very heart of the ↪Abbāsid caliphate.102
By and large, however, the biographies of the khut.abā↩ only mention the fact
of their preaching positions without any details on their preaching activities.
It is during such periods of turmoil as the civil war provoked by al-Basās̄ır̄ı103
that we find some circumstantial details on the preaching of the khut.abā↩
during the middle period. However, these details usually tell us about the
most likely consequences of being caught between the hammer and the anvil:




102SAN, 18, 217; TI, 30, 30; TI, 30, 251.
103Referred to in the sources as fitnat al-Basās̄ır̄ı (448–451 ah/1057–1060 ce).
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aftermath—refused to deliver a khut.ba in the name of the Fāt.imid caliph, al-
Basās̄ır̄ı had his hand cut off;104 after the Saljūqs took the capital city back
from al-Basās̄ır̄ı in 451/1060 ce, a khat.ı̄b of the Mans.ūr congregational mosque
who had delivered khut.bas in the name of the Fāt.imid caliph under the orders
of the Būyid commander was removed from his position.105
3.3.4 The Learned Khut.abā↩
The third significant change that takes place after the beginning of the middle
period (c. 250/865 ce) is that representatives of the learned community now
occupy the office of khat.ı̄b. A closer look at the biographies of khut.abā↩ after
c. 250/865 ce shows that they are very similar to most other biographies of
this period in terms of length and the general scarcity of biographical details.
The information related to their preaching is often limited to brief statements.
As one travels across the Islamic world from west to east the numbers of
khut.abā↩ drop. The summary statistics make it clear that there are many more
data on the khut.abā↩ of the west than on those of the east—this is visible in
the absolute numbers, but even more so in the percentages:106 North Africa
and Andalusia—149 (5.76% of 2,586); Syria and Egypt—128 (2.49% of 5,139);
Iraq and Arabia—101 (1.01% of 10,041); Iran and Central Asia—100 (1.60%
of 6,254).
Considering that there always must be at least one khat.ı̄b in any major
104TI, 33, 185–187; JM, 1, 374–375.
105TI, 30, 273–274: himself a descendant of an ↪Abbāsid caliphs, he was replaced by
another member of the caliphal family.
106The percentages in the graphs are of the total number of biographies in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām;
the numbers and percentages are also for the entire period covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
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populated center, the real numbers should be significantly higher, but ratios
between khut.abā↩ and the entire scholarly population of each region probably
more comparable: technically, the larger the population, the more congrega-
tional mosques are required to accommodate every male Muslim of legally
responsible age—and the larger the number of khut.abā↩ to deliver sermons in
these mosques. Unfortunately, there are too many unknowns to allow us to
consider these data in sociological terms.107 In historical terms these data
should reflect the interest of biographers in the office of a khat.ı̄b in respective
macro regions—by the end of the period their numbers go up or down following
their cumulative curves.108
Although information on the preaching of khut.abā↩ is rather scarce and one
can hardly trace their life long patterns, their biographies provide enough data
to build their profiles, which may help us to understand regional differences.
Figure 3.13 offers a numeric summary of the most frequent features found in
biographies of khut.abā↩ after 250/865 ce (these numbers reflect biographical
data in general, not just nisbas).109 These numbers, of course, should be
considered together with the cumulative curves of the macro regions.
107This is where the historian of the Islamic world need the models of pre-modern Islamic
society in general, and of local communities in particular.
108Although the graphs are based on al-Dhahab̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, he relied on local
sources, preserving the original wording of his sources, as I argued in Section 1.2.2.4. After
reading multiple biographies of the same preachers, I am even more convinced that al-
Dhahab̄ı relied more on “stitching” rather than paraphrasing, although demonstrating this
for a large volume of text would require more time and tools that I currently have at my
disposal.
109It should be noted, that there is no contradiction between the onomastic data and the
descriptions that one finds in the biographies, although, of course, biographical information
provides more details than what one finds in the onomastic data. At the same time, it
should be added that even though numerically the statistics based on the onomastic data
and on the biographical data will differ, their curves mirror each other.
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NAAN* SYEG* IRAR* IRCA*
h. ad̄ıth 21 14.4% 17 14.1% 15 16.0% 12 13.6%
qirā↩āt 66 45.2% 20 16.5% 13 13.8% 7 8.0%
tafs̄ır 2 1.4% 1 0.8% 2 2.1% 3 3.4%
nah. w 32 21.9% 9 7.4% 6 6.4% 1 1.1%
adab 22 15.1% 9 7.4% 13 13.8% 5 5.7%
tas.awwuf 5 3.4% 3 2.5% 5 5.3% 5 5.7%
fiqh 30 20.6% 68 56.2% 30 31.9% 21 23.9%
noST* 42 28.8% 36 29.8% 44 46.8% 48 54.6%
H. anaf̄ıs 0 0.0% 2 1.7% 1 1.1% 3 3.4%
H. anbal̄ıs 0 0.0% 10 8.3% 5 5.3% 0 0.0%
Shāfi ↪̄ıs 0 0.0% 34 28.1% 8 8.5% 2 2.3%
Mālik̄ıs 6 4.1% 4 3.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
qād. ı̄ 18 12.3% 20 16.5% 8 8.5% 9 10.2%
positions 48 32.9% 52 43.0% 24 25.5% 18 20.5%
families 31 21.2% 46 38.0% 22 23.4% 25 28.4%
Total 146 100% 121 100% 94 100% 88 100%
Figure 3.13: The Khut.abā↩ in Macro Regions after 250 ah/864 ce (Residents
Only). Abbreviations : NAAN*: North Africa & Andalusia; SYEG*: Syria
& Egypt; IRAR*: Iraq & Arabia; IRCA*: Iran & Central Asia; noST*:
no specialized training reported in biographies.
Practically all khut.abā↩ had some religious training and only rarely does
one come across a biography that lacks any information on the religious train-
ing of a khat.ı̄b. However, what one finds in most cases is only a preacher’s
participation in the general transmission of knowledge, i.e. the name(s) of
scholar(s) that he transmitted from and, perhaps, of those who transmitted
from him. The general training thus primarily refers to the transmission of
h. ad̄ıth, but Figure 3.13 shows only specialists in the h. ad̄ıth sciences.
The situation with the specialized training of the khut.abā↩ is different. As
Figure 3.13 shows, the difference between east and west is not only in the
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Figure 3.14: General and Specialized Training of the Khut.abā↩ in Macro Regions.
numbers of khut.abā↩, but also in their religious training: the western khut.abā↩
are much more educated than their eastern counterparts—only 28.8% of the
khut.abā↩ in North Africa and Andalusia do not have specialized training in at
least one field, and by the time one gets to the easternmost part of the Islamic
world this percentage goes up to 54.6%.110
It should be noted that even though Syria and Egypt have very high per-
centages, the majority of these numbers falls on the late period (after c. 550/
1156 ce), when all other macro regions are going into decline; these numbers
also result from the broad institutional processes, most importantly the growth
110One may argue that this is the problem with how biographical information was reported
in different regions of the Islamic world. Even though this might be so, the biographies of
eastern scholars do not lack educational details. If anything they go to excesses in this
regard, thus the biographies of Friday preachers are likely to reflect the actual historical
situation.
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of waqf institutions that offer paid positions. This process does not really take
place in such a region as Andalusia, while in others—Iraq and Iran—it does
not reach comparable levels of development because the regions themselves go
into decline too early. With this in mind the macro region of Syria and Egypt
should be included in this comparison with great caution.
A closer look at the fluctuation of these numbers shows that after 500/
1107 ce all macro regions start featuring more khut.abā↩ with specialized train-
ing in at least one other religious discipline, although this process starts earlier
in the west and later in the east (Figure 3.14). At the same time, one can see
that the specialization of the khut.abā↩ differs from one region to another, and
the khut.abā↩ of North Africa and Andalusia differ from their counterparts in
other macro regions of the Islamic world. Here one finds a great number
of specialists in Qur↩ānic recitation (45.6%), Arabic language and grammar
(21.9%)—in both cases the ratios are noticeably higher when compared to
any other region. The ratios of those with training in h. ad̄ıth sciences and
jurisprudence are more comparable across the Islamic world.111 It should be
added that the data from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām attest that Andalusia was indeed a
prominent center of Qur↩ānic recitation, and Arabic language and grammar,
but the numbers of specialists in most religious disciplines are significantly
higher in the eastern provinces of the Islamic world, particularly in Iraq (see,
Figure 3.15).
Interesting and intriguing, however, is the fact that the sources provide no
information on the training of the khut.abā↩ as preachers. The closest that one
111Except for Syria and Egypt (for the reason stated above) where one also finds the highest
number of identifiable legal affiliations of the khut.abā↩.
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Figure 3.15: Geographical Distribution of Specialists in H. ad̄ıth, Qirā↩āt, Lugha & Nah.w
(According to Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām).
finds is that so-and-so studied the Dı̄wān al-khut.ab of Ibn Nubāta (d. 374/
985 ce), a khat.ı̄b of Aleppo.
112 However, a close look at those who studied this
book reveals that they were grammarians and linguists,113 not preachers.114
The “descriptive names” of khut.abā↩ in macro clusters show that repre-
sentatives of particular groups held the office of khat.ı̄b more often. In North
Africa and Andalusia one finds a number of Ans.ār̄ıs (about 20). Although this
nisba goes back to the tribal period of the Islamic history—“the Helpers of
the Prophet”—in the middle period, it serves as a status marker all over the
112SAN, 16, 321–322; TI, 26, 559; also TI, 25, 229.
113SAN, 23, 248; SAN, 23, 355; TS, 1, 288; TI, 37, 137; TI, 43, 63; TI, 44, 295; DhTH,
1, 264.
114The only statement that might describe the training of a khat.ı̄b is found in a biography of
Jamāl al-Dı̄n al-Dı̄nawr̄ı (d. 685/1287 ce): wa-shtaghala f̄ı s.abāhu bi-l-khut.ab, “he occupied
himself with the study of khut.bas in childhood.” However, it is likely to mean that Jamāl
al-d̄ın was doing it on his own, rather than was receiving instruction under some experienced
khat.ı̄b. Moreover, he was a khat.ı̄b of Kafar Bat.nā, a village back then (TI, 51, 246).
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Islamic world, but most prominently in Andalusia. As we move east toward
Syria and Egypt, the most numerous group among the khut.abā↩ are Shāfi ↪̄ı
scholars (over 30)—the dominance of the Shāfi ↪̄ı jurists, however, belongs to
the late period (after c. 550/1156 ce). In Iraq one finds quite a few descen-
dants of the ↪Abbāsid caliphs (about 20).115 Although their religious training
was modest at best, they held the key khit.āba offices in Baghdad, and it seems
that these offices were reserved exclusively for them.116 In Iran and Central
Asia, however, no particular group seem to stand out.117
The last interesting development I would like to dwell on regards the po-
sitions of the khut.abā↩. All regions feature preachers who hold other positions
in addition to their preacherships, which often are secondary or even tertiary.
The growth of positions held by the members of the learned class is closely con-
nected with the process of institutionalization, which takes different forms in
different places and progresses at different paces in different regions. While in
Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt one finds a number of preachers who also hold posi-
tions in the waqf institutions—most frequently teaching positions in madrasas
(and the number of these positions grows as one moves westward); in Andalusia
115SAN, 12, 535–540; SAN, 15, 551–553; SAN, 18, 241–244; SAN, 19, 469; SAN, 20,
115–116; TI, 25, 236; TI, 28, 435; TI, 31, 155–156; TI, 31, 159; TI, 31, 186–188; TI, 31,
223; TI, 32, 266–267; TI, 32, 285; TI, 35, 79; TI, 35, 204; TI, 35, 359–360; TI, 36, 337;
TI, 36, 357–358; TI, 36, 452–453; TI, 36, 521–522; TI, 39, 177; TI, 39, 236; TI, 40, 138;
TI, 41, 204–205; TI, 42, 169–170; TI, 42, 192; TI, 42, 425; TI, 46, 304; TI, 47, 116–117.
116Such as, for example, the khit.āba-office in the Mans.ūr congregational mosque (jāmi↪
al-Mans. ūr : SAN, 15, 374; TI, 25, 123; TI, 25, 236; TI, 27, 194; TI, 30, 30; TI, 31, 155;
TI, 31, 159; TI, 31, 223; TI, 36, 337; TI, 36, 357; TI, 36, 522; TI, 39, 177; TI, 42, 425;
TI, 51, 167; TM, 2, 216).
117In all regions most frequent toponymic nisbas associate preachers with the most promi-
nent regional urban centers; although regional nisbas are more frequent for Andalusia and
Egypt.
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Figure 3.16: Khut.abā↩ with and without Additional Positions (According to Ta↩r̄ıkh al-
islām).
preachers most commonly hold the positions of a qād. ı̄ and a prayer leader.
118
The graphs on Figure 3.16 (red curves) should reflect these processes. In Iran
the process starts earlier, around 400/1010 ce, but already c. 500 it slides into
decline, although this decline follows that of the cumulative curve of the region.
In all other regions the curves begin their rise c. 500/1107 ce and then follow
the flow of the cumulative curves of their respective regions. As Figure 3.14
shows, c. 500/1107 ce is also a threshold when the number of khut.abā↩ with
specialized training exceeds that of khut.abā↩ who have only general religious
training.
To conclude, it appears that the office of khat.ı̄b remained rather insignifi-
118The most common description in the biographies of the Andalusian scholars is: waliya-
l-qad. ā↩ wa-l-s.alāt id. āfatan ilá-l-khit.āba–the order of things often varies.
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cant and was held largely by religious scholars with limited training. However,
the process of institutionalization reconfigured the social space of the reli-
gious class and the office of khat.ı̄b became incorporated into the overall set of
positions that would usually be held by learned men. The office itself still re-
mained minor, but the fact that now scholars with expertise and contributions
in other areas held this office started to attract more attention of biographers
and chroniclers.
3.4 Qas.as. : Narrating Religious Stories
In terms of biographees, the qas.as. exists only in the early period (Figure 3.17).
After 250/865 ce the word qus.s. ās. is increasingly used to refer to a group of
faceless individuals—always in plural, always in a quite unspecific, but usually
negative context. It looks as if the chroniclers start using this term as a blanket
category for all the bad people out there, as whenever one tries to find a person
in these groups he is nowhere to be found. The early qus.s. ās. , on the other hand,
are very concrete individuals.
Qas.as. is usually translated as “the narration of religious stories,” or simply
“storytelling.” However, as the biographies of the qus.s. ās. suggest, qas.as. is
not necessarily about “stories,” but rather about the gradual presentation
of information in general: something complex is “cut into pieces” (qas.s.a)
and then narrated piece by piece. In the context of preaching, this can be
understood as the “spoon-feeding” of religious lore.119
119The qas.as. is often often mentioned together with tafs̄ır , which usually stands for the
explanation of the Qur↩ān, but in the early period it could refer to the explanation of the
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Figure 3.17: Chronological Distribution of the Qus.s. ās. .
The numbers of those who may be considered involved in qas.as. are rather
significant and one finds the first reported qās.s. during the reign of ↪Umar b. al-
Khat.t.āb: Tamı̄m al-Dār̄ı was first to narrate religious lore to the community,
for which he received the permission of the caliph.120 It may have taken
him a while to get this permission, but when ↪Umar finally granted it he also
instructed Tamı̄m al-Dār̄ı to “admonish” people before he came out to perform
his own preaching duty, namely to deliver a khut.ba (↪iz. qabla an akhruja li-l-
khut.ba).
121
Most biographies of the qus.s. ās. simply state the fact that their biographees
were involved in qas.as. , but other circumstantial details are often missing. Yet,
the contexts in which qas.as. -related activities are mentioned suggest that a
religious lore in general—also a piece-by-piece representation (SAN, 4, 156; SAN, 4, 321;
SAN, 4, 599; TI, 7, 113; TI, 9, 639; TI, 23, 520).
120SAN, 2, 442–449.
121SAN, 2, 442–449. al-Dhahab̄ı also gives a report on yet another first storyteller: ↪Ubayd
b. ↪Umayr al-Layth̄ı al-Junda ↪̄ı (d. 74/694 ce), who also lived in the time of ↪Umar b. al-
Khat.t.āb. This one is also described as wā↪iz. , who was “reminding people of what they
forgot” (kāna yudhakkiru-l-nās TI, 5, 480–482; also: SAN, 4, 156–157).
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Figure 3.18: Geography of the Qus.s. ās. from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
qās.s. may have held a salaried position
122 in a mosque123 or in the army (al-
jund).124 The qus.s. ās. are reported to have been holding their preaching sessions
up to two times a day, usually after the obligatory daily prayers (s.alāt);
125
and some are reported to have preached standing, following the example of
the early khut.abā↩-rulers.
126 Unlike the early khut.abā↩, most qus.s. ās. were of
122One finds that ↪Umar b. Abd al-↪Az̄ız provided a salary of two d̄ınārs per month to
Muslim b. Jandab al-Hudhal̄ı (d. 106/725 ce), a Medinan storyteller, who prior to that
was practicing qas.as. without any compensation (wa kāna qabla dhālika yaqas.s.u bi-lā rizq)
(TI, 7, 256–257).
123SAN, 17, 316; TShK, 3, 185; TI, 28, 326; SAN, 5, 188; SAN, 6, 101; TI, 4, 24; TI,
6, 118; TI, 7, 419; TI, 7, 425; TI, 9, 641; TH, 1, 319. Some of the qus.s. ās. are referred to
as qās.s. al-jamā↪a, which may imply that they were “Friday qus.s. ās.” (SAN, 5, 319; TI, 7,
404; TI, 13, 72); unfortunately the sources do not provide any details on what exactly this
phrase means. In any case, mosques (masjid, jāmı̄‘ ) are the most frequently reported places
of the qas.as. ; other places that also come up are: the burial procession (TI, 19, 136); the
qās.s. ’ own house (SAN, 4, 516); and the place that is most commonly associated with the
qus.s. ās.—the streets/roads (t.uruqāt, TI, 29, 296).
124SAN, 3, 146; TI, 6, 5; TI, 6, 317; TI, 7, 136; TI, 7, 481; TI, 9, 520.
125SAN, 4, 336; SAN, 6, 101.
126SAN, 2, 447; SAN, 4, 132; TI, 5, 409; TH, 1, 319.
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humble origin—the number of mawāl̄ı is rather significant (Figure F.4)127—
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Figure 3.19: Nisbas of the Qus.s. ās. (50) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (20–250 ah/642–
865 ce).
The context of qas.as. is rather difficult to establish because of the scarcity
of data. One does find, however, that the qus.s. ās. are often involved in tafs̄ır ,
“the interpretation of the Qur↩ān,”128 and the major themes seems to have
revolved around such issues as death (mawt),129 grave [tortures] ([↪adhāb] al-
qabr),130 and godly fear (khawf )131—the themes that are also at the heart of
the wa↪z. . The tears shed by both the qus.s. ās.
132 and their audiences133 is yet
127The “powerful” nisba al-Qurash̄ı here refers to the mawāl̄ı of this tribe.
128SAN, 4, 156; SAN, 4, 321; SAN, 4, 599; TI, 7, 113; TI, 9, 639; TI, 23, 520.
129TI, 8, 226; TI, 8, 304.
130TI, 8, 304.
131SAN, 8, 47; TI, 8, 303; TI, 11, 186; TI, 51, 296.
132TShK, 3, 185; TI, 8, 303; TI, 10, 499
133SAN, 3, 214; TShK, 3, 185; TI, 5, 459; TI, 8, 303; TI, 10, 499
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another feature that the qas.as. shares with the wa↪z. .
This leads us to another important issue—a quite significant overlap be-
tween the qas.as. and the wa↪z. .
134 The broad definition of preaching yields a
rather large group involved in the wa↪z. during the early period (until c. 250/
865 ce), but the early wa↪z. can hardly be interpreted as a preaching practice.
Unlike the qas.as. , the descriptions of which convey a strong sense of regular-
ity and continuity, most instances of the early wa↪z. are single actions (see
Section 3.5.2). Those rather rare cases when the wa↪z. may be interpreted as
a practice, it usually overlaps with the qas.as. . The descriptions of these two
practices are very similar—and, in fact, biographers even say that they are the
same.135 However, my reading of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām strongly suggests a regional
and perhaps ideological difference between the two.
The geographical distribution of the early qus.s. ās. (Figure 3.18) corresponds
to the core of the Islamic world during the early period, which can be described
as a triangle that brings together Arabia, Iraq and Syria (see also Figures 3.18
& F.4). However, when the core of the Islamic world starts shifting eastward
at the end of the early period, the geography of the qus.s. ās. does not follow
this shift and most of them are still found in the urban areas of Arabia,136
134SAN, 4, 157; SAN, 4, 274; SAN, 5, 107; SAN, 5, 188; SAN, 5, 319; SAN, 5, 91;
SAN, 6, 97; SAN, 8, 46; SAN, 15, 382; SAN, 17, 316; TFSh, 2, 569; TShK, 3, 59; TI,
5, 410; TI, 7, 171; TI, 7, 339; TI, 8, 64; TI, 8, 201; TI, 8, 303; TI, 8, 442; TI, 9, 174; TI,
10, 269; TI, 10, 326; TI, 11, 184; TI, 13, 410; TI, 25, 164; TI, 28, 326; TI, 31, 173; JM,
2, 32; TSh, 1, 255.
135E.g., al-qās.s. huwa-l-wā↪iz. (SAN, 7, 452).
136SAN, 4, 156–157; SAN, 5, 318–322; TI, 5, 480–482; TI, 7, 403–405; TI, 9, 398; SAN,
6, 97; TI, 6, 533; TI, 7, 149–150; TI, 7, 171–172; TI, 7, 256–257; TI, 8, 441–443; TI, 9,
341; TI, 10, 313–314; TI, 10, 325–327; TI, 7, 415–416; TI, 10, 289–290.
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Figure 3.20: The Early and Middle Urban Centers. Most qus.s. ās. are associated with the
early urban centers, while the wu↪↪āz. are with the middle urban centers.
Syria,137 Egypt,138 but perhaps most prominently in the early urban centers
of Iraq—Basra139 and Kufa.140
Most qus.s. ās. come from the centers that were prominent under the Umayyads,
but these quickly fade under the ↪Abbāsids, almost completely disappearing
from the social map of the Islamic world by c. 300/913 ce. As these centers
fade—mainly, Medina, Basra and Kufa (Figure 3.20)—so too do the qus.s. ās. .
137SAN, 2, 442–449; SAN, 5, 90–93; TI, 5, 409–411; TI, 6, 211–212; SAN, 4, 272–277;
TI, 5, 542–544; TI, 7, 136; TI, 9, 519–520.
138SAN, 4, 131–133; SAN, 5, 107–108; TI, 5, 409–411; TI, 7, 425; TI, 7, 484–485; TI, 8,
90–91; TI, 13, 409–414; TI, 7, 339–340.
139SAN, 4, 515–517; SAN, 5, 452–454; SAN, 8, 46–48; TI, 4, 24; TI, 6, 117–119; TI, 6,
158–159; TI, 8, 54–56; TI, 8, 64–65; TI, 8, 268–269; TI, 8, 302–304; TI, 9, 69; TI, 9, 174;
TI, 10, 269–272; TI, 10, 499–501; TI, 11, 184–187; TI, 13, 222–224.
140SAN, 4, 321–343; SAN, 5, 103–105; SAN, 5, 188–189; SAN, 5, 205; SAN, 6, 275–278;
SAN, 6, 278–281; SAN, 6, 385–390; TI, 6, 533; TI, 7, 229–230; TI, 7, 339; TI, 7, 418–419;
TI, 7, 437–438; TI, 7, 474; TI, 8, 278; TI, 9, 118; TI, 12, 423–424.
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At the same time, the rise of new urban centers—most prominently Baghdad,
Nishapur and Isfahan (Figure 3.20)—brings in the wu↪↪āz. in great numbers,
although this development will be most clearly visible in the middle period
(c. 250–550 ah/865–1156 ce), when these urban centers flourish. Thus, wa↪z.
as a preaching practice starts replacing the qas.as. when the core of the Islamic
world is shifting eastward, toward central Iraq and north-eastern Iran.
The early qus.s. ās. appear to be knowledgeable and pious individuals,
141 and
critical comments against specific qus.s. ās. , or qus.s. ās. in general, do not start until
the ↪Abbāsid period: in these cases they are either directed toward the qus.s. ās.
of the early ↪Abbāsid period, or—if they go back to the Umayyad period—
clearly come from the scholars of the ↪Abbāsid era and the new ↪Abbāsid
centers.142
One finds negative comments toward the qus.s. ās. coming from such key
individuals as Abū H. anifa,
143 Mālik b. Anas144 and Ah.mad b. H. anbal,
145
but these are the attacks on all qus.s. ās. who—together with beggars—are the
worst of liars.146 Although not all of these individuals fall squarely into the
geographical divide that I suggest, it is not unheard of for the later Muslim
scholars to tweak the words of the key early authorities.147
141Some of them were appointed as judges (SAN, 4, 131; SAN, 4, 272; SAN, 4, 515;
SAN, 6, 276; TI, 5, 409; TI, 5, 542).
142SAN, 8, 47; SAN, 9, 477; SAN, 19, 36; TI, 8, 303; TI, 9, 69; TI, 9, 118; TI, 10, 289;
TI, 10, 499; TI, 11, 185; TI, 12, 424; also: SAN, 5, 222; SAN, 6, 122; TI, 8, 263.
143TS, 1, 53.
144SAN, 9, 424.
145SAN, 3, 455; TI, 5, 508; SAN, 11, 86; SAN, 11, 300.
146TH, 1, 252. Occasionally the S. ūf̄ıs are added to the mix: SAN, 11, 300; SAN, 11, 86;
TM, 1, 243.
147On the pages of the same corpus one also finds positive comments toward the qus.s. ās.
from Mālik b. Anas (TI, 14, 448) and Ah.mad b. H. anbal (SAN, 5, 222; SAN, 11, 170; TI,
8, 55; TI, 17, 45; SAN, 11, 170; TI, 17, 45).
204
One does find qus.s. ās. in Baghdad, but in dwindling numbers, and as time
goes on their descriptions become worse and worse.148 The last “good” qās.s.
dies in 264/878 ce.149 Around 300/913 ce—after the qus.s. ās. have practi-
cally disappeared from biographical collections—one finds the faceless qus.s. ās.
banned from the streets of the ↪Abbāsid capital as troublemakers who in-
cite people to unrest.150 Although the faceless qus.s. ās. are found during the
Umayyad period as well, their image is quite positive, as they boost the morale
of the Muslim warriors.151
To conclude, it appears that the shift from qas.as. to wa↪z. is a sign of chang-
ing élites in the Islamic world, whereby the new élite rejects the old one by
rejecting a practice strongly associated with it.152 It should be stressed that
the borderline between qas.as. and wa↪z. in each specific biography remains a
fuzzy one,153 but the overall pattern becomes clear after all the biographies are
examined. Nonetheless, this interpretation should be reexamined on a wider
148SAN, 12, 114; SAN, 15, 381; TFSh, 2, 569; TI, 18, 57; TI, 20, 277; TI, 28, 326; TI,
29, 296; TI, 31, 173; JM, 2, 32; TH, 1, 151; TH, 1, 219; TH, 1, 319; TSh, 1, 255.
149SAN, 15, 382; TI, 25, 165; TH, 1, 151. As usual, there is always another last one—this
one dies in 338/950 ce (SAN, 15, 381–382; TI, 25, 164–165), but the curve clearly shows
that by this time the qus.s. ās. have completely disappeared from the pages of biographical
collections. These “last good” qus.s. ās. are Baghdadis and in both cases their piety surprises
biographers.
150SAN, 12, 552; TI, 20, 238; TI, 20, 238; TI, 21, 17; SAN, 13, 474. See also much later:
TI, 27, 238; SAN, 12, 552; SAN, 13, 474; SAN, 16, 509; TI, 20, 238; TI, 21, 17; TI, 27,
153; TI, 27, 238; TH, 2, 157.
151E.g., SAN, 3, 146, and also references to the qus.s. ās. in the army given above. One also
finds that some caliphs of both great dynasties used to have personal preachers—the qus.s. ās.
in the case of the Umayyads (TI, 8, 225–227.), and the wu↪↪āz. in the case of the ↪Abbāsids.
152The practice could have also been associated with the Khārijites (SAN, 4, 148; TI, 5,
327).
153The reference is to “fuzzy logic,” a theory that offered degrees of truth as an alternative
to the classical binary logic, which could not give a satisfactory solution to such problems
as, for example, at what point a balding man can be considered bold. (On “fuzzy logic” see,
for example: Petr Hajek, ‘Fuzzy Logic’, in: Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2010 edition (2010)).
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Figure 3.21: Geography of the Wu↪↪āz. .
corpus of earlier sources.
3.5 Wa↪z.
3.5.1 Chronology and Geography
Unlike the geographical distribution of the khut.abā↩, the geographical distri-
bution of those who can be identified as wu↪↪āz. has a strong eastward leaning
(Figure 3.21). Unlike khut.ba, wa↪z. was never an obligatory practice, so this
distribution most likely represents the actual development of this practice in
different regions of the Islamic world up until the end of the period covered in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
Like the chronological distribution of khut.abā↩, the chronological distribu-
tion of wu↪↪āz. also suggests roughly the same three periods: the early period
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Figure 3.22: The Chronological distribution of the Wu↪↪āz. in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
until c. 250/865 ce, when the curve goes down; the middle period between
c. 250–550 ah/865–1156 ce, when the curve steadily goes up; and the late
period after c. 550/1156 ce, when the curve plummets (Figure 3.22).
The chronological distribution of khut.abā↩ in the macro regions (Figure 3.23)
offers a more detailed picture of wa↪z. across the entire Islamic world. It shows
even more strikingly that wa↪z. was an eastern practice that never took root
in North Africa and Andalusia, and was a rather minor phenomenon in Syria
and Egypt.
3.5.2 Single Admonitions
The early wa↪z. (until c. 250/865 ce) always has a clear edifying message,
but most examples of wa↪z. in this period are single actions.
154 Moreover, the
154SAN, 1, 529; SAN, 2, 186; SAN, 2, 447; SAN, 3, 525; SAN, 4, 13; SAN, 4, 170;
SAN, 4, 67; SAN, 5, 367; SAN, 6, 412; SAN, 7, 368; SAN, 8, 329; SAN, 8, 374; SAN,
8, 442; SAN, 8, 459; SAN, 9, 169; SAN, 9, 287; SAN, 9, 64; SAN, 9, 79; SAN, 10, 578;
SAN, 11, 533; SAN, 14, 499; SAN, 15, 162; SAN, 16, 321; SAN, 17, 421; SAN, 19, 398;
SAN, 19, 492; SAN, 21, 323; TFSh, 1, 134; TShK, 2, 328; TS, 1, 212; TS, 1, 263; TS,
1, 53; TS, 1, 74; TS, 1, 80; TI, 4, 248; TI, 5, 144; TI, 5, 297; TI, 7, 24; TI, 7, 422; TI, 9,
168; TI, 9, 478; TI, 10, 258; TI, 10, 317; TI, 10, 439; TI, 11, 31; TI, 11, 347; TI, 12, 89;
TI, 12, 200; TI, 12, 213; TI, 12, 225; TI, 13, 15; TI, 13, 193; TI, 13, 412; TI, 13, 432; TI,
16, 155; TI, 18, 266; TI, 28, 268; TI, 28, 268; TI, 29, 162; TI, 35, 288; TI, 40, 26; TI, 48,
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Figure 3.23: Chronological Distribution of the Wu↪↪āz. in Macro Regions. The two graphs
on top show the cumulative curves for the same macro regions (given for comparison).
instances of wa↪z. are one-on-one events that usually take place in private set-
tings. The contexts of these events also indicates that often “admonishments”
are reactive: someone admonishes someone else in order to correct something
quite specific that an upright Muslim should not have done. Such private and
singular admonitions better fall into the category of “commanding right and
forbidding wrong” (al-amr bi-l-ma↪rūf wa-l-nahy ↪an al-munkar), rather than
preaching proper. Where, of course, the boundary between the two lies is the
matter of perspective.
Another distinctive feature of the early wa↪z. is that most commonly a wā↪iz.
is someone of lower social standing who “admonishes” someone of higher stand-
21; TM, 1, 190; TM, 1, 52; TM, 1, 523; TM, 2, 316; JM, 1, 177; DM, 1, 27.
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ing, most commonly—caliphs155 and their governors.156 To put it differently,
the subjects of khut.ba-related actions now become the objects of wa↪z. -related
actions.157 The powers-that-be occasionally ask those below them for an “ad-
monition:” ↪Umar (II) b. ↪Abd al-↪Az̄ız asked one of his clients—a Berber
named Muzāh. im—to keep an eye on him and admonish if need be,
158 which
also tells us that wa↪z. -related actions in the early period could also be some-
what involuntary.159
What definitely sets the early wa↪z. aside from other early prominent preach-
ing forms is that it also features as a written “admonition,”160 while other
forms are always oral. Most of these written “admonitions” are also directed
upward, toward the powers-that-be. Mālik b. Anas is reported to have sent
a number of letters to caliphs and governors, which he considered a way of
performing the duty of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” (al-amr
bi-l-ma↪rūf wa-l-nahy ↪an al-munkar).161
As was discussed in the section on the qas.as. , some instances of the wa↪z.
that convey a sense of a regular practice often overlap with the qas.as. , but
155TI, 8, 442; TI, 6, 474; SAN, 11, 533; SAN, 12, 41; TI, 18, 266; SAN, 7, 85; TI, 9,
469; TI, 10, 258; TM, 1, 115; SAN, 8, 329; SAN, 9, 287; SAN, 9, 64; SAN, 9, 97; TI,
12, 89; TI, 12, 213; TI, 12, 24; TI, 13, 15; TI, 13, 427.
156SAN, 6, 54; TS, 1, 74; TI, 8, 584.
157Although biographies from all periods are saturated with stories about the Prophet,
there are very few reports where Muh.ammad “admonishes” anyone—and most of them are
from the period after 250/865 ce when wa↪z. as a practice is on the rise. (SAN, 3, 420;
SAN, 17, 482; SAN, 19, 43; TShK, 10, 37; TI, 29, 98; TI, 34, 147).
158TI, 6, 474–475.
159SAN, 8, 436; TFSh, 1, 134; TShK, 2, 97; TShK, 3, 154; TS, 1, 212; TI, 4, 97; TI,
6, 474; TI, 10, 258; TI, 11, 31; TI, 40, 26; DhTH, 1, 22.
160SAN, 4, 170; SAN, 9, 64; TI, 11, 387; TI, 12, 200; TI, 12, 24; TM, 1, 110; JM, 1,
177.
161TM, 1, 110; TM, 1, 111 (pp. 111–119); he also sent out similar “admonitions” to his
fellow scholars (TM, 1, 131).
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as a practice the latter features more prominently in the early period. Over
the period of 200–300 ah/816–913 ce, wa↪z. as a term replaces qas.as. . This
shift is gradual both chronologically and geographically. And most likely the
biographers—many of whom considered them to be the one and the same
thing—were not even aware of this shift. Perhaps it is for this reason that
the sources do not mention the first wā↪iz. , while they do mention the first
qās.s.—actually, even two of them (see Section 3.4).
The nisbas of the wu↪↪āz. (Figure D.4) of this period also display similarities
between qas.as. and wa↪z. : toponymic nisbas aside, one finds a significant groups
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Figure 3.24: Nisbas of the Wu↪↪āz. (67) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (20–250 ah/642–
865 ce).
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3.5.3 Admonishing the Community
The beginning of the middle period (c. 250/865 ce) marks the staggering
growth of the wu↪↪āz. in the Islamic world. Now the wu↪↪āz. are increasingly
individuals with at least some religious training who admonish flocks of people
in the cities and rural areas. At the same time, the singular, private form of
the wa↪z. never completely disappears and one finds that famous preachers are
























































































































































































Figure 3.25: Nisbas of the Wu↪↪āz. (329) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (251–550 ah/
866–1156 ce).
The geographical distribution of the khut.abā↩ revealed a quite significant
difference between the west and the east of the Islamic world—almost 2:1. The
difference between the east and the west in terms of the wu↪↪āz. is even more
staggering—almost 8:1. Compared to Iran and Central Asia, the macro region
of North Africa and Andalusia is a barren land. Again, both the absolute
211
numbers and the percentages clearly show the difference between west and
east: North Africa and Andalusia—29 (1.12% of 2,586); Syria and Egypt—52
(1.01% of 5,139); Iraq and Arabia—114 (1.14% of 10,041); Iran and Central
Asia—231 (3.69% of 6,254). The numbers of the wu↪↪āz. practically double
when one moves from one macro region to another, while the percentages
remain roughly the same, until we get to Iran where it triples.
Although the chronological mark for the cumulative curve is c. 250/865 ce,
the growth of the wu↪↪āz. starts at different periods in different macro regions.
The numbers of wu↪↪āz. start growing in the macro region of Iran and Central
Asia (mostly Khurāsān) even before 250/865 ce. Iraq and Arabia (mostly the
new centers of the former) join c. 250/865 ce, but the overall growth is much
slower. Syria and Egypt join this race only c. 400/1010 ce, and, unlike the
curve of the Syrian and Egyptian khut.abā↩, the curve of the wu↪↪āz. stabilizes
rather quickly at a pretty low point. Although the curve of Andalusia and
North Africa starts going up earlier—c. 350/962 ce—it is very difficult to
characterize this curve as one of growth.
This configuration is puzzling. The macro region of North Africa and
Andalusia poses a significant problem. With such extremely low numbers of
wu↪↪āz. in this region, it is difficult to discuss wa↪z. as a preaching practice.
162
The objection may be raised that this results from al-Dhahab̄ı’s regional bias.
However, al-Dhahab̄ı’s coverage of that macro region appears to be fair.163
162At the same time, one finds a rather significant volume of research on the wa↪z. in this
region produced by Jones. Most recently, Jones (2012), The Power of Oratory , for other
publications see Section 3.1.2 and Bibliography. At the same time, the number of wu↪↪āz.
that Jones mentions with a different degree of detail is still smaller than what my corpus
provides.
163See Sections 2.1.3 & A.7.1 above.
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Besides, his own macro region—Syria and Egypt—is rather shallow on wu↪↪āz. ,
yet, as the curves show, he covered it thoroughly, especially after c. 500/
1107 ce. Moreover, he did not have any objection to including a significant
number of wu↪↪āz. from Iraq and Iran, which may only mean that one can rule
out any prejudice on his part against the “public” preachers.164
Wa↪z. as a practice was different from khut.ba in many ways. From very
early on165 wu↪↪āz. preached more frequently, often several times a week, while
khut.abā↩ preached only once a week. The sermons of the wu↪↪āz. never had
any duration limits, while a good khut.ba was always a short khut.ba.
166 The
preaching of the wu↪↪āz. was often itinerant in nature, while the khut.abā↩ were
always tied to the mosques. Moreover, the descriptions of the wu↪↪āz. often
convey a sense that wa↪z. was a vocation which required serious commitment—
something one rarely finds in the biographies of the khut.abā↩. Last but not
least, wa↪z. was an art that individuals actually studied under famous and
experienced wu↪↪āz. .
167
Figure 3.26 shows the most frequent descriptions of wu↪↪āz. . It is rather
difficult to discuss the situation in North Africa and Andalusia, since the
164The biographical collections of the legal schools seem to offer a similar east-to-west
distribution, although, since at the moment I cannot map the data from these collections,
my projections are preliminary.
165Especially if one considers the wa↪z. to be a continuation of the qas.as. .
166SAN, 5, 360; TS, 1, 20.
167One of the most common formula is akhadha-l-wa↪z. min fulān b. fulān, literally, “he
took [the art of] the wa↪z. from so-and-so.” This and other similar formulae are often used
to denote the studies of major religious subjects as h. ad̄ıth, fiqh, qurā↪āt etc. See: SAN, 11,
33; SAN, 19, 606; SAN, 21, 373; SAN, 23, 9; TShK, 5, 235; TShK, 8, 339; TI, 17, 37;
TI, 34, 191; TI, 39, 92; TI, 40, 175; TI, 41, 117; TI, 42, 288; TI, 43, 150; TI, 45, 99; TI,
45, 362; TI, 46, 112; TI, 46, 197; TI, 46, 212; TI, 47, 436; TI, 52, 139; TI, 52, 404; JM,
2, 154; TSh, 2, 82; DhTH, 1, 57; DhTH, 1, 101; DhTH, 1, 199; DhTH, 1, 244; DhTH,
1, 253.
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NAAN* SYEG* IRAR* IRCA*
h. ad̄ıth 6 20.7% 5 9.6% 17 14.9% 33 14.3%
qirā↩āt 4 13.8% 4 7.7% 19 16.7% 10 4.3%
tafs̄ır 2 6.9% 3 5.8% 9 7.9% 23 10.0%
nah. w 3 10.3% 1 1.9% 10 8.8% 7 3.0%
adab 2 6.9% 6 11.5% 13 11.4% 16 6.9%
tas.awwuf 3 10.3% 2 3.9% 8 7.0% 28 12.1%
fiqh 4 13.8% 26 50.0% 43 37.7% 83 35.9%
noST* 11 37.9% 18 34.6% 46 40.4% 96 41.6%
H. anaf̄ıs 0 0.0% 6 11.5% 5 4.4% 11 4.8%
H. anbal̄ıs 0 0.0% 4 7.7% 19 16.7% 8 3.5%
Shāfi ↪̄ıs 1 3.5% 6 11.5% 6 5.3% 17 7.4%
Mālik̄ıs 1 3.5% 1 1.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
qād. ı̄ 0 0.0% 4 7.7% 3 2.6% 11 4.8%
positions 4 13.8% 14 26.9% 28 24.6% 49 21.2%
families 3 10.3% 18 34.6% 21 18.4% 64 27.7%
Total 29 100% 52 100% 114 100% 231 100%
Figure 3.26: The Wu↪↪āz. in Macro Regions after 250 ah/864 ce (Residents
Only). Abbreviations : NAAN*: North Africa & Andalusia; SYEG*: Syria
& Egypt; IRAR*: Iraq & Arabia; IRCA*: Iran & Central Asia; noST*:
no specialized training reported in biographies.
numbers there are too low. The situation in Syria and Egypt is not significantly
better. In Iraq and Iran the situation is different and it makes more sense to
consider the percentages. The percentages of wu↪↪āz. with more than just a
general religious training are higher than they are for those of the khut.abā↩—
and they would be even higher if we were to consider training in wa↪z. itself
as specialized training. The problem, however, is that most statements on
training in wa↪z. are found in the biographies of the Iraqi wu↪↪āz. after 500/
1107 ce, so it is hard to say whether wa↪z. in the Iranian provinces of the
earlier period was considered a subject comparable to h. ad̄ıth, qirā↩āt , fiqh or
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tas.awwuf . In any case, the emphasis in specializations of the Iranian wu↪↪āz.
is more on “content-based” religious subjects, such as tafs̄ır (10.0%), h. ad̄ıth
(14.3%), and fiqh (35.9%). A noticeable number of S. ūf̄ıs is also difficult to miss
(12.1%). In Iraq, the rates of those with specialized training in the fiqh (37.7%)
and h. ad̄ıth (14.9%) are quite comparable to those of the Iranian wu↪↪āz. , but
the emphasis shifts from the tafs̄ır and tas.awwuf to the qirā↩āt (16.7%).
Overall, the summary statistics on the wu↪↪āz. leave a rather different im-
pression of this group from that of a more conventional reading of their bi-
ographies. While reading their biographies, one usually gets the impression
that the wu↪↪āz. were quite an exceptional group. However, the data from
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām strongly suggest that the prevailing majority of the wu↪↪āz.
do not even remotely resemble such prominent practitioners of wa↪z. as Ibn al-
Jawz̄ı (d. 597/1201 ce) and his grandson Sibt. b. al-Jawz̄ı (d. 654/1257 ce),
who received a lion’s share of scholarly attention.168 A closer look at the
biographies of the wu↪↪āz. further reveals that the Jawz̄ıs are the most fre-
quent common denominator when it comes to the detailed information on the
wu↪↪āz.—particularly the fascinating descriptions of wa↪z. sessions (it should
be stressed that they were also often writing about themselves). They are
quoted in all the sources of the corpus that were written after their lifetime.
Figure 3.27 vividly illustrates this point: the spike in discussions of wa↪z. and
the wu↪↪āz. (500–650 ah/1107–1253 ce) closely mirrors that of the references
to the Jawz̄ıs, both the grandfather and the grandson, who are abundantly
quoted by al-Dhahab̄ı.
168Swartz’ studies of the wa↪z. deal mainly with the grandfather, while Talmon-Heller’s
research of wa↪z. features the grandson most prominently. See Section 3.1.2 for an overview.
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Figure 3.27: References to the Jawz̄ıs and the Wu↪↪āz. in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām
This is not to say that what the Jawz̄ıs wrote about preachers should
be ignored; yet this is something one must be fully aware of while writing a
history of the wa↪z. . Moreover, even considering this significant contribution of
the Jawz̄ıs, the actual numbers of the wu↪↪āz. are not necessarily exaggerated.
Figure 3.28 shows that the numbers of the wu↪↪āz. change rather smoothly—
going up during 250–550 ah/865–1156 ce, and then down starting around
550/1156 ce (left). At the same time, the overall volume of the biographies
of the wu↪↪āz. (cumulative length in words—on the right) is changing in a
different manner with a significant spike visible during c. 440–620 ah/1049–
1224 ce, which one can interpret that the Jawz̄ıs augmented the already on-
going process, rather than completely altered it.
With all this in mind, it is still worth taking a look at the “educational”
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Figure 3.28: The Wu↪↪āz. : Numbers and Volumes (According to Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām). The two
histograms show how the numbers (left) of their biographies and their cumulative volumes
(right) were changing over time.
graphs of the wu↪↪āz. , which actually show that all macro regions start featuring
more wu↪↪āz. who specialized in at least one field noticeably earlier than this
happens with the khut.abā↩ in the same macro regions: Iran and Central Asia
around 330/942 ce (almost 200 lunar years earlier); Iraq and Arabia around
430/1039 ce (almost 70 lunar years earlier); Syrian and Egypt around 420/
1030 ce (about 60 lunar years earlier). In North Africa and Andalusia it also
happens earlier, but only slightly and, as was stressed above, the numbers
of wu↪↪āz. for this region are too low to consider them representative of any
process.
3.5.4 The Fate of the Wa↪z.
Many wu↪↪āz. preached wherever they happened to find themselves. Moreover,
famous wu↪↪āz. were often expected to deliver a sermon during their stay in a
new place. Keeping this in mind, one can approach the data on the wu↪↪āz. with
more emphasis on geography and the travels of the wu↪↪āz. across the Islamic
world. Looking into the geographical connections of the wu↪↪āz.—something
217
Figure 3.29: General and Specialized Training of the Wu↪↪āz. in Macro Regions.
that did not make much sense in the case of the khut.abā↩—should provide us
with valuable insights into how this practice was developing in time and space.
Figure 3.26 already suggested a gradual westward move of the wu↪↪āz. .
Graphs and maps can demonstrate this more efficiently, especially if one adds
“visitors” into the equation. In the previous sections the emphasis was on the
wu↪↪āz. who can be considered “residents,” i.e. they are associated with partic-
ular macro regions through their toponymic nisbas. The “visitors” are those
whose biographies mention places from particular macro regions, but whose
toponymic nisbas associate them with different macro regions. Figure 3.30
shows that Iran and Central Asia had only a rather insignificant number of
visiting wu↪↪āz. . The macro regions of Iraq and Arabia had both in practically
the same amounts, while Syria and Egypt had almost twice as many visiting
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Figure 3.30: Resident and Visiting Wu↪↪āz. in Macro Regions.
wu↪↪āz. as they had their own. North Africa and Andalusia are still outliers,
although for what it is worth, here the number of the visiting wu↪↪āz. is even
more insignificant.169
If one takes a closer look at the maps of geographical connections of the
wu↪↪āz. in the chronological perspective (Figures 3.31 & 3.32), it becomes very
clear that a number of Iranian wu↪↪āz. traveled to Iraq. Going back to the dis-
cussion of regional connections (see Chapter 2.2), it should be added that the
geographical connections of the Iranian wu↪↪āz. are consistent with the cumu-
lative connections of their respective regional clusters: like their countrymen,
169It is tempting to add though, that the highest number of the Andalusian wu↪↪āz. have
nisbas al-T. ulayt.il̄ı, i.e. they are strongly associated with the city of Toledo—the only sig-
nificant urban center that reached its peak during 400–500 ah/1010–1107 ce, the period of
the temporary decline of Andalusia. For more details, see Section A.7. Perhaps, the time
of instability increased the demand for the wu↪↪āz. .
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Figure 3.31: Connections of the Wu↪↪āz. during 270–470 ah/884–1078 ce.
the wu↪↪āz. from the Iranian provinces travel mostly to Iraq, very few of them
reach Syria and Egypt (mostly those from northwestern Iran), and almost none
get as far as North Africa and Andalusia. This focus on Iraq makes a lot of
sense, as Iran and Iraq share the highest number of migrants.170 The Iranian
wu↪↪āz. travel to Iraq—more precisely, central Iraq, which flourishes during the
middle period. Keeping in mind a significant number of Iranian migrants,
these wu↪↪āz. must have felt most comfortable and most welcome among their
countrymen in central Iraq.
The macro region of Iran and Central Asia reaches its second peak around
500/1107 ce, after which it goes into a rapid decline. The cumulative maps
of the Iranian regional clusters show that the volume of this macro region’s
connections with Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Syria grows significantly after
170Please, refer to the descriptions of regional clusters in Appendices for more details.
220
Figure 3.32: Connections of the Wu↪↪āz. during 470–670 ah/1078–1272 ce.
this point, as a number of Iranian scholars are moving to Iraq and Syria.
Around 550/1156 ce the numbers of wu↪↪āz. visiting Iraq reach the highest
point. A number of these Iranians settle in Iraq and become residents—the
most prominent examples would be the J̄ılān̄ı and the Suhraward̄ı families,
key S. ūf̄ı families with quite a few wu↪↪āz. in their ranks.
171 This migration of
Iranian wu↪↪āz. contributes to the growth of the wu↪↪āz. in Iraq, which reached
its own peak around 575/1180 ce. Is is also at this moment in time that
the numbers of the wu↪↪āz. who visit Syria reach their highest point—some
of the Iranian wu↪↪āz. do travel to Syria (though not to Egypt), but as the
maps show, there is much more movement between Iraq and Syria, starting
perhaps as early as 520/1127 ce. From 570/1175 ce on, all the connections
shift westward and form a triangle among central Iraq, Syria and Egypt.
171In the graphs these cases are considered “residents,” because they also have Iraqi nisbas.
Both families resided in the ↪Abbāsid capital.
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Thus, the late period (starting c. 550/1156 ce), that marks the beginning
of the rapid decline of the wu↪↪āz. , also marks a significant geographical change:
now the wu↪↪āz. of Iraq, which is nearing its own decline, travel to Syria and
many of them try to settle there. There were three Baghdād̄ı families of
wu↪↪āz. that became prominent at roughly this period: the J̄ılān̄ıs, S. ūf̄ıs who
belonged to the H. anbal̄ıs school of law; the Jawz̄ıs, who were H. anbal̄ıs; and
the Suhraward̄ıs, another S. ūf̄ı family that belonged to the Shāfi ↪̄ı school. By
the end of the period one finds wu↪↪āz. from all three families who have moved
to Syria. The most prominent of these was Sibt. b. al-Jawz̄ı (d. 654/1257 ce),
who became almost as famous a preacher in Damascus as his grandfather
had been in Baghdad,172 although considering that our knowledge about both
preachers is based largely on autobiographical information, their importance
may be overstated.
Although a number of wu↪↪āz. travel to Syria and later to Egypt, the practice
of wa↪z. does not strike deep roots in these regions. It seems that most of the
famous preachers in these regions are Iraqis, and when their time comes there
is no one to replace them.
As the biographies of the wu↪↪āz. disappear, the faceless wu↪↪āz. start fea-
turing in the biographies of others and descriptions of events (in Syria and
Egypt)—a phenomenon strikingly similar to what happened to the qus.s. ās. af-
ter the core of the Islamic world had shifted to central Iraq and Iran. These
wu↪↪āz. are now “professional lamenters”—or, perhaps, more precisely those
172Writing about the wa↪z. in Zangid and Ayyūbid Syria, Talmon-Heller concentrates almost
exclusively on this famous preacher, mentioning a few more only in passing. See, Talmon-
Heller (2007a), Islamic piety in medieval Syria: mosques, cemeteries and sermons under
the Zangids and Ayyūbids (1146-1260), 128–141.
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who make others weep profusely—at the funerals of military commanders and
their wives.173
To conclude, wa↪z. was an Iranian practice that planted deep roots in Iraq,
together with a great number of other Iranians who moved there. It appears
that wa↪z. as a practice encountered no difficulties in Iraq, also because the
learned community was in the process of formation while the Iranian wu↪↪āz.
were moving there. By the time the social space was finally reconfigured, the
wu↪↪āz. were part and parcel of it. This did not happen in Syria and Egypt,
which had never had wu↪↪āz. in significant numbers, most likely, because the
Iranian connections had never really reached these regions. By the time the
wu↪↪āz.—now mostly Iraqis—start moving there, the social space is already
configured with its madrasas and other waqf institutions firmly in place. The
wu↪↪āz. do not fit in this arrangement and the practice essentially lasts only as
long as the wu↪↪āz. from the old centers remain alive.
My corpus does not go far beyond 700/1301 ce, and most legal biograph-
ical collections are not particularly rich on the wu↪↪āz. , but those that offer
meaningful numbers (See Figure M.1), strongly suggest the same decline of
this preaching practice (Figure 3.34), which coincides with the growth of the
khut.ba. The overall demise of the wa↪z. is also confirmed by Petry’s study of
the civilian élite in Cairo of the 15th century. Petry provides tables of individ-
uals involved in different professions, which allow for a glimpse into the ratio
between the khut.abā↩ and the wu↪↪āz. . Unfortunately, an absolute number is
given only for the khut.abā↩ (279), but even the most optimistic estimate gives
173See, TI, 44, 324; TI, 46, 438; TI, 52, 458. One also finds a short biography of the
shaykh of these wu↪↪āz. : TI, 52, 458. Other references to the faceless wu↪↪āz. : TI, 52, 458.
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type source bios khat.ı̄b wā↪iz. ratio
h. anaf̄ı JM 3,056 47 1.54% 37 1.21% 1.27
h. anaf̄ı TT 358 6 1.68% 4 1.12% 1.50
h. anaf̄ı TS 894 24 2.68% 12 1.34% 2.00
mālik̄ı DM 631 34 5.39% 6 0.95% 5.67
mālik̄ı TM 975 25 2.56% 13 1.33% 1.92
shāfi ↪̄ı TFSh 277 4 1.44% 17 6.14% 0.24
shāfi ↪̄ı TShK 1,420 62 4.37% 92 6.48% 0.67
shāfi ↪̄ı TSh 748 75 10.03% 34 4.55% 2.21
h. anbal̄ı TH 707 1 0.14% 9 1.27% 0.11
h. anbal̄ı DhTH 547 27 4.94% 63 11.52% 0.43
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (c. 250–670 ah/864–1272 ce)
H. anaf̄ıs TI 481 7 1.46% 23 4.78% 0.30
Mālik̄ıs TI 400 15 3.75% 4 1.00% 3.75
Shāfi ↪̄ıs TI 973 47 4.83% 33 3.39% 1.42
H. anbal̄ıs TI 427 18 4.22% 31 7.26% 0.58
Figure 3.33: The Khut.abā↩ and the Wu↪↪āz. in the Legal Biographical col-
lections. Sources : JM—al-Jawāhir al-mud. ı̄ya f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya of Ibn
Ab̄ı-l-Wafā↩ (d. 775/1374 ce); TT—Tāj al-tarājim f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya
of Ibn Qutlūbughā (d. 879/1475 ce); TS—al-T. abaqāt al-san̄ıya f̄ı tarājim
al-h. anaf̄ıya of al-Tamı̄mı̄ al-Dār̄ı (d. 1010/1602 ce); DM—al-Dibāj al-
mudhahhab f̄ı ma↪rifat a↪yān ↪ulamā↩ al-madhhab of Ibn Farh. ūn (d. 799/
1397 ce); TM—Tart̄ıb al-madārik wa-taqr̄ıb al-masālik li-ma↪rifat a↪lām mad-
hhab Mālik of al-Yah. sūb̄ı (d. 544/1150 ce); TFSh—T. abaqāt al-fuqahā↩ al-
shāfi ↪̄ıya of al-Shahrazūr̄ı (d. 676/1278 ce); TShK—T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya al-
kubrá of al-Subk̄ı (d. 771/1370 ce); TSh—T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya of Ibn Qād. ı̄
Shuhba (d. 851/1448 ce); TH—T. abaqāt al-h. anābila of Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá (d.
526/1133 ce); DhTH—al-Dhayl ↪alá t.abaqāt al-h. anābila of Ibn Rajab (d.
795/1393 ce).
the ratio of 5:1, while the less optimistic is 15:1.174 These data agree with
174The overlap between the khut.ba and the wa↪z. is insignificant: of 279 khut.abā↩ only 9
were involved in wa↪z. (3.22%).
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Figure 3.34: Distribution of the Wu↪↪āz. in the Corpus. Sources: JM—al-Jawāhir al-
mud. ı̄ya f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya of Ibn Ab̄ı-l-Wafā↩ (d. 775/1374 ce); TT—Tāj al-tarājim
f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya of Ibn Qutlūbughā (d. 879/1475 ce); TS—al-T. abaqāt al-san̄ıya f̄ı
tarājim al-h. anaf̄ıya of al-Tamı̄mı̄ al-Dār̄ı (d. 1010/1602 ce); DM—al-Dibāj al-mudhahhab
f̄ı ma↪rifat a↪yān ↪ulamā↩ al-madhhab of Ibn Farh. ūn (d. 799/1397 ce); TM—Tart̄ıb al-
madārik wa-taqr̄ıb al-masālik li-ma↪rifat a↪lām madhhab Mālik of al-Yah. sūb̄ı (d. 544/
1150 ce); TFSh—T. abaqāt al-fuqahā↩ al-shāfi ↪̄ıya of al-Shahrazūr̄ı (d. 676/1278 ce);
TShK—T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya al-kubrá of al-Subk̄ı (d. 771/1370 ce); TSh—T. abaqāt al-
shāfi ↪̄ıya of Ibn Qād. ı̄ Shuhba (d. 851/1448 ce); TH—T. abaqāt al-h. anābila of Ibn Ab̄ı
Ya↪lá (d. 526/1133 ce); DhTH—al-Dhayl ↪alá t.abaqāt al-h. anābila of Ibn Rajab (d. 795/
1393 ce).
the most likely projection of the curves based on the data from al-Dhahab̄ı’s
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.175
3.5.5 A Note on Female Preachers
The wa↪z. is the only form of preaching where one finds female actors. The
first woman one encounters is ↪Ā↩isha, “the Mother of the Believers” (umm
al-mu↩min̄ın), but she can hardly be considered a preacher. She does engage in
actions that are described with the wa↪z. -related vocabulary, but as most wa↪z. -
175Petry (1981), The civilian elite of Cairo in the later Middle Ages.
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Figure 3.35: Female preachers (wā↪iz. āt) mentioned in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
related actions of the early period, these are single, private “admonitions” di-
rected at specific individuals, mostly male leaders of the Islamic community.176
↪Ā↩isha is often compared to the early khut.abā↩—her eloquence is second only
to that of the Prophet himself—but she is never directly described with the
khut.ba-related vocabulary.
177
Another interesting example from the early period is Ghazāla (killed c. 76/
696 ce), a courageous wife of Shab̄ıb b. Yaz̄ıd (killed 77/697 ce), a Khārij̄ı
leader of the Jaz̄ıra. Ghazāla vowed to get up on the pulpit of a mosque—and
eventually she did so in the mosque of Kufa after Shab̄ıb b. Yaz̄ıd captured
the city with his troops. Unfortunately, it is not clear what exactly she did
when she finally got her chance to rise on the pulpit.178
al-Dhahab̄ı included about 450 women in his Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, of whom 13
are described as wā↪iz.as.
179 As Figure 3.35 shows, most of them flourished after
176SAN, 2, 186; SAN, 2, 243; SAN, 3, 147.
177SAN, 2, 191; SAN, 3, 147; SAN, 4, 95; SAN, 13, 585; TShK, 2, 199; TI, 4, 248.
178SAN, 4, 148; TI, 5, 329.
179SAN, 10, 5–99; SAN, 20, 148–149; SAN, 22, 288–290; TI, 31, 199–200; TI, 36, 69–70;
TI, 36, 474; TI, 36, 517–518; TI, 40, 172–173; TI, 41, 215–216; TI, 42, 165–166; TI, 42,
279–280; TI, 44, 70; TI, 45, 138; TI, 45, 379; TI, 46, 329; TI, 47, 405; TI, 50, 112–113;
TI, 52, 404–405; DhTH, 1, 244–249.
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500/1107 ce. Their biographies are brief and offer few details, but they convey
pretty much the same idea—these were pious women who were preaching to
other women (kānat ta↪iz.u l-nisā↩).
Their geography, however, follows the general geographical pattern of the
wa↪z. , as most of them are of either Iraqi or Iranian origin. Those who were
not born in Baghdad eventually ended up in the capital city. The last of
these female preachers, Khad̄ıja bint Yūsuf (d. 699/1300 ce), was a native of
Baghdad who moved to Damascus.180
3.6 Current Findings in the Light of Previous
Scholarship
Computational reading of the corpus yielded a significant body of data relevant
to different forms of preaching that have already received scholarly attention.
However, not all forms are equally represented and the available data are
sufficiently coherent only for such forms as khut.ba, qas.as. , and wa↪z. (tadhk̄ır).
The analysis of data from the corpus shows that the period of 200–300 ah/
816–913 ce was pivotal for all three forms (with a turning point around 250/
865 ce): the khut.ba becomes almost exclusively a delegated practice; qas.as.
as a legitimate preaching practice gradually disappears over this period, while
the wa↪z. takes its place.
In the early period, i.e. before c. 250/865 ce, the major forms of preaching
have clear societal orientations. The early khut.ba is always oriented downward:
180TI, 52, 404–405.
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rulers, or their governors who represent them, address their subjects. The early
wa↪z. is directed upward: here subjects address those who rule them; however,
it should be stressed that the early wa↪z. can hardly be treated as a preaching
practice, since most instances are occasional one-on-one admonitions, and,
in this regard, it is rather a counterpart of nas. ı̄h. a, “advice,” and was. ı̄ya,
“counsel.” Unlike the khut.ba and the wa↪z. , the qas.as. is orientated horizontally:
the preachers of this form are of roughly the same social standing as their
listeners, although more knowledgeable in matters of religion.
The societal directionality of preaching after the 3rd/9th century is not as
clear. This century marks the formation of a learned stratum and we start
finding more and more individuals who are primary identified through their
engagement in the transmission and development of religious learning. In
social terms, we now deal with an “intermediary” class that occupies social
space between the ruling élites and the populace at large. Like governors of
the early period, the learned khut.abā↩ now act as official representatives of
powers-that-be, simultaneously confirming the legitimacy of their rule and the
loyalty of the community that they preach to during Friday sermons. One can
still think of the khut.ba as oriented downward, although rulers are now often
found in the audience.
The wa↪z. becomes an important preaching practice after the 3
rd/9th cen-
tury, but as such loses the clear societal orientation of the early wa↪z. . Even
though the practice of occasional private admonishment of powers-that-be
never completely disappears, wa↪z. now is clearly a preaching practice oriented
toward groups of Muslims (as well as non-Muslims) of all social standings.
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Data from my corpus relevant to the qas.as. do not add much to the already
existing discussions of this practice in academic literature.181 With almost no
exceptions, my corpus offers the same textual evidence on the early qus.s. ās. :
the same names of the early qus.s. ās. , their often official status, their respectable
religious reputation, their role as army preachers, etc. However, working with
the corpus of biographical collections it becomes clear that corroborative ev-
idence is not sufficient. Thus, although one can identify about 50 qus.s. ās. in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām during the period before 250/865 ce, there are very few com-
mon elements in their biographies as well as in the passages relevant to qas.as.
as a preaching practice, which makes it difficult to speak of historical patterns.
Nonetheless, the emphasis of computational reading on social, chronological
and geographical perspectives allows us to see some patterns that were largely
overlooked by my predecessors. Confirming that there was a significant num-
ber of pietists among the early qus.s. ās. , my reading also adds that most of
them were of humble tribal origin and were strongly associated with the early
Islamic centers, such as Medina, Basra, Kufa (and partially Syria and Egypt
which peak for the first time in the early period). It may be concluded that
these were individuals with very limited opportunities for vertical mobility, for
whom the role of qās.s. may have been the only way to improve their status
within a Muslim society that remained tribal during its early period.182
181Johannes Pedersen, ‘The Islamic preacher: wā↪iz., mudhakkir, qās.s.’, Ignace Goldz-
iher Memorial Volume, 1 (1948); Johannes Pedersen, ‘The Criticism of the Islamic
Preacher’, Die Welt des Islams, 2 (1953); Swartz (1971), Ibn al-Jawz̄ı’s Kitāb al-qus.s. ās.
wa↩l-mudhakkir̄ın. Including a Critical Edition, Annotated Translation and Introduc-
tion; Athamina (1992), ‘Al-Qasas’; Berkey (2000), ‘Storytelling, preaching, and power
in Mamluk Cairo’; Berkey (2001), Popular preaching and religious authority in the me-
dieval Islamic Near East .
182See Section 2.3.2.1 on de-tribalization.
229
In terms of chronology, the biographical data of my corpus show that qus.s. ās.
(at least recognizable ones) disappear over the course of the 3rd/9th century.
This chronology corresponds to the one suggested by Pellat, who dealt mainly
with the early qus.s. ās. .
183 However, these biographical data also problematize
discussions of qus.s. ās. during later periods, after 250/865 ce. The lack of bi-
ographical data on popular preachers in certain regions and periods does not
necessarily mean that they did not exist there and then,184 but any discus-
sion of a practice whose practitioners are missing becomes highly problematic.
There appears to be no way of knowing who exactly were those qus.s. ās. who
were so feverishly criticized in the polemical literature.
Berkey offers an insightful discussion of controversy around popular preach-
ing/storytelling by weaving together critical comments of religious scholars
from different periods and different regions of the Islamic world: the Iraq̄ı
scholar Ibn al-Jawz̄ı (d. 597/1201 ce); Ibn al-H. ājj (d. 737/1337 ce), Zayn
al-Dı̄n al-↪Irāq̄ı (d. 806/1404 ce), Jalāl al-Dı̄n al-Suyūt.̄ı (d. 911/1506 ce)—
all residents of Egypt; and ↪Al̄ı b. Maymūn al-Idr̄ıs̄ı (d. 917/1512 ce), a
Morrocan S. ūf̄ı living in Syria.
185 The similarity of provided comments implies
a comparable degree of similarity between manifestations of popular preach-
ing/storytelling in the periods and regions of these scholars. This, however,
does not agree with the geographies of qas.as. and wa↪z. . It may also be added
that descriptions and references to qus.s. ās. in the polemical literature seem too
183See, Pellat Ch., ‘K. ās.s.,’ in EI2.
184In later periods, qus.s. ās. as biographees are completely absent from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām and
other biographical collections of the corpus; even references to them are extremely scarce.
185See, Berkey (2000), ‘Storytelling, preaching, and power in Mamluk Cairo’,
Berkey (2001), Popular preaching and religious authority in the medieval Islamic Near
East , 22-35.
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generic,186 and one is left to wonder whether qās.s.—and even more so qus.s. ās. ,
its plural form—was just a blanket category applied to everyone who did not
belong to established scholarly networks, yet dared to contest the authority of
the networked scholars on the popular level.
Later qus.s. ās. are often described as charlatans who pretend to possess reli-
gious knowledge only to delude unsophisticated believers.187 In this light, the
appearance of the wa↪z. is often interpreted in academic studies as a natural
substitute for the now reprehensible qas.as. . However, computational reading
offers a different perspective on this issue. Although there is a noticeable over-
lap between these practices, the data from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām strongly suggest
that wa↪z. as a preaching practice displaces qas.as. when the geography of the
early Islamic world shifts eastward, and the early élites strongly associated
with the cities of Medina, Basra, and Kufa (and partially Syria and Egypt)
become displaced by the new élites of urban centers in central Iraq and south-
western and northeastern Iran (primarily Baghdad, Isfahan, and Nishapur).
As the old centers dwindle, so does the qas.as. , while the importance of the
wa↪z. grows together with the importance of the new centers. It is during and
after this chrono-geographical shift that qus.s. ās. start featuring as faceless in-
dividuals who endanger the purity of religious knowledge. Considering that it
was the members of this new, eastern élite who were developing and impos-
ing standards of authenticity—the names of such scholars as al-Bukhār̄ı and
186One often finds similar descriptions in the biographies of individuals who professed views
that were later labeled as “reprehensible innovations” and who belonged to networks that
did not survive in the long run.
187This issue is covered in all studies that mention the qas.as. , but perhaps most vividly
in: Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The mediaeval Islamic underworld: the Banū Sāsān
in Arabic society and literature (Leiden: Brill, 1976).
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Muslim should suffice—it is not entirely surprising that the representatives of
the dwindling élite were portrayed as jeopardizing the entire Islamic tradition.
This interpretation, however, should be considered provisional; further inquiry
into earlier biographical collections should provide critical amount of data to
trace this pattern more clearly.188
With main emphasis on chronological, geographical and social perspectives,
computational reading produces data that does not always allow me to engage
fully with the arguments that have been advanced by the scholars of Islamic
preaching. The difficulty is mainly methodological. To paraphrase Roded,189
although biographical collections are often cited, little or no indication is given
as to how widespread certain phenomena were; nor does one find a compara-
tive perspective as to how these phenomena fit into the larger picture of the
social and religious history of the pre-modern Islamic world. My corpus of-
fers biographies for at least five hundred khut.abā↩ and almost as many wu↪↪āz. ,
while no academic study of preaching mentions more than a dozen preachers.
This raises questions about methodological considerations that were used by
the scholars of Islamic preaching to select specific preachers and treat them
as a representative sample of particular preaching practices. Considering that
exceptional preachers attract more scholarly attention, academic representa-
tions of Islamic preaching become even more problematic. At the moment
more decisive conclusion is not possible, but further, more conventional read-
188It is worth mentioning that a similar explanation of rivalry between the H. anaf̄ıs (old
élite) and the Shāfi ↪̄ıs (new élite) in Nishapur was offered by Bulliet: Bulliet (1972), The
patricians of Nishapur , 37–40.
189The Israeli scholar encountered the same methodological problem during her study of
women in Islamic history Roded (1994), Women in Islamic biographical collections, vii-viii.
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ing of all discovered biographies of preachers should allow us to see whether
these studies are off the mark.
Although computational reading makes engagement with the already exist-
ing studies of preaching difficult, its emphasis on chronological, geographical
and social aspects offers us an opportunity to put them into a larger context.
Although the sum of existing studies of the wa↪z. does not constitute the history
of this preaching form in medieval Islamic world, together and on its own they
convey a confusing message about this preaching practice even for Islamicists,
not to mention non-specialists who might try to build upon their research.190
In and of itself this hardly invalidates any of these studies in particular, but
the lack of chronological, geographical and social191 perspectives does not al-
low the reader to get the sense of historical importance of this practice in
respective regions, leaving one with an impression that the wa↪z. was equally
190Although neither Berkey, nor Jones claim to offer histories of medieval Islamic preaching,
the titles of their works—Popular Preaching and Religious Authority in the Medieval Islamic
Near East and The Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World, respectively—speak
louder than disclaimers buried in introductions and one often finds scholars from different
fields treating these studies in more general terms. For example, in his review, Hirschkind
represents Berkey’s book as “a rich and nuanced account of medieval Islamic preaching” (in
History of Religions, Vol. 42, No. 3 (February 2003), 252-255); see also: Hirschkind (2006),
The ethical soundscape, 221, n.13; similarly, Fatma Tütüncü, ‘The Women Preachers of
the Secular State: The Politics of Preaching at the Intersection of Gender, Ethnicity and
Sovereignty in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, 46:4 (July 2010), 595; Kabir Tambar,
‘Iterations of lament: Anachronism and affect in a Shi‘i Islamic revival in Turkey’, American
Ethnologist , 38:3 (2011), 498; Loren D. Lybarger, ‘The demise of Adam in the Qis.as. al-
Anbiyā: the symbolic politics of death and re-burials in the Islamic ‘Stories of the prophets”,
Numen, 55:5 (January 2008), passim. Swartz’ studies that revolve essentially around Ibn al-
Jawz̄ı and his preaching career are often treated in the same manner: see, e.g., Douglas C.
Young, ‘Preachers and poets: the popular sermon in the Andalus̄ı maqāma’, Journal of
Arabic Literature, 34 (2003).
191Talmon-Heller and Jones offer “profiles” of wu↪↪āz. , but they are limited to discussions of
a small number of biographies of famous preachers. See, Talmon-Heller (2007a), Islamic
piety in medieval Syria: mosques, cemeteries and sermons under the Zangids and Ayyūbids
(1146-1260), 128-140, Jones (2012), The Power of Oratory , 218-230.
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prominent in the eastern and the western provinces of the Islamic world. The
data from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām clearly shows that the prominence of this preaching
practice goes down as one moves westward; showing no chronological cluster-
ing, extremely low numbers of wu↪↪āz. in North Africa and al-Andalus make
any discussion of wa↪z. as a practice in this region practically impossible.
192
The analysis of the geographical connections of regional clusters193 shows
that the geography of the wa↪z. is consistent with the extents of the common-
wealths of Iranian regional clusters: the wa↪z. is present only where Iranian
connections are strong. My analysis shows that the highest number of wu↪↪āz.
is found in Iran. This is where it originates and flourishes;194 it is from here
that it spreads to Iraq, where it strikes deep roots. As Iranian regions go into
decline, we find the Iranian wu↪↪āz. traveling and migrating to Iraq.
195 Later,
when Iraq suffers the same fate, we find Iraqi wu↪↪āz. traveling and migrating
to Syria and Egypt, where the number of visiting wu↪↪āz. significantly exceeds
that of the local ones. These connections never really reach North Africa and
al-Andalus, perhaps because Iraq and al-Andalus go in decline roughly at the
same period and their geographical orientation almost simultaneously shifts
toward Egypt and Syria.
The question, nonetheless, remains: why does the practice of wa↪z. strike
192At the same time it is Jones in her latest book who discusses more wu↪↪āz. , than Berkey,
Talmon-Heller, or Swartz (provided that we leave his translation of the Kitāb al-qus.s. ās. wa-
l-mudhakkir̄ın aside); at the same time, the number of preachers that she discusses is still
lower than what my corpus provides.
193See, Appendix A for the detailed overviews of all regional cluster.
194It is very likely that its appearance is connected with the Karrāmiyya movement (and
probably other populist religious movements), but the data from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām do not
allow us to trace this connection. By incorporating Iranian biographical collections and
local histories, we should be able to shed more light on this issue.
195Please, refer to the graphs in the relevant section above.
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such deep roots in Iraq, but not in Syria and Egypt? The answer may be in
the process of institutionalization that eventually made the social structure of
the learned community utterly rigid through the introduction of waqf insti-
tutions with their paid positions. When the Iranian wu↪↪āz. started traveling
to Iraq, the learned community was still in formation;196 besides, communi-
ties of Iranian migrants could have offered a welcoming climate to the Iranian
wu↪↪āz. .
197 These two factors should have allowed the Iranian wu↪↪āz. to blend
into the Iraqi learned community and become an essential segment of society
at large. Later, when wu↪↪āz. started traveling and migrating to Syria and
Egypt, they found themselves under quite different circumstances. By this
period, the process of institutionalization had almost completed the transfor-
mation of the learned community. Religious scholars were now increasingly
identified through waqf positions that they hold and for which they rival with
each other. This should have made it very difficult for the newcomers to fit
in—especially for those of them who represented a practice that was not pop-
ular here in the first place.198 By the end of the period covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh
al-islām, the wa↪z. and its practitioners practically disappear from the regions
of its coverage. Since by the end of the period Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām covers almost
exclusively the Arab lands (other collections do not offer much either), there
is no way to know at the moment whether the wa↪z. managed to take roots in
196See Section 2.3.2.4 on professionalization and institutionalization.
197For more details, see sections on Iranian clusters in Appendix A.
198In the chapter on the wa↪z. in Syria, Talmon-Heller provided of local wu↪↪āz. , which are
essentially limited to the biography of the famous Sibt b. al-Jawz̄ı, a Baghdād̄ı who moved
to Damascus. He was an exceptional preacher and managed to fit in; yet, it is worth noting
that he gave up his affiliation with the H. anbal̄ı school of law and converted to H. anafism—no
doubt to improve his chances.
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India or Anatolia, where the Iranian élites also emigrated.
The overall chronology of wa↪z. as a preaching practice roughly corresponds
to the one offered by Swartz.199 However, his idea that even as it disappeared,
the wa↪z. becomes a part of the khut.ba is difficult to test. My current corpus
offers no evidence to support this view, but it definitely shows that the over-
lap between the wa↪z. and the khut.ba was utterly insignificant over the entire
period: in other words, there were very few preachers who were involved in
both forms of preaching.
Institutionalization may also explain why the numbers of khut.abā↩ keep on
growing throughout the period.200 As a role/position that was sanctioned by
the Prophet himself, it was a better fit for the new world of salaried positions
in which the learned found themselves by the end of the period covered in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Although some Islamic scholars considered the office of a
khat.ı̄b to be the grandest office that a scholar might hope to fill, particularly
because the Prophet himself was a khat.ı̄b,
201 biographical data from the corpus
strongly suggests that the status of this office differed significantly depending
on the region, at least in the eyes of the authors who put together these
biographical collections. The overall disregard for khut.abā↩ in Iran and Central
Asia is rather difficult to explain. An insight to this issue may be found in a
H. anaf̄ı biographical collection that mentions “the custom of the Bukharans”
(↪ādat ahl Bukhārá), according to which a khat.ı̄b and an imām of the Friday
199See, Swartz (1982), ‘Preaching, Islamic’; this is the only academic treatment of the
wa↪z. that offers its chronology.
200Their numbers go down only in regions that themselves go in decline.
201Berkey (2001), Popular preaching and religious authority in the medieval Islamic Near
East , 12.
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service are roles for two different individuals, of which the latter—i.e., the
role of imām—is reserved for a more knowledgeable and pious individual.202
Extrapolating from one piece of anecdotal evidence is rather dangerous,203
but if such an attitude toward khut.abā↩ was common in Central Asia and the
Iranian provinces, it may explain why we find so few khut.abā↩ in these dense
regions, where people seem to have had more respect for, or interest in the
wu↪↪āz. . Ultimately, however, whether this was because the office was more
respected in the western part of the Islamic world than it was in the east, or
because authors in the west were more concerned about positions than their
counterparts in the east, or, perhaps, for some other reasons, remains unclear
for now.
* * *
Computational reading has allowed me to trace chronological, geographical
and some social patterns of major preaching forms that other scholars of Is-
lamic preaching have overlooked. The overall analysis of such a vast collection
as Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām has also allowed me to create a background that helps to
contextualize findings about preachers. The further study of these preaching
forms will rely on more conventional reading of biographies combined with
more elaborate computational reading that should help compare patterns re-
lated to preaching and preachers with the patterns related to the entire learned
class.
202bal man huwa a↪lam min-hu wa-ah. san t.ar̄ıqa; see, TS, 1, 263.
203Although, on the other hand, this is the only hint in the entire corpus.
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Further Prospects
After less than two years of development, the method of computational read-
ing allows us to get almost instantaneous insights into a great number of
historical issues. Although technologically the approach has been developed
practically from scratch, in spirit it follows in the footsteps of the quantita-
tive method that scholars of Islam have used since the 1970s. In its current
state the method is best suited for analyzing biographical data from social,
chronological and geographical perspectives, yet the complexity of analytical
tasks can be increased ad infinitum. Computational reading is flexible, scal-
able and fast, beyond comparison with conventional methods. By dwelling on
these properties, we should obtain a glimpse into the prospects of its further
implementation.
The flexibility of computational reading allows us to ask various historical
questions by designing analytical algorithms of any complexity.204 Although
the emphasis in this dissertation has been primarily on analysis of biographical
data (dates, names and toponyms), computational reading also allows for the
204It should be stressed that even though the method puts a lot of emphasis on the use
of technology, its effectivene implementation requires traditional training in Near Eastern
studies.
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analysis of complex textual. For example, we can get a glimpse into the age
structure of Islamic élites through the computational analysis of age statements
that often occur in biographies. Through analysis of the most frequent types
of such statements in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, my experimental algorithm yields ages
for over 5,100 individuals and shows that during the period of almost seven
centuries the average lifespan fluctuated between 67 and 80 lunar years (Fig-
ure 3.36, left), clearly decreasing as age statements become more and more
frequent, after c. 350/962 ce (Figure 3.36, right). Onomastic and toponymic
synsets that allow re-grouping data using social, religious and geographical
parameters may shed light on the age structure of different social groups and
local communities. With minor modifications, this analytical algorithm can be
applied to other sources as well. For example, the Had̄ıyat al-↪ārif̄ın offers age
data on about 1,650 Islamic authors (out of approximately 8,800) and a very
cursory glance at the results shows that longevity was indeed characteristic of
religious scholars,205 while most of the short-lived authors are usually found in
the field of poetry and fine literature, where talent and audacity seem to have
been more important than networks and perseverance. Our ability to collect
such data from numerous biographical collections will help us to advance the
study of the demography of the Islamic world.
In a similar manner, algorithms can be devised for a more complex analy-
205Bulliet determines an average lifespan of 78 lunar years (Bulliet (1970), ‘A Quantita-
tive Approach to Medieval Muslim Biographical Dictionaries’, 200); Nawas gives 80 lunar
years (John Nawas, ‘Development of the Islamic religious sciences’ 11 (1999), 161, also see
fn. 8 for more references.), and Şentürk—79.82 (Şentürk (2005), Narrative social structure:
anatomy of the Hadith transmission network, 610-1505 , 65). In all three cases the emphasis
is strongly on the religious élites, and even more so on the transmitters of h. ad̄ıth, for whom
longevity was one of the most important characteristics; the coverage of Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām is,
of course, not limited to any specific group.
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Figure 3.36: Age statements from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. The left image shows the chronological
fluctuation of the average lifespan, while the image on the right shows the chronological
distribution of age statements (darker areas mean more age statements).
sis of onomastic data that would allow us, for example, to reproduce Bulliet’s
study of conversion.206 The very fact that this study is still being criticized207
more than three decades from its publication shows that Bulliet’s model of
conversion cannot be discarded through a critique of where it fails, if oth-
erwise it still remains plausible and coherent. The old model will remain
standing until an equally plausible alternative can be offered. The flexibility
of computational reading will allow re-testing the original model of conversion
on new biographical collections, while experimenting with its variations and
developing a new one.
The emphasis in this dissertation has been primarily on biographical col-
lections. However, computational reading can be applied to texts of any genre,
although it does work best for texts that show structural regularities of some
kind. For example, one can design algorithms that will allow tracing the usage
206Bulliet (1979), Conversion to Islam in the medieval period: an essay in quantitative
history .
207Most recently: David J. Wasserstein, ‘Where have all the converts gone? Difficulties
in the study of conversion to Islam in al-Andalus’, Al-Qant.ara, 33:2 (February 2013).
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of Qur↩ānic verses over the entire digital corpus of Islamic sources. Such a
large-scale study of how the Qur↩ān was quoted and interpreted by different
authors will improve our understanding of how different aspects of the Islamic
scripture were coming to prominence depending on historical circumstances.
The same can be done for the Prophetic traditions (sing. h. ad̄ıth), where com-
putational reading will be particularly helpful for the analysis of chains of
transmitters. Compendia of legal decisions (sing. fatwá) can also be ana-
lyzed in the same manner and the exploratory analysis of possible correlations
between the topics of legal decisions, locales and periods will most likely re-
veal unexpected commonalities and differences among regional communities of
Muslims, while offering a unique perspective on the long-term regional devel-
opment of Islamic law. Likewise, interesting experiments can be designed for
the study of classical Arabic poetry. Considering that meters can be identified
computationally,208 scholars of Arabic poetry can look for correlations between
meters and themes, and, of course, put their discoveries in geographical and
chronological perspective.209
The scalability of computational reading makes it possible to test whether
the same historical questions yield similar results when asked of new sources:
this is done by applying existing analytical algorithms to new sources. For
example, the already-devised complex means of identifying preachers and pas-
208For one such tool see, The Encyclopaedia of Arabic Poetry by Cultural Founda-
tion, Abu Dhabi (UAE), reviewed in details by Michael Bonner and Maxim Romanov at:
alraqmiyyat.org/2013/02/arabicpoetryencyclopaedia.
209Similar studies in the history of English fiction have already yielded a number of in-
teresting and unexpected discoveries (In addition to the already cited studies of Franco
Moretti, see also Matthew L. Jockers, Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and Literary
History, 1st edition (University of Illinois Press, April 2013).
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sages relevant to preaching can be effectively applied to local biographical
collections and local histories, which will allow us to get a more detailed idea
of the chronology of different preaching practices in particular regions of the
Islamic world, while simultaneously testing whether regional representation in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām corresponds to that of local sources.
Computational reading is fast. It does take a great deal of time to put to-
gether the essentials—devise algorithms, compile synsets, reformat sources—
but when they are ready, the results can be produced almost instantaneously.
The results can be easily regenerated if analytical algorithms require adjust-
ments or new sources added to the corpus; and it does not matter whether
analytical algorithms are applied to a single text or to the entire digital corpus
of classical Arabic that already exceeds 400 million words. In most cases the
results come in volumes that are significant enough to trace historical patterns.
The volume of structured data that has been generated so far from Ta↩r̄ıkh
al-islām alone is sufficient for dozens of studies that will allow us to advance
our understanding of the social history of the pre-modern Islamic world. Most
of these data have remained outside this dissertation project, but to give the
reader an idea of these “byproducts,” we can take a quick look at the results
for the major Sunn̄ı legal schools. Figure 3.37 shows that each school had
a distinct geographical network. In and of themselves, these geographies are
hardly surprising and largely agree with what the students of Islam have al-
ready discovered over the last century or so. (It is worth highlighting, however,
that these maps are a circumstantial result of two years’ research by a gradu-
ate student). At the same time, once they have been reformatted into graphs
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Figure 3.37: Geographical Networks of the Legal Schools. NB: each maps has its own
scale.
and chronological maps—similar to the ones that were used in the part on
preaching and preachers—these data can give scholars of Islam a much more
subtle picture of how these geographical networks were changing over time,
where and when they flourished, stagnated, and declined. The use of hierar-
chical lists of geographical entities—toponymic synsets—allows us to take a
more detailed view of these geographical networks and analyze connections,
not only among provinces, but also among urban centers and even city quar-
ters. By putting data on all four legal schools on the same chronological maps
we can get a glimpse into how these schools coexisted in different regional
clusters. Figure 3.38 should give an idea of how the “relative weights” of the
schools were changing over time in major regional clusters during the period
of 470–670 ah/1078–1272 ce.
In the same manner one can trace the chronology and geography of any
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Figure 3.38: “Relative Weights” of the Legal Schools in Regional Clusters.
social group that can be identified in the sources through relevant onomastic
elements or more complex textual descriptions. One of the major advantages of
the computational approach is that instead of artificially imposing chronolog-
ical and geographical boundaries, it allows us to discover periods and regions
that are important to specific phenomena, practices, or social groups.
Somewhat ironically, the advantages of computational reading also pose
problems. The volume of results generated with this method is overwhelming.
The visualization of data with tables, graphs, and maps is helpful for getting
meaningful insights into findings, but comprehension and interpretation of
these data will require collaborative efforts and decades of more traditional
research. Fortunately, computational reading also allows us to marshal all
relevant textual evidence for close reading.
* * *
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The appearance of historical sources in digital format has already made a
significant impact on historical studies in general. The 126th Annual Meeting of
the American Historical Association (Chicago, 2012) featured a series of nearly
two dozen sessions on digital history. Titled “The Future is Here,” this series
particularly emphasized the value of text-mining and geographical information
systems (GIS) for working with “big data.” It would be logical to expect that
the digital corpora of Islamic texts will sooner or later make a similar impact on
our field as well. This will affect the way we study these sources, what research
questions we ask of them, and how we train new generations of scholars. The
ability to work with “big data,” so amply supplied by generations of Muslim




By studying regional maps and histograms of connections, we can get a more
nuanced idea of how each cluster was integrated into the Islamic world. Num-
bers that I will be using refer to individuals who come from a specific cluster
(based on their toponymic nisbas) and whose biographies mention one and
more locations in the same (local connections on Figure A.1)1 or other clus-
ters (transregional connections on Figure A.2). Individuals with toponymic
nisbas that refer to different regional clusters are considered as transregional
migrants, although determining the starting and end points methodologically
is not yet possible (Figure A.3).
Since the most probable routes are not taken into consideration at the
moment, interpreting connections might be somewhat complicated: the count
of connections with transitional regions—i.e. those between the home clus-
1The number of local connections within a regional cluster might be an indicator of how
well this cluster is represented in the source, or how well the literary tradition developed in
that region.
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Figure A.1: Local Connections in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
ter of an individual and the final destination—might be significantly higher
than what straightforward statistics allow us to see. For example, if Egypt is
mentioned in the biography of a certain person from Andalusia, this means
he must have traveled via the Maghrib and the North African cluster. At
the same time, if such transitional regions are not mentioned, this may im-
ply that at certain periods these regions were not particularly interesting—no
notable authorities to study with, for example—and therefore there was noth-
ing to mention. One cannot infer this from single connections, but a more or
less significant number of connections in combination with their chronological
distribution should point to that direction.
The rest of this chapter will offer accounts on each major cluster. The maps
of connections for each regional cluster will be slightly different: they visual-
ize connections for the entire period covered in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām and provide
some basic statistics for each cluster: visitors, migrants, natives/residents, and
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Figure A.2: Transregional Connections in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
connections. Some explanations are in order.
“Visitors” are those whose biographies mention toponyms that belong to
the cluster in question (primary cluster), but whose toponymic nisbas associate
them with other regional clusters (secondary clusters). This category also
includes individuals without toponymic nisbas.
“Migrants” are those who, in addition to a toponymic nisba that belongs
to the primary cluster, also have toponymic nisbas that associate them with
other regional clusters.
“Natives/residents” of the cluster are those with toponymic nisbas that
belong to the primary cluster. Those “with local connections” are individuals
whose biographies mention more than one location within the primary clus-
ter; those “with transregional connections” are individuals whose biographies
mention locations outside the primary cluster. Connections on these maps
are plotted according to the model on Subfigure (iii) of Figure 2.7, discussed
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Figure A.3: Transregional Migrants in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
above: here we are plotting biographical data of only those individuals whose
geographical affiliations are known. Each secondary cluster also has two ac-
companying numbers separated by a slash. The first number shows numbers
of natives/residents of the primary cluster who visited this secondary cluster.
These numbers represent only direct connections between the primary and sec-
ondary clusters (but not between secondary clusters: see the model shown on
Subfigure (i) of Figure 2.7). The second number shows numbers of migrants
between the primary and secondary clusters.
The “Total number of transregional connections” shows the cumulative
number of transregional connections, which is always higher than the number
of natives/residents “with transregional connections.”2 Natives/residents with
transregional connections show the extent to which the élites of the primary
cluster actively maintained connections with other regions, while transregional
2For example, an individual who visited three secondary clusters equals to three transre-
gional connections, but to one native/resident with transregional connections.
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Figure A.4: Connections: Central Arabian Cluster.
connections help to determine the overall orientation of the primary cluster
within the Islamic world.
Additionally, the histograms of transregional connections and transregional
migrants are often included to show how these connections are distributed over
time. Series of chronological maps of connections for each regional cluster
(similar to those shown on Figures 2.9–2.12) are included into the Disser-
tation Appendices. Animated series of these maps are available online at
www.alraqmiyyat.org.
A.1 Central and South Arabia
Most of the connections between the Central Arabian Cluster (Figure A.4)
and the rest of the Islamic world are north and northeast bound: mainly with
Iraq (208), Iran (116 total: 49 with southwestern Iran, 49 with northeastern
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Iran, and 25 with northwestern Iran), Syria (67) and Egypt (60). Peaks of
connections with practically all clusters fall in the first 300 lunar years, with
steady decline beginning between 150/768 ce and 200/816 ce, depending on
the cluster in question. Transregional connections after 300/913 ce mostly
remain with the closest clusters: Iraq, southwestern Iran, Egypt and Syria,
shifting in volume toward Syria and Egypt by the end of the main period.
The low number of recurring connections with most of the other clusters must
reflect traffic to the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina.
Considering that Arabia steadily disappears from the social map of the Is-
lamic world starting around 100/719 ce, connections during this period seem
to reflect the migrations of Arabians to the conquered provinces: most notably
to Iraq (68) and northeastern Iran/Khurāsān (30)—in both cases the absolute
majority of migrants fall onto the period before 200/816 ce. Migrations be-
tween central Arabia and southwestern Iran (27) and Egypt (15) are rather
sporadic, although two minor peaks can be identified: based on the density
curves, for both clusters they occuraround 250/865 ce and 550/1156 ce.
Connections between the South Arabian Cluster and the rest of the Is-
lamic world are oriented north and northwest: Egypt (101), Syria (81), Iraq
(70), Andalusia (49), Central Arabia (29), North Africa (17) and the Maghrib
(12). The majority of these connections fall in early periods: 50–400 ah/671–
1010 ce with Egypt; 50–200 ah/671–816 ce with Syria and Iraq; connections
with Andalusia are later: 300–600 ah/913–1204 ce. Transregional migrations
are oriented in a similar manner and fall in the same periods: Egypt (75),
Syria (54), Iraq (41), Andalusia (44), Central Arabia (3), North Africa (7)
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Figure A.5: Connections: South Arabian Cluster.
and the Maghrib (5).
Major urban centers in Arabia are Mecca (268), Medina (794),3 al-T. ā↩if
(21) and S. an↪ā↩ (51)—all peaking in 100–200 ah/719–816 ce. The majority
of individuals from the South Arabian clusters are referred to by their regional
nisbas al-Yaman̄ı (166) and al-H. ad. ramı̄ (134), peaking at the same period.
A.2 Iraq
Iraq is by far the most important region for the most part of the period covered
in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Judging by the data from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, Iraq maintained
thorough connections with most regional clusters. In part, such high numbers
might come from the fact that al-Dhahab̄ı relied heavily on sources written
3This number includes some false positives, since nisba al-Madan̄ı may occasionally refer
to cities other than Medina; this, however, does not affect the curve.
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Figure A.6: Connections: Iraq.
from the Irāq̄ı/Baghdād̄ı perspective (such as, for example, the multi-volume
Ta↩r̄ıkh Baghdād of al-Khat.̄ıb al-Baghdād̄ı); at the same time, however, such a
tremendous presence of the Irāq̄ı/Baghdād̄ı perspective in al-Dhahab̄ı’s sources
indicates that it was in Iraq where the learned community was developed the
most.
The most dense connections are with Iran (1017 in total, rather evenly
distributed between three main Iranian regions: 351 with northeastern Iran,
350 with southwestern Iran and 312 with northwestern Iran), Syria (615, plus
108 with the Anatolian cluster, and 96 with Jordan), Egypt (455), the Central
Arabian cluster (325) and the Jaz̄ıra (212).
Connections with more remote regions are rather substantial as well: 147
with the South Arabian cluster, 120 with the Central Asian cluster, 94 with
the Maghrib, 67 with the South Eastern cluster, 48 with Andalusia, 44 with
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the Caucasian cluster, and 44 with the North African cluster.
The patterns of these connections differ, but often—particularly when it
comes to well-represented clusters—they mirror the main double-peak curve of
Iraq or of respective regional clusters. The curve of Iraq reaches its first peak
around 200/816 ce, then goes into decline, levels out around 440/1049 ce,
starts recovering around 480/1088 ce and reaches its second peak around 590/
1195 ce, and then plunges again.4 The curve of Iraq follows political develop-
ments rather closely: the first rise corresponds to the growth of the garrison
cities of Kufa and Basra and the rise of the ↪Abbāsid dynasty. It reaches its first
peak slightly before the ↪Abbāsid caliphate plunges into a turmoil of military
conflicts, followed by the coming of the Būyids, who will be “protecting” the
↪Abbāsid caliphs for almost a century. The pro-Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte climate created by the
Būyids was not welcoming for the Sunn̄ı religious scholars—during this period
of decline the numbers of the Sunn̄ı scholars drop, while those with various
Sh̄ı ↪̄ıte affiliations rise quite noticeably. Their recovery begins shortly after the
coming of the Saljūqs, who posed as the saviors of Sunnism and the protectors
of the ↪Abbāsid caliphs. Saljūq support of H. anafism, Niz.ām al-mulk’s support
of Shāfi↪ism—particularly through his network of madrasas—and the H. anbal̄ı
movement that rallied to support the ↪Abbāsid caliphs created a different
religio-political climate: it led to the second peak that follows the restoration
of the independent ↪Abbāsid caliphate under the H. anbal̄ı waz̄ır Ibn Hubayra
after 550/1156 ce that will last until the end of the reign of al-Nās.ir li-d̄ın
Allāh (r. 575–622 ah/1180–1226 ce), the last powerful caliph of the ↪Abbāsid
4Although the first peak is more significant, it is difficult to refer to the second one as
minor. See Figure 2.5
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Figure A.7: Iraq: Connections with Other Regions.
dynasty.
Throughout the period, connections with Iran are quite even and contin-
uous: with all three Iranian regions they reach the first peak roughly around
200/816 ce and the second one around 600/1204 ce. Both peaks are quite
similar, although connections with northeastern and northwestern Iran seem
to be more dense around the first peak, while those with southwestern Iran
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around the second one. The pattern of Central Asian connections is very
similar, although the first peak happens somewhat later—around 300/913 ce.
Egyptian connections peak for the first time around 300/913 ce, after
which they go into decline and practically come to naught during 480–520 ah/
1088–1127 ce; then they peak again around 600/1204 ce.
Connections with Syria also peak twice: first around 300/913 ce, then
they go down reaching their lowest point around 500/1107 ce, after which
they skyrocket and remain at their highest for the rest of the period covered
in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām. Only connections with Syria display this trend.
Connections with Arabia—both Central and South—first peak between
160–180 ah/778–797 ce and then, to a much lesser extent, around 600/
1204 ce. However, only connections with the Central Arabian cluster remain
uninterrupted during the entire period.
Connections with the Jaz̄ıra are evenly low until about 450/1059 ce when
they begin to grow, reaching their peak around 600/1204 ce.
Most transregional migrants (1031 total) also come from/go to the closest
regions. Migrant connections are most dense with Iran (451 total). Almost
half of Iranian connections are with northeastern Iran/Khurāsān (192) peak-
ing around 250/865 ce—undeniably the trail of the Khurāsān̄ı roots of the
↪Abbāsid movement. Migrations between Iraq and northwestern and south-
western Iran peak around 550/1156 ce (141 and 118 migrants respectively).
The pattern of migration between Iraq and Syria (112) is similar to the that
of transregional connections between these regions, although migrant connec-
tions reach first minor peak somewhat earlier—around 200/816 ce. They
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begin their second climb after 450/1059 ce and keep on growing through the
end of our period, with the major peak lying after 700/1301 ce.
Most migrations between Iraq and the Jaz̄ıra (91) are after 500/1107 ce.
Migrations between Iraq and Egypt (75) mirror the pattern of their transre-
gional connections, peaking around 300/913 ce and slightly after 600/1204 ce.
All migrants between Iraq and Arabia are during the early period: migra-
tions from Central Arabia (67) end rather abruptly around 200/816 ce, while
those from South Arabia (41) linger until around 300/913 ce.
Iraq has a significant number of urban centers, practically all of them are
situated on either the Tigris or the Euphrates, the two great rivers that define
Mesopotamia. The most prominent centers are Baghdād (3895), Basra/al-
Bas.ra (1665), Kufa/al-Kūfa (1515), Wāsit. (401), Mosul/al-Maws.il (313) and
al-Anbār (93).
On the geographical map the urban centers of Iraq form three distinct clus-
ters: the south—with Basra/al-Bas.ra (1665, peaking around 140/758 ce) and
Abadan/↪Abbādān (10, peaking around 220/836 ce); the north with Mosul/
al-Maws.il (313, peaking around 610/1214 ce) and Irb̄ıl (67, peaking around
650/1253 ce), and a rather large center, located where the two great rivers
come closest to each other. This cluster includes most of the urban centers
of Iraq: Baghdad (3,895, peaking around 585/1190 ce), Kufa/al-Kūfa (1515,
peaking around 120/739 ce), Wāsit. (401, peaking around 580/1185 ce), al-
Anbār (93, peaking around 560/1166 ce), ↪Uqbarā (64, peaking around 435/
1044 ce), al-Madā↩in (44, peaking around 180/797 ce), Samarrā↩ (43, peaking
around 290/904 ce), al-H. illa (41, peaking around 590/1195 ce), Tikr̄ıt (28,
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Figure A.8: Connections: Northeastern Iran (Khurāsān).
peaking around 590/1195 ce), al-H. ı̄ra (24, peaking around 320/933 ce) and
Jarjarāya (14, peaking around 220/836 ce).
The general pattern of urban growth appears to be gradual shift northward:
the south peaks during the first 200 lunar years, most of the cities of the
center peak during 501–600 ah/1108–1204 ce, while the north peaks during
601–700 ah/1205–1301 ce.
A.3 Northeastern Iran (Khurāsān)
The geographical connections of northeastern Iran are oriented firmly toward
Iraq (684). These connections peak twice: first around 230/846 ce, and then,
to a lesser extent, around 520/1127 ce. The highest number of northeast-
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ern Iranian migrants is also with Iraq (192).5 The peak of migrations hap-
pens slightly later, around 250/865 ce. This illustrates the important role
that the abnā↩ al-dawla (“sons of the dynasty), the Khurāsān̄ı backbone of
the ↪Abbāsid military, played in bringing the second great Islamic dynasty to
power. Although both transregional connections and migrations go down after
the peak of 250/865 ce, they stabilize around 400/1010 ce and grow slightly
until their second peak: around 520/1127 ce for transregional connections and
550/1156 ce for migrations. After this both go down, coming to naught by
the end of the period.
The volume of connections with other regional clusters is noticeably lower:
249 with Syria, 214 with the Central Arabian cluster, 181 with northwest-
ern Iran, 150 with the Central Asian cluster, 143 with Egypt, and 138 with
southwestern Iran.
The minor peak of Syrian connections is around 240/855 ce, while the
major one comes around 520/1127 ce. The major peak of Egyptian connec-
tions is, on the other hand, around 250/865 ce and the minor—around 600/
1204 ce. Central Arabian connections remain uninterrupted and relatively
even until about 450/1059 ce, after which they go down. Connections with
northwestern Iran are distributed in a rather similar manner. Connections
with southwestern Iran, on the other hand, pick up around 200/816 ce and
reach their peak around 500/1107 ce. Central Asian connections peak around
350/962 ce and visibly go down after 500/1107 ce.
As was noted above, the highest number of transregional migrants is with
5Which is twice as much compared with the second largest number of migrants with Syria
(81) and the highest number of migrants between two different regions in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām.
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Figure A.9: Northeastern Iran: Connections with Other Regions.
Iraq (192). Syria comes next (81); however, there very few migrations un-
til 400/1010 ce when their numbers begin to grow rapidly, peaking around
500/1107 ce, but still continuing through the end of the period. Migrations
between northeastern Iran and the Central Asian Cluster (67) continue with
minor interruptions from 120/739 ce till 620/1224 ce, with the most dense
period 450–520 ah/1059–1127 ce. Migrations with northwestern Iran and
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southwestern Iran are the same in volume (42) and follow roughly the same
pattern: mostly between 250/865 ce and 600/1204 ce, peaking around 510/
1117 ce. Migrations between the Central Arabian cluster and northeastern
Iran are lower in numbers (30), but very dense with most of them happening
before 200/816 ce. Migrations to/from other clusters very sporadic.
The largest urban center of northeastern Iran is Nishapur/Naysābūr (1,105).
The importance of this center begins to grow rapidly around 170/787 ce. The
density curve reaches its peak around 290/904 ce and remains there, fluctu-
ating only slightly, until about 360/972 ce. Then, the curve goes into fluctu-
ating decline until about 520/1127 ce, after which it plummets. Naysābūr̄ıs
practically disappear by the end of the period. Other centers of this region
are: Merv/Marw [al-shāhijān] (425, peaking around 215/831 ce), Herat/Harāt
(424, peaking around 390/1001 ce), Balkh (171, peaking 220/836 ce), T. ūs
(136, peaking around 525/1132 ce), Nasā (70, peaking 240/855 ce), Isfarāȳın
(58, peaking around 400/1010 ce), Sarakhs (49, peaking around 500/1107 ce),
Miana/Mayhana (31 peaking 520/1127 ce), Fushanj/Būshanj (28, peaking
500/1107 ce), Marw al-rūdh6 (22, peaking 490/1098 ce), Ab̄ıward (21, peak-
ing 485/1093 ce).
In the earliest period a number of individuals from this region are described
with their regional nisba al-Khurāsān̄ı (170, peaking around 185/802 ce), but
with the growth of the importance of this region a shift to urban nisbas takes
place.
6Modern Bālā Murghāb in Afghanistan.
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Figure A.10: Connections: The Central Asian Cluster.
A.4 The Central Asian Cluster
Since it is very difficult to separate the Central Asian cluster from northeast-
ern Iran, it makes sense to review them in conjunction. Most transregional
connections are with Iran (252 total: 145 with northeastern Iran, 57 with
northwestern Iran, and 50 with southwestern Iran), Iraq (218), Syria (123),
and Egypt (73). Unlike in case with Andalusia, where travelers could get to
Egypt using sea routes skipping the Maghrib and the North African sector,
the Central Asians could hardly skip northeastern Iran, since it was their main
gateway to the core of the Islamic world.
Connections with Iraq peak twice: around 300/913 ce and, to a slightly
lesser degree, around 550/1156 ce. Connections with northeastern Iran have
a similar pattern, although the second peak is around 520/1127 ce and it is
clearly the major peak. Connections with Egypt mirror the Egyptian curve:
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Figure A.11: The Central Asian Cluster: Connections with Other Regions.
they peak around 300/913 ce, get interrupted around 500/1107 ce, but begin
to grow rapidly around 600/1204 ce. The Syrian connections also have two
peaks: the minor one around 200/816 ce, and the major one—after 600/
1204 ce. Syrian connections, however, remain uninterrupted from 200/816 ce
on.
The main urban centers of the Central Asian Cluster are Bukhārā (343)
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and Samarqand (112)—both peak around the same time (300/913 ce and 285/
899 ce respectively). A number of individuals also come from the province of
Khorezm/Khwārizm and are referred to by their regional nisba al-Khwārizmı̄
(59).
A.5 Southwestern Iran
Southwestern Iran is also clearly oriented toward Iraq, with which it shares the
highest number of transregional connections (376) and transregional migrants
(118). Connections with Iraq begin to grow around 100/719 ce and keep
on growing quite steadily. They reach their peak around 550/1156 ce and
then, rather rapidly, go down. The pattern of transregional migrations with
Iraq is rather similar. Others dense transregional connections are with the
neighbors—northeastern Iran (124), Syria (121), northwestern Iran (92), the
Central Arabian cluster (90) and Egypt (79).
Connections with northeastern Iran begin to grow about 250/865 ce and
peak around 380/991 ce; then they are in decline, but peak for the second
time—this is a minor peak—around 530/1136 ce and then go down again.
Syrian connections do not have a distinct peak; they begin about 220/836 ce
and grow slowly but steadily with some minor fluctuations. Between 500/
1107 ce and 620/1224 ce they are roughly on the same level, after which
they decline slightly, but still remain uninterrupted by the end of the period.
Uninterrupted connections with northwestern Iran begin around 200/816 ce,
peak around 400/1010 ce and then decline, coming to naught by the end of
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Figure A.12: Connections: Southwestern Iran.
the period. Connections with central Arabia are rather evenly distributed over
the entire period. Connections with Egypt begin around 150/768 ce and peak
around 300/913 ce, then—as with many other clusters—they get interrupted
around 500/1107 ce, after which they begin rising again, reaching their second
minor peak around 620/1224 ce.
The orientation of transregional migrations is somewhat different: south-
western Iran shares almost the same amount of migrants with northeastern
Iran (42), northwestern Iran (40), and Syria (42); two other noticeable regions
are the Central Asian and Central Arabian clusters (20 and 27 respectively).
In most cases migrations mirror the patterns of transregional connections, with
the exception of northeastern Iran with which migrations peak around 500/
1107 ce.
The most significant urban centers of this region are Isfahan/Is.bāhān (1,124,
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Figure A.13: Southwestern Iran: Connections with Other Regions.
peaking around 460/1069 ce) and Sh̄ırāz (100); other urban centers are repre-
sented only marginally. Most urban centers peak after 250/865 ce and before
470/1078 ce.
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Figure A.14: Connections: Northwestern Iran.
A.6 Northwestern Iran
Connections of northwestern Iran are also firmly oriented toward Iraq (470); its
other strong connections are west/southwest bound—with Syria (186, plus 48
with Jordan) and Egypt (132), and east/southeast bound—with northeastern
Iran (168) and southwestern Iran (145).
Connections with Iraq begin to grow quite steadily around 100/719 ce and
reach their peak about 550/1156 ce, after which their connections go down
rather quickly. Connections with Syria begin around 220/836 ce, grow until
around 350/962 ce and then hold rather steady—with only minor fluctuations—
until the end of the main period. Connections with Egypt have their major
peak around 300/913 ce, a short interruption around 500/1107 ce, and their
minor peak around 620/1224 ce. Most connections with southwestern Iran
are roughly between 200/816 ce and 600/1204 ce, peaking quite noticeably
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around 400/1010 ce. Connections with northeastern Iran also peak around
400/1010 ce, but most connections with this region are between 300/913 ce
and 560/1166 ce.
Northwestern Iran shares most of its transregional migrants with Iraq (141)
and the distribution of migrations is very similar to that of transregional con-
nections between these two regions. Most of migrations between northwestern
Iran and Syria (41) occur after 400/1010 ce, peaking sharply around 500/
1107 ce and then growing again after 600/1204 ce. Most migrations to/
from northeastern Iran (41) fall onto the period of 300–600 ah/913–1204 ce,
peaking around 500/1107 ce. The most dense period of migrations to/from
southwestern Iran (41) is 300–550 ah/913–1156 ce.
Both transregional connections and transregional migrations between north-
western Iran and other regional clusters are sporadic.
Most prominent urban centers of this regions are al-Rayy (280, peaking
around 225/841 ce), Hamadhān (254, peaking around 495/1102 ce), Qazw̄ın
(118, peaking around 350/962 ce), and Astarabād (56, peaking around 335/
947 ce). All other urban centers are relatively minor (less than 30) and more
individuals from northwestern Iran are referred to by nisbas that associate
them with the provinces of the cluster, such as Gorgan/Jurjān (al-Jurjān̄ı,
181), T. abaristān (al-T. abar̄ı, 92), Gilan/J̄ılān (al-J̄ıl[ān]̄ı, 49),
7 and Deylem/
al-Daylam (al-Daylamı̄, 33).
7Most of these nisbas, however, are likely to describe the descendants of a famous
Baghdād̄ı S. ūf̄ı ↪Abd al-Qādir al-J̄ıl[ān]̄ı (d. 561/1166 ce): numbers of individuals with
this nisba begin to grow after 520/1127 ce and peak around 600/1204 ce. Something simi-
lar happens with nisba al-Suhraward̄ı—it also refers to a location in northwestern Iran and
a famous Baghdād̄ı S. ūf̄ı shaykh Abū H. afs. ↪Umar al-Suhraward̄ı (d. 632/1235 ce).
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Figure A.15: Northwestern Iran: Connections with Other Regions.
Most urban centers peak during 300–600 ah/913–1204 ce.
A.7 Andalusia and North Africa
Figure A.16 shows that Andalusia was rather strongly connected with the
North Africa (328 total: 190 with the Maghrib, and 138 with the North African
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Figure A.16: Connections: Andalusia.
Cluster), Egypt (259), Syria (154), Iraq (137), the Central Arabian Cluster
(135), Iran (total 115: 44 with southwestern Iran, 38 with northwestern Iran,
33 with northeastern Iran), the Jaz̄ıra (27) and Jordan (28).
Distributions of these connections—Figure A.17 (top)—tend to mirror that
of Andalusia itself (see, Figure 2.5): the two-peaked curve with high points
around 250/865 ce and 600/1204 ce and the low point between 450–500 ah/
1059–1107 ce. Strong, uninterrupted Andalusian connections with Egypt be-
gin around 200–240 ah/816–855 ce and continue until the end of the main
period, with the highest peak around 600/1204 ce. The pattern of connections
with Iraq and Central Arabia is rather similar. Andalusian connections with
the Maghrib begin to grow rapidly around 400/1010 ce and remain partic-
ularly strong during 540–640 ah/1146–1243 ce, reaching their highest point
around 600/1204 ce; during this period Andalusia is most strongly connected
270
Figure A.17: Andalusia: Connections with Other Regions.
with the Maghrib and the North African cluster.
Andalusia also seems to have remained relatively well connected with the
South Arabian cluster (62): even though the number of connections per 20
lunar year period is rather low—between two and five—they remain uninter-
rupted during 280–680 ah/894–1282 ce. In a rather similar manner Andalusia
is connected with southwestern Iran (44), although the period of uninterrupted
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connections is shorter, from 420/1030 ce until 640/1243 ce.
Connections with other clusters are rather sporadic and frequently inter-
rupted. After 600/1204 ce connections with all clusters decline, except for
Egypt, Syria, the Jaz̄ıra and Jordan—as was noted above, at this period these
regions seem to form one continuous macro-region.
A large volume of local connections—significantly larger than the volume
of connections with any other regional cluster—might be interpreted as a sign
of cultural self-sufficiency of the region, to which geographical isolation must
have contributed greatly.
A closer look at transregional migrants (241 total; Figure A.17 (bottom))
shows somewhat different patterns: the highest number of migrants (44) is
between Andalusia and the South Arabian cluster—almost uninterruptedly
between 280/894 ce and 660/1262 ce. The general direction must have been
toward Andalusia, particularly if we take into account that the number of
connections decline during 600–660 ah/1204–1262 ce, which corresponds with
the general decline of Andalusia. The number of transregional migrants during
this period grows only with Egypt beginning from 520/1127 ce (23 total), and
Syria beginning about 500/1107 ce (33 total)—in both cases from Andalusia.8
The North African cluster (32) and the Maghrib (22) also share a noticeable
number of transregional migrants: the former almost uninterruptedly during
300–640 ah/913–1243 ce, peaking around 500/1107 ce, and the latter mostly
during 480–640 ah/1088–1243 ce.
Iraq (22) and northwestern Iran (19) are also visible in this regard, although
8And most likely from Syria to Andalusia during 100–320 ah/719–933 ce.
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the periods are different: mostly 200–400 ah/816–1010 ce for the former and
500–620 ah/1107–1224 ce for the latter.
The peaks of urban centers—periods when the majority of individuals from
these urban centers flourish—split into two major periods (Figure 2.16). Dur-
ing the first period of roughly 300–400 ah/913–1010 ce which falls mostly on
the Spanish Umayyad caliphate (138–422 ah/756–1032 ce), the first group of
urban centers reaches a zenith: Córdova/Qurt.uba (633), Badajoz/Bat.alyaws
(24), Elvira/Ilb̄ıra (21), Pechina/Bajjāna (21), Ecija/Istija (12), Huesca/Washqa
(11).
A century of urban decline9 is followed by the second period of urban
growth: roughly 500–600 ah/1107–1204 ce. It falls on the second half of the
reign of the Almoravids (al-Murābit.ūn, 448–541 ah/1057–1147 ce) and the
reign of the Almohads (al-Muwah. h. idūn, 524–667 ah/1131–1269 ce) and here
we witness the most significant urban boom: Seville/Ishbiliyya (248), Valen-
cia/Balansiyya (141), Murcia/Mursiya (85), Granada/Gharnāt.a (82), Xàtiva/
Shāt.iba (71), Dénia/Dāniya (61), Zaragoza/Saraqust.a (44), Jaén/Jayyān (33),
Sidonia/Shadhūna (18), Tortosa/T. urt.ūsha (13), Niebla/Labla (11); peaking
at 610/1214 ce, Málaga/Mālaqa (55) may also be added to this list.10
The Maghrib is almost equally connected with Egypt (79), Andalusia (77)
and Syria (78); and to a lesser extent with Iraq (67), Iran (total 53: 23 with
9During the period of 400–500 ah/1010–1107 ce that was marked by the fall of the Span-
ish Umayyads, the reign of “the petty kings” (mulūk al-t.awā↩if, 11
th century ce) and then
the coming of the Almoravids (al-Murābit.ūn, 448–541 ah/1057–1147 ce), does not show
any significant urban peaking, with only two urban centers reaching their highest: Toledo/
T. ulayt.ila (89) around 430/1039 ce and Almeŕıa/al-Mariyya (91) around 490/1098 ce. The
peak of Toledo might very well belong to the end of first period, while that of Almeŕıa to
the beginning of the second one.
10The peak of Mallorca/Mayūrqa (16) also falls into this period.
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Figure A.18: Connections: The Maghrib.
southwestern Iran, 15 with northwestern Iran, 15 with northeastern Iran) and
the Central Arabian Cluster (32). Most of connections with all these regions
fall onto the period of 500–700 ah/1107–1301 ce, which is the peak period for
the Maghrib itself.
The Maghrib shares transregional migrants with the North African cluster
(22), Andalusia (22), Iraq (25), Syria (18), Egypt (17) and southwestern Iran
(12). In most cases migrations peak during the period of 500–700 ah/1107–
1301 ce, although the major peak for Iraq is around 200/816 ce, which is also
the minor peak for Syria and the North African cluster.
Major connections of the North African Cluster are with Egypt (85, the
primary peak is around 300/913 ce, and the secondary one—600/1204 ce),
Andalusia (61, peaking around 500/1107 ce) and the Maghrib (59); and to a
lesser extent with Syria (40, peaking after 600/1204 ce), Iraq (29), Central
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Figure A.19: Connections: The North African Cluster.
and South Arabia (22 and 10 respectively—peaking during 400–450 ah/1010–
1059 ce). Major migrant connections are roughly with the same regions, with
peaks during the same periods: with Egypt (43), Andalusia (32), Syria (40),
Iraq (11) and South Arabia (7).
North African urban centers are not numerous during this period: al-
Qayrawān (114, peaking around 320/933 ce), Ceuta/Sabta (63, peaking around
590/1195 ce), Fes/Fās (45, peaking around 580/1185 ce), Tlemcen/Tilimsān
(19), and Marrakesh/Marrākish (15). Individuals from these regions are more
often referred to by their regional nisbas: al-Maghrib̄ı (“Maghrebian”, 191),
al-Ifr̄ıq̄ı (“African,” 78) and al-S. iqill̄ı (“Sicilian,” 41)
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A.7.1 A Note on al-Dhahab̄ı’s Coverage of Andalusia
Data collected by Maŕıa Avila for her demographic study of Andalusia during
the period 360–460 ah/972–1069 ce offer a valuable opportunity to assess al-
Dhahab̄ı’s representation of this important region. In her research Avila relied
mostly on four major Andalusian biographical collections:11 Ta↩r̄ıkh ↪ulamā↩
al-Andalus of Ibn al-Farad. ı̄ (d. 403/1013 ce), al-S. ila of Ibn Bashkuwāl (d.
578/1183 ce), Tart̄ıb al-madārik of qād. ı̄ ↪Iyād. al-Yah. sūb̄ı (d. 544/1150 ce),
and al-Takmila li-kitāb al-s. ila of Ibn al-Abbār (d. 595/1199 ce). al-Dhahab̄ı
used three of these four collections as his sources—only the Tart̄ıb al-madārik
is not found in his list.12
Avila’s data appear to be the most exhaustive biographical dataset on
Andalusia now available, and comparison of her data with a similar subset
from al-Dhahab̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām should give us a clue as to how thorough
al-Dhahab̄ı was in compiling his magnum opus. Figure A.20 shows two his-
tograms and density curves for both subsets.
The absolute numbers are quite different: al-Dhahab̄ı has 519 biogra-
phies for this period, while Avila was able to collect 1,132—which makes al-
Dhahab̄ı’s data about 45.8% of perhaps all available biographical records on
Andalusian scholars. The curves13 of both datasets, on the other hand, are
quite similar. This shows that whatever criteria al-Dhahab̄ı used for putting
together his collection, his representation of Andalusia as a region is rather
11Maŕıa Luisa Avila, La sociedad hispanomusulmana al final del califato: (aproxi-
mación a un estudio demográfico) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Ivestigaciones Ciet́ıficas:
Instituto de Filoloǵıa, Departamento de Estudios Arabes, 1985), 25-26.
12TI, 1, 11–17.
13On the importance of curves see Section 1.2.4 above.
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Figure A.20: Representation of Andalusia: al-Dhahab̄ı Vs. Avila. The histograms show
numbers of biographies of Andalusian scholars: the left histogram shows data from al-
Dhahab̄ı’s Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (based on toponymic nisbas: 519 biographees), while the right
one displays data collected by Maria Luisa Avila from four major biographical collections
on Andalusia (1,132 biographees). Had al-Dhahab̄ı written his book in 100 volumes—the
possibility that he himself mentioned—his coverage of Andalusia could have looked as shown
in the middle (projection).
fair, and while the ratio of biographies per each decade varies slightly, his curve
does not contradict the exclusively Andalusian one.
The graph in the middle shows how al-Dhahab̄ı’s coverage of Andalusia
might have looked had he chosen to write his book in more than 100 volumes—
the possibility he himself mentioned.14,15
A.8 Syria
Transregional connections of Syria (Figure A.21) are primarily with Iraq (399),
Egypt (366), Iran (374 total: 127 with northeastern Iran, 113 with southwest-
ern Iran, and 79 with northwestern Iran), Arabia (248 total: 131 with the
14TI, 1, 12.
15The projection is crude: the numbers of biographies for each decade are simply doubled.
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Figure A.21: Connections: Syria.
center and 117 with the south) and Jordan (170). The volume of connections
with more distant clusters is lower: Andalusia (46), the North African cluster
(41), the Maghrib (34), and the Central Asian cluster (44).
The peaks of connections with most regional clusters mirror the Syrian
curve that peaks twice: first at the end of the Umayyad period, around 140/
758 ce, and second—somewhere after 700/1301 ce, during the Mamlūk period.
The peaks of connections with most regions are after 500/1107 ce, varying
slightly from cluster to cluster. Syrian connections with Arabia, both central
and south, and Iraq also have minor peaks—around 100/719 ce with Arabia,
and around 200/816 ce with Iraq. Local Syrian connections, however, are
most dense, particularly after 500/1107 ce (801 total).16
16There are 576 Syrian connections to which connections with Jordan (170) and the
Anatolian Cluster (55) can be added as well, which brings the overall number of local
connections to 801.
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Figure A.22: Syria: Connections with Other Regions.
Syria shares most of its transregional migrants with Iran (164 total: 81
with northeastern Iran, 42 with southwestern Iran, and 41 with northwestern
Iran), Iraq (112), Jordan (88), Egypt (78), South Arabia (54) and the Jaz̄ıra
(51). The absolute majority of transregional migrations take place after 600/
1204 ce. However, migrant connections with the South Arabian cluster peak
around 100/719 ce and practically come to an end around 250/865 ce. Migra-
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tions between Iraq and Syria peak twice: first around 220/836 ce, and then,
around 620/1224 ce. Migrations between Syria and northeastern Iran reach
their highest point around 500/1107 ce.
Some of the Syrian urban centers peak during the early period—between
100/719 ce and 300/913 ce: Homs/H. ims. (268, peaking 130/749 ce), Darāyā
(38, peaking 160/778 ce), H. awrān (28, peaking 245/860 ce). Some urban
centers of neighboring Jordan and the Anatolian cluster (al-↪Awās.im) reach
their peak during 201–300 ah/817–913 ce. In Jordan: al-Ramla (59) around
210/826 ce, and Tyre/S. ūr (38) around 270/884 ce. In al-↪Awās.im: Antioch/
Antākiyya (63) around 250/865 ce, Misis/al-Mas.s.̄ıs.a (56) around 215/831 ce,
and T. ars.ūs. (35) around 245/860 ce.
Most urban centers of Syria, however, peak in the 7th/13th century, and
together with the peaking urban centers of neighboring regions they form a
crescent-shaped cluster (See Section 2.2.4 below).
A.9 Egypt
Most of the Egyptian connections are with Syria (253, plus 96 with Jordan and
27 with the Anatolian cluster), Iraq (180), Iran (110 total: 49 with southwest-
ern Iran, 31 with northeastern Iran, and 30 with northwestern Iran), the South
Arabian cluster (98), the Central Arabian cluster (84), the North African clus-
ter (70), the Jaz̄ıra (50), Andalusia (42).
Early peaks of Egyptian connections are with the South Arabian Clus-
ter (around 200/816 ce), with the North African cluster (300/913 ce) and
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Figure A.23: Connections: Egypt.
northeastern Iran (also around 300/913 ce); the minor peak of connections
with Iraq also occurs around 300/913 ce. Connections with all other clusters
peak around 600/1204 ce: most strong connections are with Iraq, the Central
Arabian cluster, Jordan, the Jaz̄ıra, the South Arabian cluster, and, most no-
tably, with Syria—these connections begin rapid growth around 550/1156 ce
and peak sometime after 700/1301 ce.
Migration patterns differ, but with the exception of the South Arabian
cluster (75), most migrations are with the closest regions: Syria (82, plus 60
with Jordan), Iraq (78), Iran (51 total: 22 with northwestern Iran, 19 with
northeastern Iran, and 10 with southeastern Iran), the North African Cluster
(44), Andalusia (25) and the Jaz̄ıra (22). Until about 400/1010 ce the highest
numbers of migrants are with the Southern Arabian Cluster, followed by those
with Iraq. Around 600/1204 ce migrations peak between Egypt and Jordan,
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Figure A.24: Egypt: Connections with Other Regions.
Syria, Iraq and, to a much lesser extent, with Andalusia.
Major Egyptian urban centers during are Alexandria/al-Iskandariyya (211,
peaking around 625/1229 ce), Damietta/Dimyāt. (36, peaking around 625/
1229 ce as well), Tinn̄ıs (23, peaking around 290), and Sakhā (16, peaking
around 650/1253 ce). Cairo/al-Qāhira becomes only marginally noticeable
by the very end of the period covered in the Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (less than 10).
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Figure A.25: Connections: The Jaz̄ıra.
Among the well-represented geographical clusters in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām, Egypt is
the least urbanized region. The absolute majority of people from this region
are described with their regional nisba al-Mis.r̄ı (“Egyptian,” 1,563).
East African connections are as minor as the cluster itself. They are di-
rected toward Syria (15), Egypt (14), Central Arabia (9) and Iraq (9). The
first phase of connections fall onto the early period of 50/671 ce–130: all be-
tween Syria and Central Arabia. The second phase of connections is in the
late period, beginning around 470/1078 ce: first toward Iraq, then toward
Egypt and Syria. Transregional migrants are almost exclusively with Syria
and Egypt during the late period—Abyssinian slave-soldiers and eunuchs who
make their way into the administrative and military élites.
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A.10 The Jaz̄ıra
Connections of the Jaz̄ıra are split almost evenly between Syria (230)17 and
Iraq (216)—two important regions that the Jaz̄ıra brings together.18 Connec-
tions with these two regions remain uninterrupted through the entire period,
but most of them fall on the late period—when the curve of the Jaz̄ıra itself
begin to grow. During this earlier period connections are more dense with
Iraq and they to grow around 500/1107 ce, reaching their peak around 600/
1204 ce. Connections with Syria are weaker if compared to those with Iraq,
they begin to grow around 550/1156 ce and skyrocket around 600/1204 ce—
the peak lies after 700/1301 ce.
The Jaz̄ıra is also strongly connected with Egypt (127) and Iran in general
(82 total), but not with any specific Iranian cluster in particular. The patterns
of connections with Egypt and Jordan are similar to the Syrian connections,
although they are not as dense, but begin to grow slightly earlier—around 500/
1107 ce for Egypt and 450/1059 ce for Jordan. As to the Iranian clusters,
only connections with northwestern Iran seem to display some regularity—they
remain uninterrupted beginning 420/1030 ce and peak around 600/1204 ce.
Connections with other clusters are rather irregular and frequently interrupted.
Transregional migrants are distributed differently. Here the emphasis is
clearly toward Iraq (91) and then Syria (51). The number of migrants are
much lower for Egypt (19), northwestern Iran (14) and northeastern Iran (10).
17Although if the Jordanian connections (37) are added, the scale will be tipped in favor
of Syria.
18These regions are so close to each other that it was incredibly difficult to find where one
ends and another begins, particularly the boundary between Syria and the Jaz̄ıra.
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Figure A.26: The Jaz̄ıra: Connections with Other Regions.
Patterns of migrations are similar to those of transregional connections with
respective regional clusters.
The major urban centers of the Jaz̄ıra are H. arrān (224, peaking around
230/846 ce), al-Raqqa (99, peaking around 220/836 ce), and Nas.̄ıb̄ın (34,
peaking around 360/972 ce). Other urban centers of the Jaz̄ıra are minor
(below 30), but they mushroom after 600/1204 ce.
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Figure A.27: Connections: Jordan.
A.11 Jordan
Jordan (al-Urdunn & Filast.̄ın) is firmly oriented toward Syria. With Syria
Jordan also shares the highest number of transregional migrants, keeping in
mind, of course, that “transregional” is something of an exaggeration, since
together they constitute one region—Greater Syria/al-Shām. Other Jordanian
connections are directed toward Egypt (137) and Iraq (97)—with the former
it also shares a noticeable number of transregional migrants (60).
Jordan’s connections are almost equally divided between the Central Ara-
bian cluster (37), the Jaz̄ıra (33), southwestern Iran (35), northeastern Iran
(29), and northwestern Iran (21). Its orientation toward Iran in general is
more significant (total 85).
The most dense Jordanian connections are after 400/1010 ce. Connections
with Iraq and Egypt peak around 600/1204 ce and then begin to go down.
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Connections with with Syria continue growing through the end of the period.
Only transregional migrations to/from Syria and Egypt show some regularity,
mirroring the patterns of transregional connections.
The major urban centers of Jordan are Jerusalem/al-Quds (315, peaking
around 660/1262 ce), al-Ramla (59, peaking around 215/831 ce), Ashkelon/
↪Asqalān (59, peaking around 630/1233 ce), Nābulus (40, peaking around





What follows are the series of 21 mini-maps for each major regional cluster.
Each figure focuses on a particular cluster. Yellow cores visualize the number
of individuals strongly associated with a regional cluster through their nisbas,
i.e. they were either born or spent a significant amount of time there. Smaller
yellow cores visualize individuals with more than one toponymic nisba, thus
associating them with more than one region. Red “husks” show the number of
individuals who most likely visited a region—one or more locations belonging
to a cluster are mentioned in biographies. Arcs visualize connections between
regional clusters; depending on the number of individuals with connections
between two particular clusters, arcs vary in their properties: transparency,
thickness and color. Bleak thin arcs of green color stand for smaller numbers
of individuals with particular connections, while bright thick arcs of red color
stand for larger numbers of individuals with particular connections during
a given 50 lunar year period. Together, these properties allow making single
connections practically invisible, thus excluding irregularities that do not form
patterns.
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Figure B.1: Transregional Connections: Anatolian Cluster.
289
Figure B.2: Transregional Connections: Andalusia.
290
Figure B.3: Transregional Connections: Caucasian Cluster.
291
Figure B.4: Transregional Connections: Central Arabian Cluster.
292
Figure B.5: Transregional Connections: Central Asian Cluster.
293
Figure B.6: Transregional Connections: East African Cluster.
294
Figure B.7: Transregional Connections: Egyptian Cluster.
295
Figure B.8: Transregional Connections: Iraq.
296
Figure B.9: Transregional Connections: Jazira.
297
Figure B.10: Transregional Connections: Jordan.
298
Figure B.11: Transregional Connections: Maghrib.
299
Figure B.12: Transregional Connections: NE Iran.
300
Figure B.13: Transregional Connections: North African Cluster.
301
Figure B.14: Transregional Connections: NW Iran.
302
Figure B.15: Transregional Connections: South Arabian Cluster.
303
Figure B.16: Transregional Connections: South Eastern Cluster.
304
Figure B.17: Transregional Connections: SW Iran.
305
Figure B.18: Transregional Connections: Syria.
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Appendix C
Nisbas from Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām
(100 up)
307
Figure C.1: Top Nisbas: BAGHDADI (BW: bgdAdy); SHAYKH (BW: Eyx); FAQIH
(BW: fqyh); BASRI (BW: bSry).
308
Figure C.2: Top Nisbas: DIMASHQI (BW: dmEqy); MISRI (BW: mSry); QADI (BW:
qADy); KUFI (BW: kwfy).
309
Figure C.3: Top Nisbas: MAWLA (BW: mwly); IMAM (BW: AmAm); ISBAHANI (BW:
ASbhAny); HAFIZ (BW: HAfZ).
310
Figure C.6: Top Nisbas: QURTUBI (BW: qrTby); QURASHI (BW: qrEy); ANDALUSI
(BW: Andlsy); KATIB (BW: kAtb).
311
Figure C.7: Top Nisbas: SHA‘IR (BW: EACr); MUHADDITH (BW: mHdv); HANAFI
(BW: Hnfy); ADIB (BW: Adyb).
312
Figure C.8: Top Nisbas: KHATIB (BW: xTyb); TAMIMI (BW: tmymy); HANBALI
(BW: Hnbly); THIQA (BW: vqo).
313
Figure C.9: Top Nisbas: MALIKI (BW: mAlky); HASHIMI (BW: hAEmy); WASITI
(BW: wAsTy); HARAWI (BW: hrwy).
314
Figure C.10: Top Nisbas: AZDI (BW: Azdy); MARWAZI (BW: mrwzy); NAHWI (BW:
nHwy); ‘ALIM (BW: CAlm).
315
Figure C.11: Top Nisbas: WA‘IZ (BW: wACZ); RA’IS (BW: rcys); BUKHARI (BW:
bxAry); BAZZAZ (BW: bzAz).
316
Figure C.4: Top Nisbas: NAYSABURI (BW: nysAbwry); SHAFI‘I (BW: EAfCy); SALIH
(BW: SAlH); ZAHID (BW: zAhd).
317
Figure C.12: Top Nisbas: MAQDISI (BW: mqdsy); SULAMI (BW: slmy); MAWSILI
(BW: mwSly); UMAWI (BW: Amwy).
318
Figure C.13: Top Nisbas: DARIR (BW: Dryr); ‘ALLAMA (BW: ClAmo); TAJIR (BW:
tAjr); SULTAN (BW: slTAn).
319
Figure C.14: Top Nisbas: ‘ABID (BW: CAbd); ASDI (BW: Asdy); RAZI (BW: rAzy);
MAKKI (BW: mky).
320
Figure C.15: Top Nisbas: WAZIR (BW: wzyr); QUDAT (BW: qDAo); HAMADHANI
(BW: hmVAny); MU’ADDIB (BW: mcdb).
321
Figure C.16: Top Nisbas: ISHBILI (BW: AEbyly); HIMSI (BW: HmSy); HALABI (BW:
Hlby); THAQAFI (BW: vqfy).
322
Figure C.17: Top Nisbas: HAMDANI (BW: hmdAny); HARRANI (BW: HrAny);
‘ALAWI (BW: Clwy); ‘ABBASI (BW: CbAsy).
323
Figure C.18: Top Nisbas: ISKANDARANI (BW: AskndrAny); ‘ATTAR (BW: CTAr);
QAYSI (BW: qysy); SHARIF (BW: Eryf).
324
Figure C.19: Top Nisbas: SHAYBANI (BW: EybAny); LAKHMI (BW: lxmy); SALIHI
(BW: SAlHy); MAKHZUMI (BW: mxzwmy).
325
Figure C.20: Top Nisbas: TAYMI (BW: tymy); JURJANI (BW: jrjAny); ‘ARIF (BW:
CArf); WARRAQ (BW: wrAq).
326
Figure C.21: Top Nisbas: HARBI (BW: Hrby); M’ADHDHIN (BW: mcVn); BALKHI
(BW: blxy); AZAJI (BW: Azjy).
327
Figure C.22: Top Nisbas: FARISI (BW: fArsy); MUFTI (BW: mfty); KINDI (BW: kndy);
MUDARRIS (BW: mdrs).
328
Figure C.23: Top Nisbas: KHAYYAT (BW: xyAT); MAGHRIBI (BW: mgrby); BALANSI
(BW: blnsy); SADUQ (BW: Sdwq).
329
Figure C.24: Top Nisbas: QATTAN (BW: qTAn); MUSANNIF (BW: mSnf); ‘ABDI
(BW: Cbdy); HADRAMI (BW: HDrmy).
330
Figure C.25: Top Nisbas: HUSAYNI (BW: Hsyny); SA‘DI (BW: sCdy); USTADH (BW:
AstAV); TUJIBI (BW: tjyby).
331
Figure C.26: Top Nisbas: KHUZA‘I (BW: xzACy); HARIMI (BW: Hrymy); TUSI (BW:
Twsy); ZUHRI (BW: zhry).
332
Figure C.27: Top Nisbas: SHAMI (BW: EAmy); LUGHAWI (BW: lgwy); SAFFAR (BW:
SfAr); DABBI (BW: Dby).
333
Figure C.28: Top Nisbas: QAZWINI (BW: qzwyny); KHURASANI (BW: xrAsAny);
DAQQAQ (BW: dqAq); TABIB (BW: Tbyb).
334
Figure C.29: Top Nisbas: BAJALI (BW: bjly); ‘ADWI (BW: Cdwy); BAHILI (BW:
bAhly); JAWHARI (BW: jwhry).
335
Figure C.30: Top Nisbas: TA’I (BW: TAcy); HAMAWI (BW: Hmwy); KINANI (BW:
knAny); SAYRAFI (BW: Syrfy).
336
Figure C.31: Top Nisbas: SHIRAZI (BW: EyrAzy); MADINI (BW: mdyny); NABIL
(BW: nbyl); RAQQI (BW: rqy).
337
Figure C.5: Top Nisbas: ANSARI (BW: AnSAry); AMIR (BW: Amyr); MADANI (BW:
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Figure D.10: Nisbas of the Wu↪↪āz. (Iran and Central Asia) (269) in Ta↩r̄ıkh














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure D.13: Nisbas of the Wu↪↪āz. (North Africa and Andalusia) (35) in
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Figure E.10: Nisbas of the Khut.abā↩ (Iran and Central Asia) (111) in Ta↩r̄ıkh
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Figure E.12: Nisbas of the Khut.abā↩ (Syria and Egypt) (165) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-




























































































































































































































Figure E.13: Nisbas of the Khut.abā↩ (North Africa and Andalusia) (185) in
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (20–670 ah/642–1272 ce).
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Figure H.3: Non-Toponymic Nisbas of the Mudhakkirūn (54) in Ta↩r̄ıkh al-
islām (20–670 ah/642–1272 ce).
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Preachers in Legal Collections
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type source bios khat.ı̄b wā↪iz. ratio
h. anaf̄ı JM 3,056 47 1.54% 37 1.21% 1.27
h. anaf̄ı TT 358 6 1.68% 4 1.12% 1.50
h. anaf̄ı TS 894 24 2.68% 12 1.34% 2.00
mālik̄ı DM 631 34 5.39% 6 0.95% 5.67
mālik̄ı TM 975 25 2.56% 13 1.33% 1.92
shāfi ↪̄ı TFSh 277 4 1.44% 17 6.14% 0.24
shāfi ↪̄ı TShK 1,420 62 4.37% 92 6.48% 0.67
shāfi ↪̄ı TSh 748 75 10.03% 34 4.55% 2.21
h. anbal̄ı TH 707 1 0.14% 9 1.27% 0.11
h. anbal̄ı DhTH 547 27 4.94% 63 11.52% 0.43
Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām (c. 250–670 ah/864–1272 ce)
H. anaf̄ıs TI 481 7 1.46% 23 4.78% 0.30
Mālik̄ıs TI 400 15 3.75% 4 1.00% 3.75
Shāfi ↪̄ıs TI 973 47 4.83% 33 3.39% 1.42
H. anbal̄ıs TI 427 18 4.22% 31 7.26% 0.58
Figure M.1: The Khut.abā↩ and the Wu↪↪āz. in the Legal Biographical col-
lections. Sources : JM—al-Jawāhir al-mud. ı̄ya f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya of Ibn
Ab̄ı-l-Wafā↩ (d. 775/1374 ce); TT—Tāj al-tarājim f̄ı t.abaqāt al-h. anaf̄ıya
of Ibn Qutlūbughā (d. 879/1475 ce); TS—al-T. abaqāt al-san̄ıya f̄ı tarājim
al-h. anaf̄ıya of al-Tamı̄mı̄ al-Dār̄ı (d. 1010/1602 ce); DM—al-Dibāj al-
mudhahhab f̄ı ma↪rifat a↪yān ↪ulamā↩ al-madhhab of Ibn Farh. ūn (d. 799/
1397 ce); TM—Tart̄ıb al-madārik wa-taqr̄ıb al-masālik li-ma↪rifat a↪lām mad-
hhab Mālik of al-Yah. sūb̄ı (d. 544/1150 ce); TFSh—T. abaqāt al-fuqahā↩ al-
shāfi ↪̄ıya of al-Shahrazūr̄ı (d. 676/1278 ce); TShK—T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya al-
kubrá of al-Subk̄ı (d. 771/1370 ce); TSh—T. abaqāt al-shāfi ↪̄ıya of Ibn Qād. ı̄
Shuhba (d. 851/1448 ce); TH—T. abaqāt al-h. anābila of Ibn Ab̄ı Ya↪lá (d.
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Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients (Berlin: Kai-Henning Gerlach, 2005b).
Agha, Saleh Said, ‘The Arab Population in Hurāsān during the Umayyad
Period’, Arabica, 46:2 (April 1999), 211–229.
al-Dhahab̄ı, Ta↩r̄ıkh al-islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāh̄ır wa-al-a↪lām, edited by
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a↪lām madhhab Mālik (Bayrūt: Dār al-kutub al-↪ilmiyya, 1998).
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and
spread of nationalism (London; New York: Verso, 1991).
Anderson, G. L., ‘The McBee Keysort System for Mechanically Sorting
Folklore Data’, The Journal of American Folklore, 66:262 (October
1953), 340–343.
Antoun, Richard T., Muslim preacher in the modern world: a Jordanian case
study in comparative perspective (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1989).
Arnold, Thomas W., The preaching of Islam: a history of the propagation of
the Muslim faith (Westminster: A. Constable and co., 1896).
370
Athamina, Khalil, ‘Al-Qasas: Its Emergence, Religious Origin and Its
Socio-Political Impact on Early Muslim Society’, Studia Islamica, 76:76
(1992), 53–74.
Auchterlonie, Paul, Arabic biographical dictionaries: a summary guide and
bibliography (Durham [Durham]: Middle East Libraries Committee,
1987).
Avila, Maŕıa Luisa, La sociedad hispanomusulmana al final del califato:
(aproximación a un estudio demográfico) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
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Ibn al-↪Imād, Shadharāt al-dhahab f̄ı akhbār man dhahab, Dhakhā↩ir
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Islamisants ... Leuven ... 1996. Ed. U.Vermeulen & J.M.F.Van Reeth,
volume 86 (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 97–107.
Noth, Albrecht and Conrad, Lawrence I., The early Arabic historical
tradition: a source-critical study (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1994).
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